



St Michael College
Boston

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

Nil Obstat.

FR. INNOCENTIUS APAP, O.P., S.T.M.
CENSOR THEOL.

Imprimatur.

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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART.

QQ. CI.—CXL

QUESTION CI.

OF PIETY.

(*In Four Articles.*)

AFTER religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of inquiry arise with regard to piety: (1) To whom does piety extend? (2) What does piety make one offer a person? (3) Whether piety is a special virtue? (4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PIETY EXTENDS TO PARTICULAR HUMAN INDIVIDUALS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that piety does not extend to particular human individuals. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x.) that piety denotes, properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by the term *εὐσέβεια*. But the worship of God does not denote relation to man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain human individuals.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Moral. i.*): *Piety, on her day, provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy.* Now the works of mercy are

to be done to all, according to Augustine (*De Doctr. Christ.* i.). Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain special persons.

Obj. 3. Further, In human affairs there are many other mutual relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* viii. 11, 12), and on each of them is founded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a gloss on 2 Tim. iii. 5, *Having an appearance indeed of piety* (Douay,—*godliness*). Therefore piety extends not only to one's kindred and fellow-citizens.

On the contrary, Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that *it is by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country and render them faithful service.*

I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the various benefits received from them. On both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government. In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one's parents and one's country.

The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same parents, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* viii. 12). The worship given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to these.

Reply Obj. 1. The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the worship due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a particular. Hence it is written (Malach. i. 6): *If I be a father, where is My honour?* Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine worship.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x.), *the term piety is often used in connection with works of mercy,*

in the language of the common people ; the reason for which I consider to be the fact that God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word " pious " to God Himself.

Reply Obj. 3. The relations of a man with his kindred and fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being than other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to them.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PIETY PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR OUR PARENTS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that piety does not provide support for our parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, *Honour thy father and thy mother*, belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the giving of honour. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide support for one's parents.

Obj. 2. Further, A man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound to support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. xii. 14), *neither ought the children to lay up for the parents*. Therefore piety does not oblige them to support their parents.

Obj. 3. Further, Piety extends not only to one's parents, but also to other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above (A. 1.). But one is not bound to support all one's kindred and fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one's parents.

On the contrary, Our Lord (Matth. xv. 3-6) reproved the Pharisees for hindering children from supporting their parents.

I answer that, We owe something to our parents and fellow-citizens in two ways: essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially that which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's superior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to

him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that *piety gives both duty and homage*: *duty* referring to service, and *homage* to reverence or honour, because, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei.* x.), *we are said to give homage to those whose memory or presence we honour.*

Reply Obj. 1. According to Our Lord's interpretation (Matth. xv. 3-6), the honour due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them; and the reason for this is that support is given to one's father because it is due to him as to one greater.

Reply Obj. 2. Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on his father is accidental, arising from some momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the successors of their children, but children of their parents.

Reply Obj. 3. As Tully says (*loc. cit.*), *we owe homage and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country*; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to others according to our means and their personal claims.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER PIETY IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE DISTINCT FROM
OTHER VIRTUES ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue from charity.

Obj. 2. Further, It is proper to religion to give worship to God. But piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* x.). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion.

Obj. 3. Further, Piety, whereby we give our country worship and duty, seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common good. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v. 1, 2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) as a part of justice.

I answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an object under a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect of something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing is indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural principle of being and government. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and to those who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety is a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and country.

Reply Obj. 2. God is the principle of our being and government in a far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety, which pays homage to our parents and country. But things relating to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of excellence and causality, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* i.): wherefore, by way of excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God, by way of excellence, is called *Our Father*.

Reply Obj. 3. Piety extends to our country in so far as the latter is for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the good of our country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal justice has more of the character of a general virtue than piety has.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DUTIES OF PIETY TOWARDS ONE'S PARENTS SHOULD BE OMITTED FOR THE SAKE OF RELIGION ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Luke xiv. 26): *If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple.* Hence it is said in praise of James and John (Matth. iv. 22) that they left *their nets and father, and followed Christ.* Again it is said in praise of the Levites (Deut. xxxiii. 9): *Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do not know you; and to his brethren: I know you not; and their own children they have not known. These have kept Thy word.* Now a man who knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even hates them, must needs omit the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Luke ix. 59, 60) that in answer to him who said: *Suffer me first to go and bury my father,* Our Lord replied: *Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the kingdom of God.* Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety to bury one's father. Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion.

Obj. 3. Further, God is called *Our Father* by excellence. Now just as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety, so do we worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of the worship of religion.

Obj. 4. Further, Religious are bound by a vow which they may not break to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents, both on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on the

score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister without the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion.

On the contrary, Our Lord reprov'd the Pharisees (Matth. xv. 3-6) who taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying one's parents the honour we owe them.

I answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his book on the Categories (Cap. *De Oppos.*), *good is not opposed to good.* Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually hinder one another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of the other. Now, as stated above (I.-II., Q. VII., A. 2: Q. XVIII., A. 3), the act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and if it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue, but of vice. Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's parents according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that man should tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on Luke xii. 52, *the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of kindred.*

Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (*Ep. ad Heliod.*): *Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter.* Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God. If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we are not withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion.

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory expounding this saying of Our Lord says (*Hom. xxxvii. in Ev.*) that *when we find our parents to*

be a hindrance in our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them. For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their kindred, because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not the idolaters (Exod. xxxii.). James and John are praised for leaving their parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another means of livelihood, if they followed Christ.

Reply Obj. 2. Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father because, according to Chrysostom (*Hom. xxviii. in Matth.*), *Our Lord by so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries and other things that one anticipates under these circumstances.* For after the burial the will had to be read, the estate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly, because there were others who could see to the funeral. Or, according to Cyril's commentary on Luke ix., *this disciple's request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that he might support a yet living father in the latter's old age, until at length he should bury him.* This is what Our Lord did not grant, because there were others, bound by the duties of kindred, to take care of him.

Reply Obj. 3. Whatever we give our parents out of piety is referred by us to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform with regard to any of our neighbours are offered to God, according to Matth. xxv. 40: *As long as you did it to one of . . . My least . . . you did it to Me.* Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of our assistance, so that they have no other means of support, provided they incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for the sake of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves to their service without sin, or if they can be supported without our assistance, it is lawful to forgo their service, so as to give more time to religion.

Reply Obj. 4. We must speak differently of one who is yet in the world, and of one who has made his profession in

religion. For he that is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support without him, he must not leave them and enter religion, because he would be breaking the commandment prescribing the honouring of parents. Some say, however, that even then he might abandon them, and leave them in God's care. But this, considered aright, would be to tempt God: since, while having human means at hand, he would be exposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God's assistance. On the other hand, if the parents can find means of livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter religion, because children are not bound to support their parents except in cases of necessity, as stated above. He that has already made his profession in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world: wherefore he ought not, under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once more with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound, saving his obedience to his superiors, and his religious state withal, to make pious efforts for his parents' support.

QUESTION CII.

OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS.

(In Three Articles.)

WE must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of which will manifest the contrary vices.

Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues? (2) What does observance offer? (3) Of its comparison with piety.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER OBSERVANCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE, DISTINCT FROM OTHER VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that observance is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their objects. But the object of observance is not distinct from the object of piety: for Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that *it is by observance that we pay worship and honour to those who excel in some kind of dignity.* But worship and honour are paid also by piety to our parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct virtue from piety.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as honour and worship are due to those that are in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay honour and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore observance, whereby we pay worship and honour to those who

excel in dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, We have many duties towards those who are in a position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law, according to Rom. xiii. 7, *Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due*, etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements of the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice. Therefore observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from other virtues.

On the contrary, Tully (*loc. cit.*) reckons observance along with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.

I answer that, As explained above (QQ. CI., AA. 1, 3: LXXX.), according to the various excellences of those persons to whom something is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of virtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are designated as *fathers*, on account of their being charged with like cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him (4 Kings v. 13): *Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing*, etc.

Therefore, just as, in a manner, beneath religion, whereby worship is given to God, we find piety, whereby we worship our parents, so under piety we find observance, whereby worship and honour are paid to persons in positions of dignity.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CI., A. 3, *ad* 2), religion goes by the name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety properly so called is distinct from religion: and in the

same way piety can be called observance by way of excellence, although observance properly speaking is distinct from piety.

Reply Obj. 2. By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself. Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship and honour to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and not to special justice, which is a principal virtue.

Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 6).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT BELONGS TO OBSERVANCE TO PAY WORSHIP
AND HONOUR TO THOSE WHO ARE IN POSITIONS OF
DIGNITY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay worship and honour to persons in positions of dignity. For according to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* x.), we are said to worship those persons whom we hold in honour, so that worship and honour would seem to be the same. Therefore

it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and honour to persons in positions of dignity.

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to justice that we pay what we owe: wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of justice. Now we do not owe worship and honour to all persons in positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us. Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and honour to all.

Obj. 3. Further, Not only do we owe honour to persons of dignity who are placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of remuneration, according to Rom. xiii. 7, *Render . . . to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour.* Moreover, we owe them reverence and subjection, according to Heb. xiii. 17, *Obey your prelates, and be subject to them.* Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as paying worship and honour.

On the contrary, Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet. ii.*) that *it is by observance that we pay worship and honour to those who excel in some kind of dignity.*

I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: thus a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every mover has a certain excellence and power over that which is moved. Wherefore, a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there is due to him honour, which is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by repaying him, according to one's faculty, for the benefits we receive from him.

Reply Obj. 1. Worship includes not only honour, but also whatever other suitable actions are connected with the relations between man and man.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. LXXX.), debt is twofold. One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honour and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honour to persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.

Reply Obj. 3. Honour is due to the excellence of persons in positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise of their government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repayment of their labour.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER OBSERVANCE IS A GREATER VIRTUE THAN PIETY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety. For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a father who is worshipped by piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance is a greater virtue than piety.

Obj. 2. Further, Persons in positions of dignity take care of the common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common good. Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in positions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays worship to one's kindred.

Obj. 3. Further, Honour and reverence are due to the virtuous in the first place after God. Now honour and reverence are paid to the virtuous by the virtue of obser-

vance, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3). Therefore observance takes the first place after religion.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Now, immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the first table, follows the precept of honouring our parents, which refers to piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the order of excellence.

I answer that, Something may be paid to persons in positions of dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when one serves them in the administration of the affairs of the state. This no longer belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays worship not only to one's father but also to one's fatherland. Secondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity refers specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this belongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety. Therefore in comparing observance with piety we must needs take into consideration the different relations in which other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the persons of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin to us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's substance than external government, the principle of which is seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety takes precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons more akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.

Reply Obj. 1. The prince is compared to the father as a universal to a particular power, as regards external government, but not as regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this way the father should be compared with the divine power from which all things derive their being.

Reply Obj. 2. In so far as persons in positions of dignity are related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to observance, but to piety, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. The rendering of honour or worship should

be proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered in himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore, though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of honour than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received from their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay worship and honour to their parents than to virtuous persons who are not of their kindred.

QUESTION CIII.

OF DULIA.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider (1) *dulia* whereby we pay honour and other things pertaining thereto to those who are in a higher position: (2) obedience, whereby we obey their commands.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether honour is a spiritual or a corporal thing? (2) Whether honour is due to those only who are in a higher position? (3) Whether *dulia*, which pays honour and worship to those who are above us, is a special virtue, distinct from *latria*? (4) Whether it contains several species?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER HONOUR DENOTES SOMETHING CORPORAL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that honour does not denote something corporal. For honour is showing reverence in acknowledgement of virtue, as may be gathered from the Philosopher (*Ethic.* i. 5). Now showing reverence is something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 2, *ad 1*). Therefore honour is something spiritual.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 3), *honour is the reward of virtue.* Now, since virtue consists chiefly of spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the reward is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honour does not consist of corporal things.

Obj. 3. Further, Honour is distinct from praise, as also

from glory. Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honour consists of things internal and spiritual.

On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. v. 3, *Honour widows that are widows indeed*, and (verse 17), *let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honour etc.*, says (*Ep. ad Ageruch.*): *Honour here stands either for almsgiving or for remuneration*. Now both of these pertain to spiritual things. Therefore honour consists of corporal things.

I answer that, Honour denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence. Therefore men who wish to be honoured seek a witnessing to their excellence, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* i. 5, viii. 8). Now witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is the searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices; wherefore honour, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere internal movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges either God's excellence or another man's excellence before God. But, as regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs, either by words, as when one proclaims another's excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds, for instance by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by external things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like. Accordingly honour consists of signs, external and corporal.

Reply Obj. 1. Reverence is not the same as honour: but on the one hand it is the primary motive for showing honour, in so far as one man honours another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other hand, it is the end of honour, in so far as a person is honoured in order that he may be held in reverence by others.

Reply Obj. 2. According to the Philosopher (*ibid.*), honour is not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and corporal things can be greater than honour, since these corporal things themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgement of excelling virtue. It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be made known, according to Matth. v. 15, *Neither do men light a*

candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it may shine to all that are in the house. In this sense honour is said to be the reward of virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. Praise is distinguished from honour in two ways. First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honour consists of any external signs, so that praise is included in honour. Secondly, because by paying honour to a person we bear witness to a person's excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise one that works well for an end. On the other hand, honour is given even to the best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. i. 5*).

Glory is the effect of honour and praise, since the result of our bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes clear to the knowledge of many. The word *glory* signifies this, for *glory* is the same as *κληρία*, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rom. xvi. 27 observes that *glory is clear knowledge together with praise.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER HONOUR IS PROPERLY DUE TO THOSE WHO ARE ABOVE US ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that honour is not properly due to those who are above us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to Matth. xi. 11, *He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist.* Yet an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honour him (Apoc. xxii. 10). Therefore honour is not due to those who are above us.

Obj. 2. Further, Honour is due to a person in acknowledgement of his virtue, as stated above (A. 1: Q. LXIII., A. 3). But sometimes those who are above us are not virtuous. Therefore honour is not due to them, as neither is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the order of nature.

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (Rom. xii. 10): *With honour preventing one another*, and we read (1 Pet. ii. 17): *Honour all men*. But this would not be so if honour were due to those alone who are above us. Therefore honour is not due properly to those who are above us.

Obj. 4. Further, It is written (Tob. i. 16) that Tobias had ten talents of silver of that with which he had been honoured by the king: and we read (Esther vi. 11) that Assuerus honoured Mardocheus, and ordered it to be proclaimed in his presence: *This honour is he worthy of whom the king hath a mind to honour*. Therefore honour is paid to those also who are beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honour is not due properly to those who are above us.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i. 12) that *honour is due to the best*.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), honour is nothing but an acknowledgement of a person's excelling goodness. Now a person's excellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honour him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in itself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honour is always due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority. For the person honoured has no need to be more excellent than those who honour him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent than some others, or again he may be more excellent than those who honour him in some respect and not simply.

Reply Obj. 1. The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind of honour, but the honour of adoration and latria, which is due to God. Or again, he forbade him to pay the honour of dulia, in order to indicate the dignity of John himself, for which Christ equalled him to the angels according to the hope of glory of the children of God: wherefore he refused to be honoured by him as though he were superior to him.

Reply Obj. 2. A wicked superior is honoured for the excellence, not of his virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister, and because the honour paid to him is paid to the whole community over which he presides. As for

the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and should be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honour.

Reply Obj. 3. In every man is to be found something that makes it possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Philip. ii. 3, *In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves*, and thus, too, we should all be on the alert to do honour to one another.

Reply Obj. 4. Private individuals are sometimes honoured by kings, not that they are above them in the order of dignity but on account of some excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and Mardocheus were honoured by kings.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER DULIA IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE DISTINCT FROM
LATRIA ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct from latria. For a gloss on Ps. vii. 1, *O Lord my God, in Thee have I put my trust*, says: *Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due ; God by creation, to Whom we owe latria.* Now the virtue directed to God as Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as God. Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (*Ethic. viii. 8*), *to be loved is like being honoured.* Now the charity with which we love God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbour. Therefore dulia whereby we honour our neighbour is not a distinct virtue from latria with which we honour God.

Obj. 3. Further, The movement whereby one is moved towards an image is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the thing represented by the image. Now by dulia we honour a man as being made to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (*Wis. ii. 22, 23*) that *they esteemed not the honour of holy souls, for God created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him.* Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God is honoured.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x.) that the homage due to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey their masters, and which in Greek is called *dulia*, is distinct from *latria*, which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God.

I answer that, According to what has been stated above (Q. CI., A. 3), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly, which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore *dulia*, which pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from *latria*, which pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a species of observance, because by observance we honour all those who excel in dignity, while *dulia* properly speaking is the reverence of servants for their master, *dulia* being the Greek for servitude.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so again *latria* is called *dulia* by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power to create by reason of which *latria* is due to God: and so this gloss drew a distinction, by ascribing *latria* to God in respect of creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but *dulia* in respect of lordship, which is communicated to a creature.

Reply Obj. 2. The reason why we love our neighbour is God, since that which we love in our neighbour through charity is God alone. Wherefore the charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we love our neighbour. Yet there are other friendships distinct from charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In like manner, since there is one reason for serving

God and another for serving man, and for honouring the one or the other, latria and dulia are not the same virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. Movement towards an image as such is referred to the thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to the thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honour or subjection of dulia regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God actually.

Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need not be towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the image of God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His image.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER DULIA HAS VARIOUS SPECIES ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we show honour to our neighbour. Now different neighbours are honoured under different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic. ix. 2*). Since this difference of aspect in the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is divided into specifically different virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, The mean differs specifically from the extremes, as pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a mean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as in the rational creature we find

the image of God, for which reason it is honoured, so too in the irrational creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we must distinguish a corresponding difference of *dulia*: and all the more since honour is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for instance, to the wood of the Holy Cross.

On the contrary, *Dulia* is condivided with *latria*. But *latria* is not divided into different species. Neither therefore is *dulia*.

I answer that, *Dulia* may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance, and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for *dulia* signifies servitude, as stated above (A. 3). Taken in this sense it is not divided into different species, but is one of the species of observance, mentioned by Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.), for the reason that a servant reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer under another, the disciple his master under another, and so on in similar cases.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes *dulia* in a wide sense.

Reply Obj. 2. *Hyperdulia* is the highest species of *dulia* taken in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a man by reason of his having an affinity to God.

Reply Obj. 3. Man owes neither subjection nor honour to an irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are naturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honour we pay to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king's robe receives the same honour as the king himself, according to Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* iv.).

QUESTION CIV.

OF OBEDIENCE.

(In Six Articles.)

WE must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether one man is bound to obey another? (2) Whether obedience is a special virtue? (3) Of its comparison with other virtues: (4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things? (5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things? (6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE MAN IS BOUND TO OBEY ANOTHER?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has so ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to *Ecclus. xv. 14, God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.* Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.

Obj. 2. Further, If one man were bound to obey another, he would have to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his rule of conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule of human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.

Obj. 3. Further, The more gratuitous the service the more is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous. Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less acceptable through being done

out of obedience. Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.

On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb. xiii. 17): *Obey your prelates and be subject to them.*

I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In natural things it behoved the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors.

Reply Obj. 1. God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because, unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying his superiors. For Gregory says (*Moral. xxxv.*), *When we humbly give way to another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts.*

Reply Obj. 2. The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will of this other man who obeys him.

Reply Obj. 3. A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will. Wherefore

although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially before God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward will.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER OBEDIENCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general sin, because Ambrose says (*De Parad.* viii.) that *sin is to disobey the divine law*. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Every special virtue is either theological or moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxv.) that *obedience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own*. But every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, Virtues differ in species according to their objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue, comprising many special virtues.

On the contrary, Obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, as stated above (Q. LXXX.).

I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to render a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely established order of things, as shown above (A. 1), and therefore

it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (*De Natura Boni* iii.).* Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or express, because the superior's will, however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his superior's will.

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing prevents the one same material object from admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good end, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord. Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XCVI., A. 3). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not evil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the intention of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue, and disobedience a general sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Obedience is not a theological virtue, for

* Cf. P. I Q. V., A. 5.

its direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to Tit. iii. 1, *Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a word*, etc.

It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in so far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (Q. XCII., A. 2). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the person who retains another's property, and deficiency in the person who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v. 4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning justice (Q. LVIII., A. 10).

Reply Obj. 3. Obedience, like every virtue, requires the will to be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience makes a man's will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will, and seems to comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own will. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but, considered in itself, is repugnant to his own will, as happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxv.) that *obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable matters*, because, to wit, one's own will seems to

tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that *it increases in disagreeable or difficult matters*, because there one's own will tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the judgement of God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is none the less praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less devotedly* to the fulfilment of the precept.

Reply Obj. 4. Reverence regards directly the person that excels: wherefore it admits of various species according to the various aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one species, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER OBEDIENCE IS THE GREATEST OF THE VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues. For it is written (I Kings xv. 22): *Obedience is better than sacrifices*. Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above (Q. LXXXI., A. 6). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Moral. xxxv.*) that *obedience is the only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when ingrafted*. Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore obedience is greater than all the virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Moral. xxxv.*) that *evil should never be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we should lay aside the good we are doing*. Now one does not lay aside a thing except for something

* Cf. Q. LXXXII., A. 2.

better. Therefore obedience, for whose sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other virtues.

On the contrary, Obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from charity: for Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxv.) that *obedience should be practised, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not through fear of punishment, but through love of justice.* Therefore charity is a greater virtue than obedience.

I answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemning God and adhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from his contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological, virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in order to adhere to God.

Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are three kinds of human goods that man may condemn for God's sake. The lowest of these are external goods, the goods of the body take the middle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will, man makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience, whereby we condemn our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which condemn other goods for the sake of God.

Hence Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxv.) that *obedience is rightly preferred to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain, whereas by obedience we slay our own will.* Wherefore even any other acts of virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of obedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to give all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to

obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from obedience. For it is written (1 John ii. 4, 5): *He who saith that he knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is perfected*: and this because friendship makes the same liking and disliking.

Reply Obj. 1. Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship and honour to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding the aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, *in a sacrifice we slay another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will*, as Gregory says (*loc. cit.*). As to the special case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the commandment of God.

Reply Obj. 2. All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue act causally or dispositively towards their generation and preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. And yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of virtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine authority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to God. Secondly, because infusion

of grace and virtues may precede, even in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.

Reply Obj. 3. There are two kinds of good. There is that to which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (*ibid.*), *he who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from starvation, through being deprived of every good.* Thus the loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and other goods.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD OUGHT TO BE OBEYED IN ALL THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For it is written (Matth. ix. 30, 31) that Our Lord after healing the two blind men commanded them, saying: *See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country.* Yet they are not blamed for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey God in all things.

Obj. 2. Further, No one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue. Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to virtue: thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen. xxii.); and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Exod. xi.), which things are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who was an adulteress (Osee iii.), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore God is not to be obeyed in all things.

Obj. 3. Further, Whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things to conform our will to the divine

will as to the thing willed, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XIX., A. 10). Therefore man is not bound to obey God in all things.

On the contrary, It is written (Exod. xxiv. 7): *All things that the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), he who obeys is moved by the command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by their motive causes. Now just as God is the first mover of all things that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown above (I.-II., Q. IX., A. 6). Therefore just as all natural things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity, so too all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the divine command.

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the miracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine precept, but, as Gregory says (*Moral. xix.*), *gave an example to His servants who follow Him, that they might wish to hide their virtue and yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that others might profit by their example.*

Reply Obj. 2. Even as God does nothing contrary to nature (since *the nature of a thing is what God does therein*, according to a gloss on Rom. xi.), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course of nature; so too God can command nothing contrary to virtue, since virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with God's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God is the author of life and death. Nor again was it contrary to justice that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians, because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take an adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of human generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the

persons aforesaid did not sin, neither by obeying God nor by willing to obey Him.

Reply Obj. 3. Though man is not always bound to will what God wills, yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes to man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man is bound to obey God's commands in all things.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SUBJECTS ARE BOUND TO OBEY THEIR
SUPERIORS IN ALL THINGS?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. For the Apostle says (Coloss. iii. 20): *Children, obey your parents in all things*, and farther on (verse 22): *Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh*. Therefore in like manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.

Obj. 2. Further, Superiors stand between God and their subjects, according to Deut. v. 5, *I was the mediator and stood between the Lord and you at that time, to show you His words*. Now there is no going from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands between. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. iv. 14): *You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus*, and (1 Thess. ii. 13): *When you had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it, not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God*. Therefore as man is bound to obey God in all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as religious in making their profession take vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things. Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts v. 29): *We ought to obey God rather than men*. Now, sometimes the things commanded

by a superior are against God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all things.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. I. 4), he who obeys is moved at the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity of justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance arising from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not burnt by fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is not subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humour is sometimes subject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as regards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there are two reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in all things. First on account of the command of a higher power. For as a gloss says on Rom. xiii. 2, *They that resist* (Vulg.,—*He that resisteth*) *the power, resist the ordinance of God* (cf. S. Augustine, *De Verb. Dom.* viii.). *If a commissioner issue an order, are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul? Again if the proconsul command one thing and the emperor another, will you hesitate to disregard the former and serve the latter? Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God another, you must disregard the former and obey God.* Secondly, a subject is not bound to obey his superior, if the latter command him to do something wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (*De Beneficiis* iii.): *It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man: for the better part of him is excepted. His body is subjected and assigned to his master, but his soul is his own.* Consequently in matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.

Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound

to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the household; and so forth.

Reply Obj. 1. When the Apostle says *in all things*, he refers to matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority.

Reply Obj. 2. Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a particular way, in respect of which the superior stands between God and his subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is immediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or by the written law.

Reply Obj. 3. Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors: wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for salvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be not contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case would be unlawful.

Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey: secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRISTIANS ARE BOUND TO OBEY THE SECULAR
POWER ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the secular power. For a gloss on Matth. xvii. 25, *Then the children are free*, says: *If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds sway over that kingdom are free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom.* Now Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of God, according to John i. 12: *He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in His name.* Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Rom. vii. 4): *You . . . are become dead to the law by the body of Christ*, and the law mentioned here is the divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are subject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law of the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become members of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection, whereby they were under the power of secular princes.

Obj. 3. Further, Men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress them with violence. Now, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* iv.): *Without justice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?* Since therefore the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with injustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that Christians ought not to obey secular princes.

On the contrary, It is written (Tit. iii. 1): *Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers*, and (1 Pet. ii. 13, 14): *Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him.*

I answer that, Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice, according to Rom. iii. 22, *The justice of God by*

faith of Jesus Christ : wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of justice, but strengthens it. Now the order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, else the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of obeying secular princes.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (A. 5), the subjection whereby one man is bound to another regards the body; not the soul, which retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the grace of Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as the Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. vii. 23) that in his mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin. Wherefore those that are made children of God by grace are free from the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes on 1 Tim. vi. 1, *Whosoever are servants under the yoke*, etc.

Reply Obj. 2. The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament, and therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the comparison with human law does not stand, because thereby one man is subject to another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man.

Reply Obj. 3. Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is required by the order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in order to avoid scandal or danger.

QUESTION CV.
OF DISOBEDIENCE.
(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a mortal sin? (2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER DISOBEDIENCE IS A MORTAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For every sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition given above (Q. CIV. A. 2, Obj. 1). Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin would be mortal.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxi.) that disobedience is born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore is disobedience.

Obj. 3. Further, A person is said to be disobedient when he does not fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them. Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Those who are *disobedient to parents* are reckoned (Rom. i. 30: 2 Tim. iii. 2) among other mortal sins.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12: I.-II., Q. LXXII., A. 5: Q. LXXXVIII., A. 1), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which is the cause of spiritual

life. Now by charity we love God and our neighbour. The charity of God requires that we obey His commandments, as stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12). Therefore to be disobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is contrary to the love of God.

Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior is a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to Rom. xiii. 2, *He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.* It is also contrary to the love of our neighbour, as it withdraws from the superior who is our neighbour the obedience that is his due.

Reply Obj. 1. The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it. Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially, but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept, not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is not a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to another species of sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Vainglory desires display of excellence. And since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject to another's command, it follows that disobedience arises from vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal.

Reply Obj. 3. No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin. Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude of precepts.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER DISOBEDIENCE IS THE MOST GRIEVOUS OF SINS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins. For it is written (1 Kings xv. 23): *It is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey.* But idolatry is the most grievous of sins, as stated above (Q. XCIV., A. 3). Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 2. Further, The sin against the Holy Ghost is one that removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above (Q. XIV., A. 2). Now disobedience makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything, prevents a man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (Rom. v. 19) that *by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners.* Now the cause is seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby.

On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person of the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is not the most grievous of sins.

I answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to disobey God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things commanded. For the person commanding does not equally

desire the fulfilment of all his commands: since every such person desires above all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more grievous, according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the intention of the person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that commandment, because since God's will is essentially directed to the good, the greater the good, the more does God wish it to be fulfilled. Consequently he that disobeys the commandment of the love of God sins more grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbour. On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to the greater good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a greater good, but through setting aside that which is more in the intention of the person commanding.

Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which there is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this because whoever sins against his neighbour acts also against God's commandment.—And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin is still more grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a man's precept is less grievous than the sin which contemns the man who made the precept, because reverence for the person commanding should give rise to reverence for his command. In like manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such as blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we mentally separate the disobedience from the sin) than would be a sin involving contempt of God's commandment alone.

Reply Obj. 1. This comparison of Samuel's is one, not of equality but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God, just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more.

Reply Obj. 2. Not every disobedience is a sin against the Holy Ghost, but only that to which obstinacy is added: for it is not the contempt of any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins.

Reply Obj. 3. The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was transmitted to all men, was not disobedience considered as a special sin, but pride, from which the man proceeded to disobey. Hence the Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to every sin.

QUESTION CVI
OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude. Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other virtues? (2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent? (3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favours? (4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred? (5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favour received or the disposition of the giver? (6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THANKFULNESS IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE,
DISTINCT FROM OTHER VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. For we have received the greatest benefits from God, and from our parents. Now the honour which we pay to God in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honour with which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. v. 4*). Now the purpose of giving thanks is repayment (*ibid.*). Therefore thanksgiving, which belongs to gratitude, is an

act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Acknowledgement of favour received is requisite for the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* viii. 13; ix. 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues, since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favours received, is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.).

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. LX., A. 3), the nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that excels in dignity, from whom general favours proceed; fourthly it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and private favours, on account of which we are under particular obligation to him.

Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from whom we have received some particular favour, it follows that after religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short thereof.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God was reckoned above (Q. LXXXIII., A. 17) among things pertaining to religion.

Reply Obj. 2. Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance

when it is contracted that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes (*De Beneficiis* iii.).

Reply Obj. 3. Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favours, although repayment of favours belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INNOCENT IS MORE BOUND TO GIVE
THANKS TO GOD THAN THE PENITENT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received from God, the more is one bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent.

Obj. 2. Further, A man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says (*Conf.* ii.): *What man, weighing his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn to Thee?* And farther on he says: *And for this let him love Thee as much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from the like torpor of sin preserved.* Therefore the innocent is also more bound to give thanks than the penitent.

Obj. 3. Further, The more a gratuitous favour is continuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the

favour of divine grace is more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine says (*ibid.*): *To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not have done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance I committed not.* Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks than the penitent.

On the contrary, It is written (Luke vii. 47): *To whom more is forgiven, he loveth more.** Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving.

I answer that, Thanksgiving (*gratiarum actio*) in the recipient corresponds to the favour (*gratia*) of the giver: so that when there is greater favour on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now a favour is something bestowed *gratis*: wherefore on the part of the giver the favour may be greater on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favour may be said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (*Ethic. iii.*) in treating of the voluntary and the involuntary.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

* Vulg.,—*To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN IS BOUND TO GIVE THANKS TO EVERY
BENEFACITOR ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a man is not bound to give thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm himself, according to Ecclus. xiv. 5, *He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good ?* But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.

Obj. 2. Further, Gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But some favours are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a benefactor.

Obj. 3. Further, No thanks are due to one who works for his own profit. But sometimes people bestow favours for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due to them.

Obj. 4. Further, No thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor.

Obj. 5. Further, No one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a favour he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favour may be a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man is not always bound to repayment for favours received.

Obj. 6. Further, No one is bound to do for another what is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that repayment of a favour would be hurtful or

useless to the person repaid. Therefore favours are not always to be repaid by gratitude.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. v. 18): *In all things give thanks.*

I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* i.) that *God turns all things to Himself, because He is the cause of all*: for the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that he who has received a favour should, by repaying the favour, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as stated above with regard to a father (Q. XXXI., A. 3: Q. CI., A. 2), a man owes his benefactor, as such, honour and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally he owes him assistance or support, if he need it.

Reply Obj. 1. In the words of Seneca (*De Benef.* v.), *just as a man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favour on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable.* Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (*Ethic.* v. 11), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as though they were various persons.

Reply Obj. 2. It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favour, not as he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the favour had been conferred duly, since in fact the favour is less, for, as Seneca remarks (*De Benef.* ii.) *promptness enhances, delay discounts a favour.*

Reply Obj. 3. As Seneca observes (*De Benef. vi.*), it matters much whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours, or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and benefits because he cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a man who seeks fodder for his cattle. And farther on: If he has done it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has been the loser thereby.

Reply Obj. 4. As Seneca observes (*De Benef. iii.*), when a slave does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service: when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favour: for as soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be his motive, it is no longer called service. Wherefore gratitude is due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty.

Reply Obj. 5. A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly on the heart. Hence Seneca says (*De Benef. ii.*): *Who receives a favour gratefully, has already begun to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favours received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but everywhere.* From this it is evident that however well off a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and honour. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic. viii. 14*): *He that abounds should be repaid with honour, he that is in want should be repaid with money:* and Seneca writes (*De Benef. vi.*): *There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant conversation without flattery.* Therefore there is no need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (*De Benef. vi.*), *it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no favour; how much*

more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor!

If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as heretofore. And yet, as far as it is possible without sin, the kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic. ix. 3*).

Reply Obj. 6. As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favour depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If, however, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes (*De Benef. vii.*): *It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back and safeguard my repayment.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN IS BOUND TO REPAY A FAVOUR AT ONCE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that a man is bound to repay a favour at once. For we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favours, and yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore a man is bound to repay a favour at once.

Obj. 2. Further, A good action would seem to be all the more praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay. Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favour at once.

Obj. 3. Further, Seneca says (*De Benef. ii.*) that *it is proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly.* Now repayment ought to equal the favour received. Therefore it should be done at once.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. iv.): He that hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of indebtedness.

I answer that, Just as in conferring a favour two things are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also must these things be considered in repaying the favour. As regards the affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says (De Benef. ii.): Do you wish to repay a favour? Receive it graciously. As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favour for favour, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv.), he that wishes to repay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful.

Reply Obj. 1. A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the rectitude of virtue demands.

Reply Obj. 2. Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall the proper time through earnestness.

Reply Obj. 3. Favours also should be conferred at a convenient time, and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and the same is to be observed in repaying favours.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN GIVING THANKS WE SHOULD LOOK AT THE
BENEFACTOR'S DISPOSITION OR AT THE EFFECT?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that in repaying favours we should not look at the benefactor's disposition but at the effect. For repayment is due to beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. Therefore in repaying favours we should look at the effect.

Obj. 2. Further, Thanksgiving, whereby we repay favours, is a part of justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking. Therefore also in repaying favours we should consider the effect rather than the disposition of the benefactor.

Obj. 3. Further, No one can consider what he does not know. Now God alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to repay a favour according to the benefactor's disposition.

On the contrary, Seneca says (*De Benef. i.*): *We are sometimes under a greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, and has bestowed a small favour, yet willingly.*

I answer that, The repayment of a favour may belong to three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according to the quantity received.

On the other hand, repayment of a favour belongs, though in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship we have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the usefulness accruing from the favour conferred, and in the friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in *Ethic. viii. 13*. And likewise, since gratitude regards the favour inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a favour depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect.

Reply Obj. 1. Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (*De Benef. i.*): *A kindly action consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or doer.*

Reply Obj. 2. Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as

a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of justice, as stated above (Q. LXXX.). Hence it does not follow that we shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues.

Reply Obj. 3. God alone sees man's disposition in itself: but in so far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus that a benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he does the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and readily.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE REPAYMENT OF GRATITUDE SHOULD SURPASS
THE FAVOUR RECEIVED ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is no need for the repayment of gratitude to surpass the favour received. For it is not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for instance, to one's parents, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* viii. 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favour does not tend to something yet greater.

Obj. 2. Further, If one person repays another more than he has received by his favour, by that very fact he gives him something in his turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favour which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first conferred a favour will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, since *the indefinite removes the nature of good* (*Metaph.* ii. text. 8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favour received.

Obj. 3. Further, Justice consists in equality. But *more* is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it seems that to repay more than the favour received is sinful and opposed to justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* v. 5): *We should repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious*

to them in return, and this is done by repaying more than we have received. Therefore gratitude should incline to do something greater.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 5), gratitude regards the favour received according to the intention of the benefactor; who seems to be deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favour gratis without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the favour received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (A. 3, *ad* 5, A. 5), in repaying favours we must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from his parents, namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* viii. 14). But if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as Seneca declares (*De Benef.* iii.). If, however, he were unable to do so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude.

Reply Obj. 2. The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. xiii. 8, *Owe no man anything, but to love one another.* Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit.

Reply Obj. 3. As in justice, which is a cardinal virtue, we consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.

QUESTION CVII.
OF INGRATITUDE.
(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin? (2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin? (3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin? (4) Whether favours should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER INGRATITUDE IS ALWAYS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For Seneca says (*De Benef.* iii.) that *he who does not repay a favour is ungrateful.* But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favour without sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin. Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that ingratitude is not always a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Every sin is in the power of the person who commits it: because, according to Augustine (*De Lib. Arb.* iii.: *Retract.* i.), *no man sins in what he cannot avoid.* Now sometimes it is not in the power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and yet Seneca declares (*De Benef.* iii.) that *to forget a kindness is the height of ingratitude.* Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, There would seem to be no repayment in

being unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. xiii. 8), *Owe no man anything. Yet an unwilling debtor is ungrateful*, as Seneca declares (*De Benef. iv.*). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.

On the contrary, Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim. iii. 2), where it is written: *Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked*, etc.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CVI., A. 4, *ad* 1, A. 6) a debt of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that every ingratitude is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Gratitude regards a favour received: and he that helps another to commit a sin does him not a favour but an injury: and so no thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good will, supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin, because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is contrary to gratitude.

Reply Obj. 2. No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above (Q. CVI., A. 6, *ad* 1).

Forgetfulness of a favour received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as Seneca observes (*De Benef. iii.*), *when forgetfulness of favours lays hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their repayment.*

Reply Obj. 3. The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for his benefactor.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER INGRATITUDE IS A SPECIAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection I. It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

Obj. 2. Further, No special sin is contained under different kinds of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin, for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed against a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Seneca writes (*De Benef.* iii.): *It is ungrateful to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but it is the height of ingratitude to forget it.* Now these do not seem to belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special sin.

I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus illiberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for instance if one were to show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner than it is due, as stated above (Q. CVI., A. 4). But still more opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency of gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above (Q. CVI., A. 6), inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now every deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing. Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also is ingratitude one special sin.

It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the favour received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks, and the third to repay the favour at a suitable place and time according to one's means. And since what is last in the order of generation is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favour, the second when he declines to notice and indicate that he has received a favour, while the third and supreme degree is when a man fails to recognize the reception of a favour, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover, since opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for good, to the second to find fault with a favour received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though it were unkindness.

Reply Obj. 1. In every sin there is material ingratitude to God, inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude. But formal ingratitude is when a favour is actually contemned, and this is a special sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special sin from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this way the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin.

Reply Obj. 3. These three are not different species but different degrees of one special sin.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER INGRATITUDE IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For one ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful to God by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of ingratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin.

Obj. 2. Further, A sin is mortal through being contrary

to charity, as stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12). But ingratitude is contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that virtue, as stated above (Q. CVI., A. 1, *ad* 3, A. 6, *ad* 2). Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Seneca says (*De Benef.* ii.): *Between the giver and the receiver of a favour there is this law, that the former should forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget having received.* Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should the latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin.

Obj. 4. *On the contrary,* No one should be put in the way of committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (*ibid.*), *sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he has received.* But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal sin.

I answer that, As appears from what we have said above (A. 2), a man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for instance by failing to recognize the favour received, or to express his appreciation of it, or to pay something in return, and this is not always a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q. CVI., A. 6), the debt of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, however, he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises either from some kind of negligence or from some disinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by reason either of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing withheld, this being needful to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case of necessity.

Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay the debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes a mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing that is done.

It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character.

Reply Obj. 1. By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful to God to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, in so far as it removes a virtuous act of obedience to God.

Reply Obj. 2. When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not contrary to, but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of charity, but excludes some act thereof.

Reply Obj. 3. Seneca also says (*De Benef. vii.*): *When we say that a man after conferring a favour should forget about it, it is a mistake to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing so very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it.*

Reply Obj. 4. He that is unaware of a favour conferred on him is not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do so if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object of a favour should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly, wishing to avoid popularity; and because the kindness is all the greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on whom he is conferring the favour.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER FAVOURS SHOULD BE WITHHELD FROM THE
UNGRATEFUL ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that favours should be withheld from the ungrateful. For it is written (*Wis. xvi. 29*): *The hope of the unthankful shall melt away as the winter's ice.* But this hope would not melt away unless favours were withheld from him. Therefore favours should be withheld from the ungrateful.

Obj. 2. Further, No one should afford another an occasion of committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favour is given an occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favours should not be bestowed on the ungrateful.

Obj. 3. Further, *By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented* (Wis. xi. 17). Now he that is ungrateful when he receives a favour sins against the favour. Therefore he should be deprived of the favour.

On the contrary, It is written (Luke vi. 35) that *the Highest . . . is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil.* Now we should prove ourselves His children by imitating Him (*ibid.* 36). Therefore we should not withhold favours from the ungrateful.

I answer that, There are two points to be considered with regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer, and thus it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favour. The second is, what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (*De Benef.* iii.), *a man is often grateful although he repays not,* because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he does not achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being so a second time. If, however, the more he repeats his favours, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing his favours upon him.

Reply Obj. 1. The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man deserves to suffer.

Reply Obj. 2. He that bestows a favour on an ungrateful person affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to be imputed to the bestower.

Reply Obj. 3. He that bestows a favour must not at once act the part of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly physician, by healing the ingratitude with repeated favours.

QUESTION CVIII.

OF VENGEANCE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether vengeance is lawful? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) Of the manner of taking vengeance: (4) On whom should vengeance be taken?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER VENGEANCE IS LAWFUL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps what is God's sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is written (Deut. xxxii. 35, and Rom. xii. 19): *Revenge to Me, and I will repay.* Therefore all vengeance is unlawful.

Obj. 2. Further, He that takes vengeance on a man does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant. ii. 2, *As the lily among the thorns,* says: *He is not a good man that cannot bear with a wicked one.* Therefore we should not take vengeance on the wicked.

Obj. 3. Further, Vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of fear, but of love, as Augustine states (*Contra Adamant.* xvii.). Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.

Obj. 4. Further, A man is said to avenge himself when he takes revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful even for a judge to punish those who have

wronged him: for Chrysostom* says: *Let us learn after Christ's example to bear our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's wrongs, not even by listening to them.* Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.

Obj. 5. Further, The sin of a multitude is more harmful than the sin of only one: for it is written (Ecclus. xxvi. 5-7): *Of three things my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the gathering together of the people, and a false calumny.* But vengeance should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Matth. xiii. 29, 30, *Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both to grow,* says that *a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor should the sovereign.* Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful.

On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save what is good and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His enemies: for it is written (Luke xviii. 7): *Will not God revenge His elect who cry to Him day and night?* as if to say: *He will indeed.* Therefore vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful.

I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance, and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom. xii. 21): *Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.*

If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of

* Cf. *Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v. in Matth.* falsely ascribed to S. Chrysostom.

the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honoured), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed.

Reply Obj. 1. He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God, but makes use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. xiii. 4) of the earthly prince that *he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.* If, however, a man takes vengeance outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and therefore sins.

Reply Obj. 2. The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but they do not bear with them so as to endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their neighbour. For Chrysostom* says: *It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook God's wrongs is most wicked.*

Reply Obj. 3. The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong to the Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.

Reply Obj. 4. Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to seize him (4 Kings i.); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (4 Kings ii.); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him into exile (XXIII., Q. iv., Cap. *Guilisarius*). But in so far as the wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i.*).

Reply Obj. 5. When the whole multitude sins, vengeance

* Cf. *Obj. 4* and footnote.

must be taken on them, either in respect of the whole multitude—thus the Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of Israel (Exod. xiv.), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed (Gen. xix.)—or as regards part of the multitude, as may be seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf.

Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord (Num. xxv.) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the multitude.

On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude should be spared and severity forgone. The same applies to the sovereign, whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude: unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to arise from his punishment.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER VENGEANCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so are the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a special virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, There is no need to appoint a special virtue for an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. Now man is sufficiently disposed by the

virtues of fortitude or zeal to avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, There is a special vice opposed to every special virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance. Therefore it is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (*De Inv. Rhet. ii.*) reckons it a part of justice.

I answer that, As the Philosopher states (*Ethic. ii. 1*), aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says (*loc. cit.*) that by *vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and in general whatever is obscure** (i.e. derogatory), *either by self-defence or by avenging it.* Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from the bestowal of a particular favour, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as it is concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.

Reply Obj. 2. Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the fervour of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far as a man avenges the

* *Obscurum.* Cicero wrote *obfuturum*: but the sense is the same as S. Thomas gives in the parenthesis.

wrong done to God and his neighbour, because charity makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue proceeds from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (*Hom. xxvii. in Ev.*), *there are no green leaves on the bough of good works, unless charity be the root.*

Reply Obj. 3. Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written (*Prov. xiii. 24*): *He that spareth the rod hateth his son.* But the virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with regard to all the circumstances.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER VENGEANCE SHOULD BE WROUGHT BY MEANS OF PUNISHMENTS CUSTOMARY AMONG MEN ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means of punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to uproot him. But Our Lord forbade (*Matth. xiii. 29*) the uprooting of the cockle, whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore sinners should not be put to death.

Obj. 2. Further, All who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death: and this is evidently false.

Obj. 3. Further, To punish a man publicly for his sin seems to publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion for sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not be inflicted for a sin.

On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the divine law as appears from what we have said above (*I.-II., Q. CV., A. 2*).

I answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive of virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing those things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning, else fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom, and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name. Wherefore, according to Augustine's reckoning (*De Civ. Dei* xxi.), Tully writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment: namely, death, whereby man is deprived of life; stripes, retaliation, or the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety; slavery, and imprisonment, whereby he is deprived of freedom; exile, whereby he is banished from his country; fines, whereby he is mulcted in his riches; ignominy, whereby he loses his good name.

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle, when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without danger, but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners.

Reply Obj. 2. All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the truth of the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of others.

Reply Obj. 3. The very fact that the punishment, whether of death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same time as the sin, makes man's will averse to sin: because the fear of punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER VENGEANCE SHOULD BE TAKEN ON THOSE WHO
HAVE SINNED INVOLUNTARILY ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow from the will of another. Yet one man is punished for another, according to Exod. xx. 5, *I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation.* Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was cursed (Gen. ix. 25), and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck with leprosy (4 Kings v.). Again the blood of Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, for they said (Matth. xxvii. 25) : *His blood be upon us and upon our children.* Moreover, we read (Josue vii.) that the people of Israel were delivered into the hands of their enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people were overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the sons of Heli (1 Kings iv.). Therefore a person is to be punished without having deserved it voluntarily.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power; thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on account of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an episcopal see on account of the depravity or evil deeds of the people. Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.

Obj. 3. Further, Ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their parents (Gen. xix.). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their children were swallowed up together with them (Num. xvi.). Moreover, dumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain on account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings

xv.). Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily.

Obj. 4. Further, Compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But a man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily.

Obj. 5. Further, Ambrose says on Luke v. that *the ship in which Judas was, was in distress*; wherefore *Peter, who was calm in the security of his own merits, was in distress about those of others*. But Peter did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes punished without having voluntarily deserved it.

On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is voluntary according to Augustine (*De Lib. Arb.* iii.: *Retract.* i.). Therefore vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved it voluntarily.

I answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ways. First, under the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due save for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his own will suffers something that is contrary to his will. Wherefore, since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXXI., A. 1), it follows that no one is punished in this way, except for something done voluntarily. Secondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good, and in this way a person is sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet not without cause.

It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body never blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it is harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of greater consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence, while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a person is

punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own. Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this present life for our humiliation or probation. But no one is punished in spiritual goods without any fault on his part, neither in this nor in the future life, because in the latter punishment is not medicinal, but a result of spiritual condemnation.

Reply Obj. 1. A man is never condemned to a spiritual punishment for another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects the soul, in respect of which each man is master of himself. But sometimes a man is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the sin of another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may be the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their master. Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another, either by *imitation*, as children copy the sins of their parents, and slaves the sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater daring; or by way of *merit*, as the sinful subjects merit a sinful superior, according to Job xxxiv. 30, *Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people?* Hence the people of Israel were punished for David's sin in numbering the people (2 Kings xxiv.). This may also happen through some kind of *consent* or *connivance*: thus sometimes even the good are punished in temporal matters together with the wicked, for not having condemned their sins, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* ix.). Thirdly, in order to mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all, as though all were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ. *sup. Josue* viii.). The saying of the Lord, *Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation*, seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in order that the descendants at least

may mend their ways; yet should the wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to take vengeance on them.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine states (*loc. cit.*), human judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is manifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby He punishes certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments, so as to know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore according to human judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault on his part, but not without cause: and this in three ways.

First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his, disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man is hindered from receiving sacred orders.

Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to the good of the clerics.

Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his inheritance through the sin of his parent.

Reply Obj. 3. By the judgment of God children are punished in temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also in their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they be spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve to be punished still more severely.

Vengeance is wrought on dumb animals and any other

irrational creatures, because in this way their owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.

Reply Obj. 4. An act done through compulsion of fear is not involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated above (I.-II., Q. VI., AA. 5, 6).

Reply Obj. 5. The other apostles were distressed about the sin of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of one, in commendation of unity, as stated above (*Reply Obj. 1, 2*).

QUESTION CIX.

OF TRUTH.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning truth there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether truth is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) Whether it is a part of justice? (4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER TRUTH IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object precedes the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue, but something prior to virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 7), it belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always praiseworthy—neither in good things, since according to Prov. xxvii. 2, *Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth*—nor even in evil things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Isa. iii. 9): *They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it.* Therefore truth is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because its object is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that by *truth we faithfully represent things as they are, were, or will be.* Likewise it is not one

of the intellectual virtues, but their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the *Second* and in the *Fourth Book of Ethics* places truth among the other virtues.

I answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this way, truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but a certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing understood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as stated in the First Part (Q. XVI., A. 1: Q. XXI., A. 2). Secondly, truth may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and virtue is *that which makes its subject good, and renders his action good*.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes truth in the first sense.

Reply Obj. 2. To state that which concerns oneself, in so far as it is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite for that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful. Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one's sin, by praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it uselessly.

Reply Obj. 3. A person who says what is true, utters certain signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either words, or external actions, or any external thing. Now these external things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the latter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far as this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore truth is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral

virtue. And it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways. First, on the part of the object, secondly, on the part of the act. On the part of the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of equality, and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the very reason that a man says what is true about himself, he observes the mean between one that says more than the truth about himself, and one that says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe the mean is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. Excess consists in making known one's own affairs out of season, and deficiency in hiding them when one ought to make them known.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER TRUTH IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the true and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special virtue, in fact every virtue is goodness, because *it makes its subject good*. Therefore truth is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, To make known what belongs to oneself is an act of truth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue, since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore truth is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, The truth of life is the truth whereby one lives aright, and of which it is written (Isa. xxxviii. 3): *I beseech Thee . . . remember how I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect heart*. Now one lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the definition of virtue given above (I.-II., Q. LV., A. 4). Therefore truth is not a special virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, Truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue, since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every virtue. Therefore neither is truth a special virtue.

On the contrary, It is numbered together with other virtues (*Ethic. ii. 7*).

I answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in making a man's deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of goodness in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto by a special virtue. And since according to Augustine (*De Nat. Boni iii.*) good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good will be found where there is a special order. Now there is a special order whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered in relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto man is perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that truth is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. The true and the good are convertible as to subject, since every true thing is good, and every good thing is true. But considered logically, they exceed one another, even as the intellect and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands the will and many things besides, and the will desires things pertaining to the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the *true* considered in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a particular good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner the *good* considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to be a special virtue, just as the *true* is a special good; yet it is not possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather, considered logically, it is the genus of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. The habits of virtue and vice take their species from what is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental and beside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a consequence beside his principal intention.

Reply Obj. 3. The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing

is true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure, namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.

Reply Obj. 4. Simplicity is so called from its opposition to duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since this belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man pretends one thing and intends another.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER TRUTH IS A PART OF JUSTICE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it seems proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling the truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the case in all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of justice.

Obj. 2. Further, Truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice is in the will, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 4). Therefore truth is not a part of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, According to Jerome truth is threefold, namely, *truth of life, truth of justice, and truth of doctrine.* But none of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all virtues, as stated above (A. 2, *ad 3*): truth of justice is the same as justice, so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of justice.

On the contrary, Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) reckons truth among the parts of justice.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXX.), a virtue is annexed to justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with justice. In the

first place it is directed to another, since the manifestation, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another the things that concern himself. In the second place, justice sets up a certain equality between things, and this the virtue of truth does also, for it equals signs to the things which concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls short of the proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers, but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore truth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary virtue to its principal.

Reply Obj. 1. Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society. Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.

Reply Obj. 2. Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the manifestation of the truth is an act of the will.

Reply Obj. 3. The truth of which we are speaking now differs from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding Article (*ad 3*).

We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life a man lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the rectitude of the law in those judgements which refer to another man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of life. In another way the truth of justice may be understood as referring to the fact that, out of justice, a

man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man confesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice. This truth is a particular act of justice, and does not pertain directly to this truth of which we are now speaking, because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a man's chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 7) in describing this virtue: *We are not speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned.*

The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths relating to science. Wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are. Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something concerning us, and pertain to us, in this sense the truth of doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of truth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE VIRTUE OF TRUTH INCLINES RATHER TO THAT WHICH IS LESS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so does one by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five, than that four are three. But *every falsehood is in itself evil, and to be avoided*, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* iv. 7). Therefore the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather than to that which is greater.

Obj. 2. Further, That a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to one extreme than to the

other; because truth, since it is a kind of equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more incline to that which is less.

Obj. 3. Further, To forsake the truth for that which is less seems to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract therefrom; and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to amount to an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant to truth than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible with the denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition. Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that which is greater rather than to that which is less.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 7*) that *by this virtue a man inclines rather from the truth towards that which is less.*

I answer that, There are two ways of inclining from the truth to that which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show the whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so forth. This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less. For, as the Philosopher says (*ibid.*), *this seems to be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance. For those who represent themselves as being greater than they are, are a source of annoyance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass others: whereas those who make less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by their moderation.* Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. xii. 6): *Though I should have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth from me.*

Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say that what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this virtue to incline to what is less, because this would imply falsehood. And yet this would be less repugnant to the truth, not indeed as regards the proper aspect of truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which should

be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught with greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one has what one has not, than to think or say that one has not what one has.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

QUESTION CX.

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice. Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth? (2) Of the species of lying: (3) Whether lying is always a sin? (4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER LYING IS ALWAYS OPPOSED TO TRUTH?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible with truth, since he that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to Augustine (*Contra Mendac.* iii.). Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.

Obj. 2. Further, The virtue of truth applies not only to words but also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 7) by this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's life. But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (*Contra Mend.* xii.) that *a lie is a false signification by words.* Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*Contra Mend., loc. cit.*) that the *liar's sin is the desire to deceive.* But this is not

opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Contra Mend.* x.): *Let no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie.* But this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.

I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XVIII., AA. 6, 7).

Now it has been said above (Q. CIX., A. I., *ad* 3) that the virtue of truth—and consequently the opposite vices—regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.

Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood—materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.

However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact, namely, that a person intends to

say what is false; wherefore also the word *mendacium* (lie) is derived from its being in opposition to the *mind*. Consequently if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker: so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is accidental, for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters a falsehood formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.

That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to a perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is evident that lying is directly and formally opposed to the virtue of truth.

Reply Obj. 1. We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally and essentially, rather than according to what is in it materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the truth.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii.), words hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that *a lie is a false signification by words*, the term *words* denotes every kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.

Reply Obj. 3. The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to the species of its cause.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIES ARE SUFFICIENTLY DIVIDED INTO OFFICIOUS,
JOCOSE AND MISCHIEVOUS LIES ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into *officious*, *jocose* and *mischievous* lies. For a division should be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its nature, as the Philosopher states (*Metaph.* vii. text. 43; *De Part. Animal.* i. 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect: for a *jocose* lie is told in order to make fun, an *officious* lie for some useful purpose, and a *mischievous* lie in order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (*Contra Mendac.* xiv.) gives eight kinds of lies. The first is *in religious doctrine*; the second is *a lie that profits no one and injures someone*; the third *profits one party so as to injure another*; the fourth is *told out of mere lust of lying and deceiving*; the fifth is *told out of the desire to please*; the sixth *injures no one, and profits someone in saving his money*; the seventh *injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death*; the eighth *injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the body*. Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is insufficient.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 7) divides lying into *boasting*, which exceeds the truth in speech, and *irony*, which falls short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. v. 7, *Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie*, says that there are three kinds of lies; for some

are told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is another kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of malice. The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided into these three kinds.

I answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential division of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iv. 7*), lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and this belongs to *boasting*, and the lie which stops short of the truth, and this belongs to *irony*. This division is an essential division of lying itself, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition.

Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, and with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this is called a *mischievous* lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed to some good—either of pleasure and then it is a *jocose* lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the *officious* lie, whereby it is intended to help another person, or to save him from being injured. In this way lies are divided into the three kinds aforesaid.

Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated in the *Second Objection*. Here the first three kinds are contained under *mischievous lies*, which are either against God, and then we have the lie *in religious doctrine*, or against man, and this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second kind of lie, which *profits no one, and injures someone*; or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting another, and this is the third kind of lie, *which profits one, and injures another*. Of these the first is the most grievous,

because sins against God are always more grievous, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXIII., A. 9): and the second is more grievous than the third, since the latter's gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting another.

After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a fourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition or diminution, and this is the lie which is told *out of mere lust of lying and deceiving*. This proceeds from the habit, wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 7) that *the liar, since he lies from habit, delights in lying*.

The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying. For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told *with a desire to please*: and the remaining three are comprised under the officious lie, wherein something useful to another person is intended. This usefulness regards either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie, which *profits someone in saving his money*; or his body, and this is the seventh kind, which *saves a man from death*; or the morality of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which *saves him from unlawful defilement of his body*.

Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better than the pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue than the life of the body.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY LIE IS A SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection I. It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet they seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the words of Christ and of others often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly one of them

must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, No one is rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that *God built them houses* (Exod. i. 21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, The deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very holy men that they lied. Thus (Gen. xii. and xx.) we are told that Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gen. xxvii. 27-29). Again, Judith is commended (Judith xv. 10, 11) although she lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 4. Further, One ought to choose the lesser evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another from being killed.

Obj. 5. Further, It is a lie not to fulfil what one has promised. Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says (*Synonym. ii.*): *Break your faith when you have promised ill.* Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 6. Further, Apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive our neighbour: wherefore Augustine says (*Contra Mend. xxi.*): *Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he deceives others.* Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the sake of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. vii. 14): *Be not willing to make any manner of lie.*

I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect

of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 7) that *lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise.* Therefore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (*Contra Mend.* i.).

Reply Obj. 1. It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ. That the words of certain people are variously reported in the Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine says (*De Consens. Evang.* ii.): *He that has the wit to understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what words that sense is expressed.* Hence it is evident, as he adds (*ibid.*), that *we must not judge that someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way and in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or heard.*

Reply Obj. 2. The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (*Exod.* ii. 21): *And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses.* But the subsequent lie was not meritorious.

Reply Obj. 3. In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (*Contra Mend.* v.), the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If, however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence Augustine says

(*Contra Mend., loc. cit.*): We must believe that whatever is related of those who, in prophetic times, are mentioned as being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically. As to Abraham when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was the daughter of his father, as Augustine says (*QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi.: Contra Mend. x.: Contra Faust. xxii.*). Wherefore Abraham himself said (*Gen. xx. 12*): She is truly my sister, the daughter of my father, and not the daughter of my mother, being related to him on his father's side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's first-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter's birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of this mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.

Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that her words contain truth in some mystical sense.

Reply Obj. 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbour, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (*Contra Mend. x.*).

Reply Obj. 5. A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in mind: but if he does not keep his promise,

he seems to act without faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful, because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind. Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the business in hand. For, as Seneca states (*De Benef.* iv.), for a man to be bound to keep a promise it is necessary for everything to remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising—since he promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for granted—nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor. i.), did not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him.

Reply Obj. 6. An action may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocular lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (*Contra Mend.* v.), *it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY LIE IS A MORTAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is written (Ps. vi. 7): *Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie,* and (Wis. i. 11): *The mouth that believeth killeth the soul.* Now mortal sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is against a precept of the

decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: *Thou shalt not bear false witness.* Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* i. 36): *Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of iniquity.* Now no one is said to break his faith or to be guilty of iniquity, for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.

Obj. 4. Further, The eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for a temporal meed. For Gregory says (*Moral.* xviii.) that *we learn from the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the reward which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might have received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on account of the lie of which they were guilty.* Therefore even an officious lie, such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies, is a mortal sin.

Obj. 5. Further, Augustine says (*Contra Mend.* xvii.) that *it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie.* Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept. Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off than others.

On the contrary, Augustine says on Ps. v. 7, *Thou wilt destroy, etc.: There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake of our neighbour's good.* But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and officious lies are not mortal sins.

I answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12; Q. XXXV., A. 3). Now a lie may be contrary to charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of the evil intended; thirdly, accidentally.

A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; so that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of charity, but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a man's good, for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on one's neighbour, since it causes him to have a false opinion, wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our neighbour, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the false opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge of which is of no consequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one's neighbour: for instance, if a person be deceived as to some contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.

As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one's neighbour, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and this also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's neighbour, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little pleasure is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of one's neighbour is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred through scandal from lying publicly.

Reply Obj. 1. The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a gloss explains the words of Ps. v. 7, *Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.*

Reply Obj. 2. Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and our neighbour, as stated above (Q. XLIV., A. 1, *ad* 3: I.-II., Q. C., A. 5, *ad* 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our neighbour. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness against our neighbour.

Reply Obj. 3. Even a venial sin can be called *iniquity* in a broad sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore it is written (1 John iii. 4): *Every* sin is iniquity.* It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.

Reply Obj. 4. The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways. First as regards their feeling of kindness towards the Jews, and their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in his exposition of Isa. lxxv. 21, *And they shall build houses*) explains that God *built them spiritual houses.* Secondly, it may be considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words of Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding kindness, as the objection understands the words to mean.

Reply Obj. 5. Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps

* Vulg.,—*And sin is iniquity.*

accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in this sense the saying of Augustine that *it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie*: although Augustine says this not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: *Unless perhaps it is a precept*, etc. Nor does it matter that they are placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in other matters.

QUESTION CXI.

OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY.

(In Four Articles.)

IN due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin? (2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation? (3) Whether it is opposed to truth? (4) Whether it is a mortal sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL DISSIMULATION IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is written (Luke xxiv. 28) that our Lord *pretended* (Douay,—*made as though*) *he would go farther*; and Ambrose in his book on the Patriarchs (*De Abraham*, i.) says of Abraham that he *spoke craftily to his servants, when he said* (Gen. xxii. 5): *I and the boy will go with speed as far as yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return to you.* Now to pretend and to speak craftily savour of dissimulation: and yet it is not to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abraham. Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, No sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in his commentary on Gal. ii. 11, *When Peter* (Vulg.,—*Cephas*) *was come to Antioch:—The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priests of Baal, pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach us that dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed*; and David *changed his countenance before Achis, king of Geth* (1 Kings xxi. 13). Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil to simulate good, it is good to simulate evil.

Obj. 4. Further, It is written in condemnation of certain people (Isa. iii. 9): *They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it.* Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one's sin. Therefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is never reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not a sin.

On the contrary, A gloss on Isa. xvi. 14, *In three years, etc.,* says: *Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness.* But to sin openly is always a sin: Therefore dissimulation is always a sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CIX., A. 3: Q. CX., A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by outward signs to be such as one is. Now outward signs are not only words, but also deeds. Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by words something different from that which is in one's mind, so also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is properly denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is properly a lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not whether one lie in word or in any other way, as stated above (Q. CX., A. 1, *Obj. 2*). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as stated above (Q. CX., A. 3), it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*De QQ. Evang. ii.*), *To pretend is not always a lie: but only when the pretence has no signification, then it is a lie. When, however, our pretence refers to some signification, there is no lie, but a representation of the truth.* And he cites figures of speech as an example, where a thing is *pretended*, for we do not mean it to be taken literally but as a figure of something else that we wish to say. In this way Our Lord *pretended He would go farther*, because He acted as if wishing to go farther; in order to signify something figuratively either because He was far from their faith, according to Gregory

(*Hom. xxiii. in Ev.*); or, as Augustine says (*De QQ. Evang. ii.*), because, as He was about to go farther away from them by ascending into heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on earth by their hospitality.

Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (*loc. cit.*) says that Abraham foretold what he knew not: for he intended to return alone after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord expressed what He was about to do. It is evident therefore that neither dissembled.

Reply Obj. 2. Jerome employs the term *simulation* in a broad sense for any kind of pretence. David's change of countenance was a figurative pretence, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title of Ps. xxxiii., *I will bless the Lord at all times*. There is no need to excuse Jehu's dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked man, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kings x. 29, 31). And yet he is praised withal and received an earthly reward from God, not for his dissimulation, but for his zeal in destroying the worship of Baal.

Reply Obj. 3. Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked, because no one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do evil deeds, he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man might pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but has some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil, both because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although he is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the wickedness he simulates. And because dissimulation is evil in itself, its sinfulness is not derived from the thing simulated, whether this be good or evil.

Reply Obj. 4. Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that which he is not, yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is, for this is sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by outward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not, yet he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one may hide one's sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus that we must understand the saying of Jerome on the words

of Isaias (*loc. cit.*), that the second plank after shipwreck is to hide one's sin, lest, to wit, others be scandalized thereby.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER HYPOCRISY IS THE SAME AS DISSIMULATION?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly, according to Matth. vi. 2, *When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do.* Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Moral. xxxi. 7*): *Some there are who wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of perfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks of the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and another to sin from malice.* Now those who wear the habit of holiness, without attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers, since the outward habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore dissimulation is not the same as hypocrisy.

Obj. 3. Further, Hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For Our Lord says of hypocrites (Matth. xxiii. 5) that *all their works they do for to be seen of men*: and Gregory says (*Moral. xxxi. loc. cit.*) that *they never consider what it is that they do, but how by their every action they may please men.* But dissimulation consists, not in the mere intention, but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job xxxvi. 13, *Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God*, says that *the dissembler simulates one thing and does another; he pretends chastity, and delights in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse.* Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.

On the contrary, Isidore says (*Etym. x.*): '*Hypocrite*' is a Greek word corresponding to the Latin '*simulator*,' for

whereas he is evil within, he shows himself outwardly as being good ; ὑπὸ denoting falsehood, and κρίσις judgment.

I answer that, As Isidore says (*ibid.*), the word hypocrite is derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a disguised face, by changing the colour of their complexion, so as to imitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under the guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to deceive the people in their acting. Hence Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. ii.*) that just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the parts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and in every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is not is a hypocrite : for he pretends to be just without being so in reality.

We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not, however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person simulates another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man.

Reply Obj. 1. The outward deed is a natural sign of the intention. Accordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their genus to the service of God, and seeks by their means to please, not God but man, he simulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore Gregory says (*Moral. xxxi.*) that hypocrites make God's interests subservient to worldly purposes, since by making a show of saintly conduct they seek, not to turn men to God, but to draw to themselves the applause of their approval : and so they make a lying pretence of having a good intention, which they have not, although they do not pretend to do a good deed without doing it.

Reply Obj. 2. The habit of holiness, for instance the religious or the clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one is bound to perform works of perfection. And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness, with the intention of entering the state of perfection, if he fail through weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of holiness. If,

however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in order to make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a dissembler.

Reply Obj. 3. In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two things: one by way of sign, the other by way of thing signified. Accordingly the evil intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified, which does not tally with the sign: and the outward words, or deeds, or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie as a sign.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER HYPOCRISY IS CONTRARY TO THE VIRTUE OF TRUTH ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing signified. Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be opposed to any special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates any virtue, and by means of any virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms deeds, as stated in Matth. vi. 1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not specially opposed to the virtue of truth.

Obj. 2. Further, All dissimulation seems to proceed from guile, wherefore it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to prudence as above stated (Q. LV., A. 4). Therefore, hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or simplicity.

Obj. 3. Further, The species of moral acts is taken from their end. Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vainglory: wherefore a gloss on Job xxvii. 8, *What is the hope of the hypocrite, if through covetousness he take by violence*, says: *A hypocrite, or, as the Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: for through desire of being honoured for holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he steals praise for a life which is not his.** Therefore since covetousness or vainglory

* The quotation is from S. Gregory's *Moralia*, Bk. XVIII.

is not directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is hypocrisy or dissimulation.

On the contrary, All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above (A. 1). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore dissimulation or hypocrisy is also.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* text. 13, 24, x.), *contrariety is opposition as regards form*, i.e. the specific form. Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may be opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another way indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be considered with regard to the very species of the act, and this species depends on that act's proper object. Wherefore since hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a character which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it follows that it is directly opposed to truth, whereby a man shows himself in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in *Ethic.* iv. 7.

The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered in relation to any accident, for instance a remote end, or an instrument of action, or anything else of that kind.

Reply Obj. 1. The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it as his end, not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to have it, but in respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it. Hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth, inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And he performs acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own sake, but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his hypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to that virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. LV., AA. 3, 4, 5), the vice directly opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it belongs to discover ways of achieving a purpose, that are apparent and not real: while it accomplishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds: and it stands in relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to simplicity. Now

guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception, and sometimes secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly to simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this way the virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated above (Q. CIX., A. 2, *ad* 4). There is, however, a mere logical difference between them, because by truth we mean the concordance between sign and thing signified, while simplicity indicates that one does not tend to different things, by intending one thing inwardly, and pretending another outwardly.

Reply Obj. 3. Gain or glory is the remote end of the dissembler as also of the liar. Hence it does not take its species from this end, but from the proximate end, which is to show oneself other than one is. Wherefore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things of himself, for no further purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 7), and as also we have said above with regard to lying (Q. CX., A. 2).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER HYPOCRISY IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. For Jerome says on Isa. xvi. 14: *Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness:* and a gloss on Job i. 21,* *As it hath pleased the Lord, etc., says that pretended justice is no justice, but a twofold sin:* and again a gloss on Lament. iv. 6, *The iniquity . . . of My people is made greater than the sin of Sodom,* says: *He deplores the sins of the soul that falls into hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of Sodom.* Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxi. 8) that hypocrites sin out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally.

* S. Augustine, on Ps. lxiii. 7.

Obj. 3. Further, No one deserves the anger of God and exclusion from seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is deserved through hypocrisy according to Job xxxvi. 13, *Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God*: and the hypocrite is excluded from seeing God, according to Job xiii. 16, *No hypocrite shall come before His presence*. Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed. Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.

Further, The intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But this is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself a mortal sin.

Further, Hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (*Moral. xxxi. 17*). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is hypocrisy.

I answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness, and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a person whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely, who cares not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This will depend on the end in view; for if this be contrary to the love of God or of his neighbour, it will be a mortal sin: for instance if he were to simulate holiness in order to disseminate false doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment, though unworthy, or that he may obtain any temporal good in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be not contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance when a man takes pleasure in the pretence itself: of such a man it is said in *Ethic. iv. 7* that *he would seem to be*

vain rather than evil; for the same applies to simulation as to a lie.

It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of this kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated with mortal sin.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

QUESTION CXII.

OF BOASTING.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 7). Under the first head, namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry: (1) To which virtue is it opposed? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER BOASTING IS OPPOSED TO THE VIRTUE OF TRUTH?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast even without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence. Thus it is written (*Esther* i. 3, 4) that Assuerus *made a great feast . . . that he might show the riches of the glory and of his kingdom, and the greatness and boasting of his power.* Therefore boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth.

Obj. 2. Further, Boasting is reckoned by Gregory (*Moral.* xxiii. 4) to be one of the four species of pride, *when, to wit, a man boasts of having what he has not.* Hence it is written (*Jerem.* xlvi. 29, 30): *We have heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness, and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is not according to it.* Moreover, Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxi. 7) that boasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are

opposed to the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to truth, but to humility.

Obj. 3. Further, Boasting seems to be occasioned by riches; wherefore it is written (Wis. v. 8): *What hath pride profited us? or what advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us?* Now excess of riches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed to justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 7, iv. 7), that boasting is opposed to truth.

I answer that, *Jactantia* (boasting) seems properly to denote the uplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw (*jactare*) a thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift oneself, properly speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself.* This happens in two ways. For sometimes a man speaks of himself, not above what he is in himself, but above that which he is esteemed by men to be: and this the Apostle declines to do when he says (2 Cor. xii. 6): *I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth of me.* In another way a man uplifts himself in words, by speaking of himself above that which he is in reality. And since we should judge of things as they are in themselves, rather than as others deem them to be, it follows that boasting denotes more properly the uplifting of self above what one is in oneself, than the uplifting of self above what others think of one: although in either case it may be called boasting. Hence boasting properly so called is opposed to truth by way of excess.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes boasting as exceeding men's opinion.

Reply Obj. 2. The sin of boasting may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is opposed to truth, as stated (in the body of the article and Q. CX., A. 2). Secondly, with regard to its cause, from which more frequently though not always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride as its inwardly moving and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly

* Or *tall-talking*, as we should say in English.

by arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of great things about himself; though sometimes a man takes to boasting, not from arrogance, but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein, because he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is an uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it is not the same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For this reason Gregory reckons boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the boaster frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, and so, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its end.

Reply Obj. 3. Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. First, as an occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches. Hence (Prov. viii. 18) *riches* are significantly described as *proud* (Douay,—*glorious*). Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since according to *Ethic. iv. 7* some boast, not only for the sake of glory, but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent stories about themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for instance, they pretend to be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER BOASTING IS A MORTAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is written (Prov. xxviii. 25): *He that boasteth, and puffeth himself, stirreth up quarrels.* Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels, since God hates those that sow discord, according to Prov. vi. 19. Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is forbidden in God's law is a mortal sin. Now a gloss on Ecclus. vi. 2, *Extol not thyself in the thoughts of thy soul*, says: *This is a prohibition of boasting and pride.* Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying; for according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iv. 7*), *the boaster pretends to something greater than he is, sometimes for*

no further purpose, sometimes for the sake of glory or honour, sometimes for the sake of money. Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious nor a jocose lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie. Therefore seemingly it is always a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Boasting arises from vainglory, according to Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi. 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid. For Gregory says (*Moral.* viii. 30) that *it belongs to the very perfect, by outward deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are not inwardly uplifted by the praise awarded them.* Therefore boasting is not always a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CX., A. 4), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a mortal, and sometimes a venial, sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man boasts of that which is contrary to God's glory—thus it is said in the person of the king of Tyre (*Ezech.* xxviii. 2): *Thy heart is lifted up, and thou hast said: I am God*—or contrary to the love of our neighbour, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out into invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee who said (*Luke* xviii. 11): *I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, as also is this publican.* Sometimes it is a venial sin, when, to wit, a man boasts of things that are against neither God nor his neighbour.

Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and then if it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin, then the boasting will also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a venial sin. Sometimes, however, a man breaks out into boasting through desire of gain, and for this very reason he would seem to be aiming at the deception and injury of his neighbour: wherefore boasting of this kind is more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 7) that *a man who boasts for the sake of gain, is viler than one who boasts for the sake of glory or honour.* Yet it is

not always a mortal sin because the gain may be such as not to injure another man.

Reply Obj. 1. To boast in order to stir up quarrels is a mortal sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels, not intentionally but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not be a mortal sin on that account.

Reply Obj. 2. This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from pride that is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Boasting does not always involve a mischievous lie, but only where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbour, either in itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere pleasure in boasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks (*Ethic.* iv. 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn God's commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it would be against the charity of God, in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its last end.

To boast for the sake of glory or gain seems to involve an officious lie: provided it be done without injury to others, for then it would at once become a mischievous lie.

QUESTION CXIII.

OF IRONY*

(In Two Articles.)

WE must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether irony is a sin? (2) Of its comparison with boasting.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IRONY IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that irony, which consists in belittling oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's being strengthened by God: and yet this leads one to belittle oneself, according to Prov. xxx. 1, 2, *The vision which the man spoke, with whom is God, and who being strengthened by God, abiding with him, said, I am the most foolish of men.* Also it is written (Amos vii. 14): *Amos answered . . . I am not a prophet.* Therefore irony, whereby a man belittles himself in words, is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of the English (*Regist. xii.*): *It is the mark of a well-disposed mind to acknowledge one's fault when one is not guilty.* But all sin is inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, It is not a sin to shun pride. But some belittle themselves in words, so as to avoid pride, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iv. 7.*). Therefore irony is not a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Verb. Apost., Serm.*

* Irony here must be given the signification of the Greek *εἰρωνία*, whence it is derived:—dissimulation of one's own good points.

xxix.): *If thou liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before lying, thou hast become one by lying.*

I answer that, To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the greater things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of himself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle oneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in respect of its genus, except through corruption of one of its circumstances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself to possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly. For there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly folly annexed to it, according to 1 Cor. iii. 18, *If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise.* But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text goes on to say, *is foolishness with God.* Accordingly, he that is strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, *and the wisdom of men is not with me,* and farther on, *and* I have known the science of the saints.*

It may also be replied that *the wisdom of men* is that which is acquired by human reason, while the *wisdom of the saints* is that which is received by divine inspiration.

Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, *nor am I the son of a prophet.*

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty, not only if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but also if he fall short of

* Vulg.,—*and I have not known the science of the saints.*

perfect righteousness, which sometimes is not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does not acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.

Reply Obj. 3. A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid pride. Hence Augustine says (*Tract. xliii. in Joan.*): *Shun not arrogance so as to forsake truth*: and Gregory says (*Moral. xxvi. 3*) that *it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IRONY IS A LESS GRIEVOUS SIN THAN BOASTING ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is a kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iv. 7*), irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (*Prov. xxvi. 25*): *When he shall speak low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart*. Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold wickedness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 7*): *Those who speak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, seemingly, in their manners*.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CX., AA. 2, 4), one lie is more grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is about—thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most grievous—and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person: so that in this respect they are equal.

But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely, the desire of gain or honour: whereas irony arises from a man's averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (*loc. cit.*) that *boasting is a more grievous sin than irony.*

Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then irony is more grievous.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument applies to irony and boasting, according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.

Reply Obj. 2. Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the kind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence. Thus Our Lord said of certain men (Matth. vi. 16) that *they disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast.* Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason they sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 7*) that *it is the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little of themselves:* and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men seek glory.

Reply Obj. 3. According to the words of Eccclus. xix. 23, *There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit,* and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through deceitful humility, *speaks low wickedly.*

QUESTION CXIV.

OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY.

(In Two Articles.)

WE must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarrelling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a special virtue? (2) Whether it is a part of justice?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER FRIENDLINESS IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* viii. 3) that *the perfect friendship is that which is on account of virtue.* Now any virtue is the cause of friendship: *since the good is lovable to all,* as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a consequence of every virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 6) of this kind of friend that he *takes everything in a right manner from those he loves not and are not his friends.* Now it seems to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue. Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Virtue observes the mean, according as a wise man decides (*Ethic.* ii. 6). Now it is written (*Eccles.* vii. 5): *The heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and*

the heart of fools where there is mirth: wherefore it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of pleasure (Ethic. ii. 9). Now this kind of friendship, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iv. 6*), is essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, but fears to give pain. Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.

On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now it is written (*Ecclus. iv. 7*): *Make thyself affable to the congregation of the poor.* Therefore affability, which is what we mean by friendship, is a special virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CIX., A. 2: I-II., Q. LV., A. 3), since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists in order, as stated above (Q. CIX., A. 2). And it behoves man to be maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is called friendliness.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his *Ethics*. One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in treating of charity (Q. XXIII., A. 1, A. 3, *ad 1*: QQ. XXV., XXVI.), what things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those with whom he is in contact.

Reply Obj. 2. Every man is naturally every man's friend by a certain general love; even so it is written (*Ecclus. xiii. 19*) that *every beast loveth its like*. This love is signified by signs of friendship, which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this: because we do not

show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to us by special friendship.

Reply Obj. 3. When it is said that *the heart of the wise is where there is mourning* it is not that he may bring sorrow to his neighbour, for the Apostle says (Rom. xiv. 15): *If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity* : but that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus. vii. 38, *Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them that mourn.* Again, *the heart of fools is where there is mirth*, not that they may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness. Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, according to Ps. cxxxii. 1, *Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.*

Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 6), for the sake of some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. vii. 8): *Although I made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent*, and farther on (verse 9), *I am glad ; not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance.* For this reason we should not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, and in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written (Ecclus. vii. 26): *Hast thou daughters ? Have a care of their body, and show not thy countenance gay towards them.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS KIND OF FRIENDSHIP IS A PART OF JUSTICE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this virtue does not consist in doing

that, but in behaving agreeably towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part of justice.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iv. 6*), this virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest pleasures, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LX., A. 5: Q. LXI., A. 3). Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, To give equal things to those who are unequal is contrary to justice, as stated above (Q. LIX., AA. 1, 2). Now, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iv. 6*), this virtue *treats in like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers*. Therefore this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.

On the contrary, Macrobius (*De Somno Scip. i.*) accounts friendship a part of justice.

I answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to it as to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is directed to another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of the notion of justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is bound to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to pay, or by some debt arising out of a favour received. For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely, that we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless at times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them for some good purpose.

Reply Obj. 1. As we have said above (Q. CIX., A. 3, *ad 1*), because man is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the manifestation of truth without which human society could not last. Now as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic. viii.*), no one could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for their good.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures

of the senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which have their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves becomingly towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they were noisome.

Reply Obj. 3. This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that one ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and strangers, since, as he says (*ibid.*), *it is not fitting to please or displease acquaintances and strangers in the same way.* The likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all in a fitting manner.

QUESTION CXV.

OF FLATTERY.

(In Two Articles.)

WE must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: (1) Flattery, and (2) Quarrelling. Concerning flattery there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether flattery is a sin? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER FLATTERY IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov. xxxi. 28, *Her children rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her.* Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1 Cor. x. 33, *I . . . in all things please all men.* Therefore flattery is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise. But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore Gregory says (*Moral.* xxii. 5) that detraction is a remedy against flattery. *It must be observed,* says he, *that by the wonderful moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by detractions but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the flatterer upraises, the*

tongue of the detracter may humble. But detraction is an evil, as stated above (Q. LXXIII., AA. 2, 3). Therefore flattery is a good.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. xiii. 18, *Woe to them that sew cushions under every elbow, says, that is to say, sweet flattery.* Therefore flattery is a sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXIV., A. 1, ad 3), although the friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing, and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere intention of pleasing he is said to be *complaisant*, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of making some gain out of it, he is called a *flatterer* or *adulator*. As a rule, however, the term *flattery* is wont to be applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or deeds in their ordinary behaviour towards their fellows.

Reply Obj. 1. One may praise a person both well and ill, according as one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while observing other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person by praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since perhaps they are evil, according to Ps. ix. 24, *The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul*; or they may be uncertain, according to Ecclus. xxvii. 8, *Praise not a man before he speaketh*, and again (*ibid.* xi. 2), *Praise not a man for his beauty*; or because there may be fear lest human praise should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written, (*ibid.* xi. 30), *Praise not any man before death*. Again, in like manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster charity, so that he may make spiritual progress therein.

But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil, according to Ps. lii. 6, *God hath scattered the bones of them that please men*, and according to the words of the Apostle (Gal. i. 10), *If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ*.

Reply Obj. 2. Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good.

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which is contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as regards the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER FLATTERY IS A MORTAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to Augustine (*Enchirid. xii.*), *a thing is evil because it is harmful*. But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. ix. 24, *For the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the Lord*. Wherefore Jerome says (*Ep. ad Celant.*): *Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery*: and a gloss on Ps. lxxix. 4, *Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that say to me : 'Tis well, 'Tis well*, says: *The tongue of the flatterer harms more than the sword of the persecutor*. Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less than others: wherefore it is written (Ps. xxxvi. 15): *Let their sword enter into their own hearts*. Now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. cxl. 5, *Let not the oil of the sinner fatten my head*, says: *The false praise of the flatterer softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders it susceptible*

of vice. Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in himself.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI., Cap. 3): *The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and treachery shall be degraded from his office.* Now such a punishment as this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli., *de Sanctis*) reckons among slight sins, *if one desire to flatter any person of higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of necessity.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXII., A. 2), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another's sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbour, whom he encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Isa. v. 20, *Woe to you that call evil good.* Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one man flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written (Prov. xxvii. 6): *Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy.* Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In this case it is necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall, as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal (Q. XLIII., AA. 3, 4). If, however, one man flatters another from the mere craving to please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1. The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to

harm more than the sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of greater consequence, namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively, being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (Q. XLIII., A. 1, *ad* 3: I.-II., Q. LXXIII., A. 8, *ad* 3: Q. LXXX., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2. This argument applies to one that flatters with the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.

Reply Obj. 3. The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters another treacherously, in order to deceive him.

QUESTION CXVI

OF QUARRELLING.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must now consider quarrelling; concerning which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship? (2) Of its comparison with flattery.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER QUARRELLING IS OPPOSED TO THE VIRTUE OF FRIENDSHIP OR AFFABILITY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that quarrelling is not opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability. For quarrelling seems to pertain to discord, just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated above (Q. XXXVII., A. 1). Therefore quarrelling is also.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Prov. xxvi. 21): *An angry man stirreth up strife.* Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife or quarrelling is also.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (James iv. 1): *From whence are wars and quarrels (Douay, —contentions) among you? Are they not hence, from your concupiscences which war in your members?* Now it would seem contrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it seems that quarrelling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarrelling to friendship (*Ethic.* iv. 6).

I answer that, Quarrelling consists properly in words,

when, namely, one person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be observed in this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity. Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being a person to whom someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarrelling, which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or affability, to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 6*) that *those who are opposed to everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody, are said to be peevish and quarrelsome.*

Reply Obj. 1. Contention pertains rather to the contradiction of discord, while quarrelling belongs to the contradiction which has the intention of displeasing.

Reply Obj. 2. The direct opposition of virtues to vices depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from many causes, but on the species of their acts. And although quarrelling arises at times from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence it does not follow that it is directly opposed to meekness.

Reply Obj. 3. James speaks there of concupiscence considered as a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. vii. 7 says: *The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER QUARRELLING IS A MORE GRIEVOUS SIN THAN
FLATTERY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that quarrelling is a less grievous sin than the contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin does the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than quarrelling, for it is written (Isa. iii. 12): *O My people, they that call thee*

blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps. Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarrelling.

Obj. 2. Further, There appears to be a certain amount of deceit in flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another: whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. vii. 6*). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarrelling.

Obj. 3. Further, Shame is fear of what is vile, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iv. 9*). But a man is more ashamed to be a flatterer than a quarreller. Therefore quarrelling is a less grievous sin than flattery.

On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarrelling seems to be more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Tim. iii. 2, 3) that it *behoveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome*; and (2 Tim. ii. 24): *The servant of the Lord must not wrangle.* Therefore quarrelling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.

I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In one way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving displeasure, sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as regards certain external motives, and thus flattery is sometimes more grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue honour or gain; while sometimes quarrelling is more grievous, for instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up the speaker to contempt.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving secretly, so the quarreller may do harm sometimes by assailing openly. Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person openly, by violence as it

were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a more grievous sin than theft, as stated above (Q. LXVI., A. 9).

Reply Obj. 2. In human acts, the more grievous is not always the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason: wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem to arise from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason, although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarrelling, through proceeding from greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated in the objection, shame regards the vileness of a sin: wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more ashamed of flattery than of quarrelling, although quarrelling is more grievous.

QUESTION CXVII.

OF LIBERALITY.

(In Six Articles.)

WE must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely, covetousness and prodigality.

Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether liberality is a virtue? (2) What is its matter? (3) Of its act: (4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take? (5) Whether liberality is a part of justice? (6) Of its comparison with other virtues.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIBERALITY IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination for one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 1), *it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things.* Therefore liberality is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in *Ethic.* i. 8. Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (*Ethic.* iv. 1) that *he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but to give it away.*

Obj. 3. Further, The virtues are connected with one another. But liberality does not seem to be connected with

the other virtues: since many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing to give; and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise. Therefore liberality is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Offic. i.*) that *the Gospel contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated*. Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. Therefore liberality is a virtue.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb. ii. 19*), *it belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill*. Now we may use both well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as the powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are without, such as the things of this world that are granted us for our livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Augustine (*Serm. lxiv. de Temp.*) and Basil (*Hom. in Luc. xii. 18*) excess of riches is granted by God to some, in order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal man commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (*De Offic. i.*): *It is a commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them to be in want*.

Reply Obj. 2. It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 1*) that *the liberal man does not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people*; and Ambrose says (*De Offic. i.*) that *Our Lord does not wish a man to pour out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he do as Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by*

any household cares. For this belongs to the state of perfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Q. CLXXXIV., Q. CLXXXVI., A. 3).

It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is directed to happiness.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 1*), those who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal; and likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of any other sins. Hence Ambrose says (*De Offic. i.*): *If you assist another to rob others of their possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than of pity.* Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend much on certain evil works, are not liberal.

Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good uses, without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform works of other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not in the same way as virtuous people, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXV., A. 1). In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 1*): *Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance, i.e. his means for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the giver:* and Ambrose says (*De Offic. i.*) that *it is the heart that makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIBERALITY IS ABOUT MONEY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not about money. For every moral virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to justice to be about operations, as stated in *Ethic. v. 1*. Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is about passions and not about money.

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to a liberal man to make use of any kind of wealth. Now natural riches are more real

than artificial riches, according to the Philosopher (*Polit.* i. 5. 6). Therefore liberality is not chiefly about money.

Obj. 3. Further, Different virtues have different matter, since habits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are the matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they are not the matter of liberality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 1) that *liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money.*

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. *ibid.*) it belongs to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is also called open-handedness (*largitas*), because that which is open does not withhold things but parts with them. The term *liberality* seems also to allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees (*liberat*) it, so to speak, from his keeping and ownership, and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things which are the subject of a man's free-handedness towards others are the goods he possesses, which are denoted by the term *money*. Therefore the proper matter of liberality is money.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3), liberality depends not on the quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart of the giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire, and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things given. Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of liberality, while exterior money is the object of those same passions.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says in his book *De Disciplina Christi* (*Tract. de divers.* i.), everything whatsoever man has on earth, and whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of '*pecunia*' (money), because in olden times men's possessions consisted entirely of '*pecora*' (flocks). And the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 1): *We give the name of money to anything that can be valued in currency.*

Reply Obj. 3. Justice establishes equality in external things, but has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of internal passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of liberality, and in another way of justice.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER USING MONEY IS THE ACT OF LIBERALITY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that using money is not the act of liberality. For different virtues have different acts. But using money is becoming to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence. Therefore it is not the proper act of liberality.

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality.

Obj. 3. Further, The use of money consists not only in giving it but also in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the spender, and consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says (*De Benef. v.*): *A man is not liberal by giving to himself.* Therefore not every use of money belongs to liberality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 1*): *In whatever matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter: Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the best use of riches.* Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good use of money is the act of liberality.

I answer that, The species of an act is taken from its object, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XVIII., A. 2). Now the object or matter of liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the foregoing Article (*ad 2*). And since every virtue is consistent with its object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful goods, since all external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the proper act of liberality is making use of money or riches.

Reply Obj. 1. It belongs to liberality to make good use of riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of

liberality. On the other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under another aspect, namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing is due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for the fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in relation to liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall explain farther on (Q. CXXXIV.).

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make good use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide opportunities for that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier's fortitude not only to wield his sword against the foe, but also to sharpen his sword and keep it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to use money, but also to keep it in preparation and safety in order to make fitting use of it.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated (A. 2, *ad 1*), the internal passions whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man should not be prevented from making any due use of money through an inordinate affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one consists in applying it to one's own use, and would seem to come under the designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts. Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an immoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from making suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with giving and spending, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 1). The saying of Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving: for a man is not said to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to himself.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT BELONGS TO A LIBERAL MAN CHIEFLY TO GIVE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to a liberal man chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral virtues, is regulated by prudence. Now it seems to belong very much to prudence that a man should keep his riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 1*) that *those who have not earned money, but have received the money earned by others, spend it more liberally, because they have not experienced the want of it.* Therefore it seems that giving does not chiefly belong to the liberal man.

Obj. 2. Further, No man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to do, nor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal man is sometimes sorry for what he has given, nor does he give to all, as stated in *Ethic. iv. (loc. cit.)*. Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give.

Obj. 3. Further, In order to accomplish what he intends chiefly, a man employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal man is not a beggar, as the Philosopher observes (*Ethic. iv. loc. cit.*); and yet by begging he might provide himself with the means of giving to others. Therefore it seems that he does not chiefly aim at giving.

Obj. 4. Further, Man is bound to look after himself rather than others. But by spending he looks after himself, whereas by giving he looks after others. Therefore it belongs to a liberal man to spend rather than to give.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. loc. cit.*) that *it belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving.*

I answer that, It is proper to a liberal man to use money. Now the use of money consists in parting with it. For the acquisition of money is like generation rather than use: while the keeping of money, in so far as it is directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a habit. Now in parting with a thing—for instance, when we throw something—the

farther we put it away the greater the force (*virtus*) employed. Hence parting with money by giving it to others proceeds from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves. But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more perfect, since *virtue is a kind of perfection* (*Phys.* vii. text. 17, 18). Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving.

Reply Obj. 1. It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest it be stolen or spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is not less but more prudent than to keep it usefully: since more things have to be considered in money's use, which is likened to movement, than in its keeping, which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received money that others have earned, spend it more liberally, through not having experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the sole cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue of liberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely removes the impediment to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to act liberally, because, not unfrequently, the fear of want that results from the experience of want hinders those who have acquired money from using it up by acting with liberality; as does likewise the love they have for it as being their own effect, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 1).

Reply Obj. 2. As stated in this and the preceding Article, it belongs to liberality to make fitting use of money, and consequently to give it in a fitting manner, since this is a use of money. Again, every virtue is grieved by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids whatever hinders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable giving; namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given, and giving something unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at both: but especially at the former, since it is more opposed to his proper act. For this reason, too, he does not give to all: since his act would be hindered were he to give to everyone: for he would not have the means of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him to give.

Reply Obj. 3. Giving and receiving are related to one another as action and passion. Now the same thing is not

the principle of both action and passion. Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving, it does not belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and still less to beg. Hence the verse :

In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many
Should give often, take seldom, ask never.

But he makes provision in order to give certain things according as liberality requires; such are the fruits of his own possessions, for he is careful about realizing them that he may make a liberal use thereof.

Reply Obj. 4. To spend on oneself is an inclination of nature; hence to spend money on others belongs properly to a virtue.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIBERALITY IS A PART OF JUSTICE ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not a part of justice. For justice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing is due the less liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is not a part of justice, but is incompatible with it.

Obj. 2. Further, Justice is about operations, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 9: I.-II., Q. L., AA. 2, 3): whereas liberality is chiefly about the love and desire of money, which are passions. Therefore liberality seems to belong to temperance rather than to justice.

Obj. 3. Further, It belongs chiefly to liberality to give becomingly, as stated (A. 4). But giving becomingly belongs to beneficence and mercy, which pertain to charity, as stated above (QQ. XXX., XXXI.). Therefore liberality is a part of charity rather than of justice.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Offic. i.*): *Justice has to do with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is divided into two parts, justice and beneficence, also called liberality or kind-heartedness.* Therefore liberality pertains to justice.

I answer that, Liberality is not a species of justice, since

justice pays another what is his, whereas liberality gives another what is one's own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees with justice: first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as justice is; secondly, that it is concerned with external things, and so is justice, albeit under a different aspect, as stated in this Article and above (A. 2, *ad* 3). Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to a principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Although liberality does not consider the legal due that justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due is based on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it answers to the idea of due in the lowest degree.

Reply Obj. 2. Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the body. But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to the body but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly pertain to temperance.

Reply Obj. 3. The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the fact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom he gives: wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But the giving of liberality arises from a person being affected in a certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his friends but also to those whom he knows not. Hence it belongs not to charity, but to justice, which is about external things.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIBERALITY IS THE GREATEST OF THE
VIRTUES ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues. For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now man is likened chiefly by liberality to God, *Who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not* (James i. 5). Therefore liberality is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, According to Augustine (*De Trin.* vi. 8), *in things that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best.* Now the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since *the good is self-communicative*, according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Hence Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i.) that *justice inclines to severity, liberality to goodness.* Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Men are honoured and loved on account of virtue. Now Boethius says (*De Consol.* ii.) that *bounty above all makes a man famous*: and the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 1) that *among the virtuous the liberal are the most beloved.* Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i.) that *justice seems to be more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more pleasing.* The Philosopher also says (*Rhet.* i. 9) that *brave and just men are honoured chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal.*

I answer that, Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now liberality tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily and of its own nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of its very nature it tends to set in order one's own affection towards the possession and use of money. In this way temperance, which moderates desires and pleasures relating to one's own body, takes precedence of liberality: and so do fortitude and justice, which, in a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time of peace, the other in time of war: while all these are preceded by those virtues which are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses all manner of human good; and among human goods the public good surpasses the good of the individual; and of the last named the good of the body surpasses those goods that consist of external things.

Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not being a lover of money, it follows that a man readily makes use of it, whether for himself, or for the good of others, or for God's glory. Thus it derives a certain

excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, however, we should judge of things according to that which is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature, rather than according to that which pertains to them consequently, it remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. God's giving proceeds from His love for those to whom He gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives, wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues, rather than to liberality.

Reply Obj. 2. Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by giving forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are better than money which liberality gives forth.

Reply Obj. 3. The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved is not that which is based on virtue, as though he were better than others, but that which is based on utility, because he is more useful in external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. For the same reason he becomes famous.

QUESTION CXVIII.

OF THE VICIES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE
FIRST PLACE, OF COVETOUSNESS.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and
(1) covetousness: (2) prodigality.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is a sin? (2) Whether it is a
special sin? (3) To which virtue it is opposed: (4) Whether
it is a mortal sin? (5) Whether it is the most grievous of
sins? (6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin?
(7) Whether it is a capital vice? (8) Of its daughters.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a sin. For covetousness (*avaritia*) denotes a certain greed for gold (*æris aviditas**), because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money, under which all external goods may be comprised. Now it is not a sin to desire external goods: since man desires them naturally, both because they are naturally subject to man, and because by their means man's life is sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his substance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Every sin is against either God, or one's neighbour, or oneself, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXII., A. 4). But covetousness is not, properly speaking, a sin against

* The Latin for covetousness *avaritia* is derived from *aveo* to desire; but the Greek *φιλαργυρία* signifies literally *love of money*: and it is to this that S. Thomas is alluding (cf. A. 2. *Obj. 2*).

God: since it is opposed neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which man is directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this pertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1 Cor. vi. 18): *He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body.* In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's neighbour, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own. Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Things that occur naturally are not sins. Now covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 1). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. xiii. 5): *Let your manners be without covetousness, contented with such things as you have.*

I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a due measure, evil must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that measure. Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in a certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate with health, as the Philosopher observes (*Polit.* i. 6). External goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated above (Q. CXVII., A. 3: I.-II., Q. II., A. 1). Hence it must needs be that man's good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other words, that man seek, according to a certain measure, to have external riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined as *immoderate love of possessing.* It is therefore evident that covetousness is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. It is natural to man to desire external things as means to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as it is held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Covetousness may signify immoderation about external things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires or keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly against one's neighbour, since one man cannot over-abound in external riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches, when, for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in them, immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against himself, because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in his body as do the sins of the flesh.

As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of temporal things.

Reply Obj. 3. Natural inclinations should be regulated according to reason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though old people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with regard to riches.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS A SPECIAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* iii.): *Covetousness, which in Greek is called φιλαργυρία, applies not only to silver or money, but also to anything that is desired immoderately.* Now in every sin there is immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXI., A. VI., *Obj. 3*). Therefore covetousness is a general sin.

Obj. 2. Further, According to Isidore (*Etym.* x.), *the*

covetous (avarus) man is so called because he is *greedy for brass (avidus æris)*, i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called *φιλαργυρία*, i.e. *love of silver*. Now silver, which stands for money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be measured by money, as stated above (Q. CXVII., A. 2, *ad 2*). Therefore covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently seems to be a general sin.

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Rom. vii. 7, *For I had not known concupiscence*, says: *The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil*. Now the law seems to forbid especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written (Exod. xx. 17): *Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's goods*. Therefore the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is a general sin.

On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together with other special sins (Rom. i. 29), where it is written: *Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness* (Douay,—*avarice*), etc.

I answer that, Sins take their species from their objects, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXII., A. 1). Now the object of a sin is the good towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind of sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good. And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man. Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an immoderate love of having possessions, which are comprised under the name of money, whence covetousness (*avaritia*) is denominated.

Since, however, the verb *to have*, which seems to have been originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in *De Prædicamentis*), consequently the term *covetousness* has been amplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says

in a homily (xvi. *in Ev.*) that *covetousness is a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after.* In this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the *First Objection*. Wherefore this suffices for the *Reply to the First Objection*.

Reply Obj. 2. All those external things that are subject to the uses of human life are comprised under the term *money*, inasmuch as they have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honours, and so forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it is a special vice.

Reply Obj. 3. This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is forbidden to covet another's possessions, it is also forbidden to covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality. For Chrysostom, commenting on Matth. v. 6, *Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice*, says (*Hom. xv. in Matth.*) that there are two kinds of justice, one general, and the other special, to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (*Ethic. v. 2*). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.

Obj. 2. Further, The sin of covetousness consists in a man's exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to justice and not to liberality.

Obj. 3. Further, Liberality is a virtue that observes the mean between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states

(*Ethic.* i. 7; iv. 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v. 1, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. v. 9): *A covetous man shall not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no fruits from them.* Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in the desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.

I answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition and keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his due, by stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. xxii. 27): *Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness.* Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In this way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these affections, as stated above (Q. CXVII., A. 2, ad 3, A. 3, ad 3, A. 6). In this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor. ix. 5): *That they would . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a blessing, not as covetousness,* where a gloss observes: *Lest they should regret what they had given, and give but little.*

Reply Obj. 1. Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is called illiberality* by the Philosopher.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally in the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking and keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as these

* ἀνελευθερία.

proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which latter depends on the rule of reason.

Reply Obj. 3. Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite vice: since it consists in having more than one ought according to justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For no one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy of death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying (Rom. i. 29): *Being filled with all iniquity . . . fornication, covetousness* (Douay,—*avarice*), etc., adds (*verse* 32): *They who do such things are worthy of death.* Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, The least degree of covetousness is to hold to one's own inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil says (*Serm. super. Luc. xii. 18*): It is the hungry man's bread that thou keepest back, the naked man's cloak that thou hoardest, the needy man's money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as thou mightest succour.

Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is contrary to the love of our neighbour. Much more therefore is all covetousness a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, No one is struck with spiritual blindness save through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace. But, according to Chrysostom,* *Lust for money brings darkness on the soul.* Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. iii. 12, *If any man build*

* *Hom. xv. in the Opus Imperfectum*, falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

upon this foundation, says (cf. S. Augustine, *De Fide et Oper.* xvi.) that *he builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world, how he may please the world, which pertains to the sin of covetousness.* Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but venially, for it is said of him that *he shall be saved, yet so as by fire.* Therefore covetousness is sometimes a venial sin.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3) covetousness is two-fold. In one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the unjust taking or retaining of another's property, and this belongs to theft or robbery, which are mortal sins, as stated above (Q. LXVI., AA. 6, 8). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (Q. LXVI., A. 6, *ad* 3), when we were treating of theft.

In another way covetousness may be taken as opposed to liberality: in which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly, if the love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in such wise that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the love of God and his neighbour, covetousness will then be a mortal sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love stops short of this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he does not prefer the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling for the sake of riches to do anything in opposition to God or his neighbour, then covetousness is a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Covetousness is numbered together with mortal sins, by reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is bound by a legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through fear of their want or on account of his having too much.

Reply Obj. 3. Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by preferring the love of riches to the love of God.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS THE GREATEST OF SINS ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For it is written (Ecclus. x. 9): *Nothing is more wicked than a covetous man*, and the text continues: *There is not a more wicked thing than to love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale.* Tully also says (*De Offic.* i., under the heading—*True magnanimity is based chiefly on two things*): *Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to love money.* But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 2. Further, The more a sin is opposed to charity, the more grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII. qu. 36) that *greed is the bane of charity.* Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins.

Obj. 3. Further, The gravity of a sin is indicated by its being incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be most grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an incurable sin: hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 1) that *old age and helplessness of any kind make men illiberal.* Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 4. Further, The Apostle says (Eph. v. 5) that covetousness *is a serving of idols.* Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous sins. Therefore covetousness is also.

On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, according to Prov. vi. 30. But theft pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not the most grievous of sins.

I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil, consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so far as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good. Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that is

against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin against external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be considered on the part of the good to which the human appetite is inordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods: since it is less than the good of the body, and this is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine good. From this point of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the human appetite is subjected even to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since, however, corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from that of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous of sins.

Reply Obj. 1. These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Ecclus. x. 10) it is given as a reason that the covetous man *setteth his own soul to sale*; because, to wit, he exposes his soul—that is, his life—to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues: *Because while he liveth he hath cast away*—that is, despised—*his bowels*, in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of a *narrow mind*, namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to any temporal good, not in its special acceptance for covetousness: because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal good.

Reply Obj. 3. The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable by reason of contempt: for

instance, because a man contemns God's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby man's sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the greater gravity of the sin. On the other hand, covetousness is incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one gives way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indication not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more dangerous.

Reply Obj. 4. Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man, like the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external creature by paying it Divine honour, whereas the covetous man subjects himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use, not for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as grievous a sin as idolatry.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS A SPIRITUAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

Obj. 3. Further, A sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. vi. 18), *He that committeth fornication sinneth against*

his own body. Now covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (*Hom. xxix. in Matth.*) compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil (Mark v.) and was troubled in body. Therefore covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral. xxxi.*) numbers covetousness among spiritual vices.

I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure and sorrow, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. ii. 5*). Now some pleasures are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are consummated in the carnal senses—for instance, the pleasures of the table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches. Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a bodily object.

Reply Obj. 2. Movement takes its species from the term *whereto* and not from the term *wherefrom*. Hence a vice of the flesh is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its originating in some defect of the flesh.

Reply Obj. 3. Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh in the same way as the latter, but by

way of contrast, since while the possessed man, of whom we read in Mark v., stripped himself, the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS A CAPITAL VICE ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be reckoned a capital vice.

Obj. 2. Further, As stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXXIV., AA. 3, 4), those vices are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness: since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed to an end, as stated in *Ethic.* i. 5. Therefore covetousness is not a capital vice.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* xv.) that *covetousness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who, when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who, wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other people's property.* Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi.) reckons covetousness among the capital vices.

I answer that, As stated in the *Second Objection*, a capital vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human life, as stated above (I.-II., Q. I., AA. 4, 7, 8): wherefore the more a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the

more desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appetite at rest, as the last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says (*De Consol.* iii.): the reason of which, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v. 5), is that we *use money in token of taking possession of something*, and again it is written (*Eccles.* x. 19): *All things obey money*. Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money, is a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, because it regards money, which occupies a principal place among sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article.

On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 1) that *a prodigal man is a fool rather than a knave*.

Reply Obj. 2. It is true that money is directed to something else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q. XXXVI., A. 4, *ad* 1: I.-II., Q. LXXXIV., A. 4), provided that itself be frequently the source of others.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER TREACHERY, FRAUD, FALSEHOOD, PERJURY, RESTLESSNESS, VIOLENCE, AND INSENSIBILITY TO MERCY ARE DAUGHTERS OF COVETOUSNESS ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as commonly stated, namely, *treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy.* For covetousness is opposed to liberality, as stated above (A. 3). Now treachery, fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion, restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved object, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have no connection with covetousness.

Obj. 2. Further, Treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbour. Therefore they should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.

Obj. 3. Further, Isidore (*Comment. in Deut.*) enumerates nine daughters of covetousness; which are *lying, fraud, theft, perjury, greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity, rapacity.* Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient.

Obj. 4. Further, The Philosopher (*Ethic. iv. 1*) mentions many kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality, for he speaks of those who are *sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints,* misers,† who do illiberal deeds,* and of those who *batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers of the dead, and robbers.* Therefore it seems that the aforesaid enumeration is insufficient.

Obj. 5. Further, Tyrants use much violence against their subjects. But the Philosopher says (*ibid.*) that *tyrants who destroy cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal, i.e. covetous.* Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of covetousness.

* *κυμνοπρίστης.*

† *κίμβικες.*

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi.) assigns to covetousness the daughters mentioned above.

I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now since covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this respect covetousness gives rise to *insensibility to mercy*, because, to wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with his riches.* In the second place it belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought (*affectu*). In this way it gives rise to *restlessness*, by hindering man with excessive anxiety and care, for *a covetous man shall not be satisfied with money* (Eccles. v. 9). Secondly, it may be considered in the execution (*effectu*). In this way the covetous man, in acquiring other people's goods, sometimes employs force, which pertains to *violence*, sometimes deceit, and then if he has recourse to words, it is *falsehood*, if it be mere words, *perjury* if he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we have *fraud*; if persons, then we have *treachery*, as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness.

Reply Obj. 1. There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to have species.

Reply Obj. 2. These three are distinguished as stated in the Article.

Reply Obj. 3. These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as insensibility to mercy.

* See Q. XXX. A. 1.

Reply Obj. 4. The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives but little he is said to be *sparing*; if nothing, he is *tight-fisted*: if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be a *κυμνοπρίστης* (*skinflint*), a cummin-seller, as it were, because he makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by labouring much to make little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means, whether by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.

Reply Obj. 5. Just as liberality is about moderate sums of money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.

QUESTION CXIX.

OF PRODICALITY.

(In Three Articles.)

WE must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness? (2) Whether prodigality is a sin? (3) Whether it is a graver sin than covetousness?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRODICALITY IS OPPOSITE TO COVETOUSNESS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.

Obj. 2. Further, Opposites relate to one same thing. But covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.

Obj. 3. Further, Sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXII., A. 3). Now prodigality seems always to be directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated (Luke xv. 13) of the prodigal son that he *wasted his substance living riotously*. Therefore it seems that prodigality is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness and liberality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 7: iv. 1) that prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we give here the name of covetousness.

I answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and prodigality differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful of them than he ought: and as regards external action, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in retaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness.

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be *prodigal*, while he who is deficient in giving is said to be *covetous*. Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (*Ethic.* iv. 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of necessity, since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects.

Reply Obj. 2. Prodigality regards passions in respect of money, not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.

Reply Obj. 3. The prodigal does not always exceed in

giving for the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 1) that *many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRODIGALITY IS A SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. vi. 10): *Covetousness (Douay,—Desire of money) is the root of all evils.* But it is not the root of prodigality, since this is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, The Apostle says (1 Tim. vi. 17, 18): *Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others.* Now this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, It belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming to the perfect, who fulfil the words of our Lord (Matth. vi. 34), *Be not . . . solicitous for to-morrow,* and (Matth. xix. 21), *Sell all (Vulg.,—what) thou hast, and give to the poor.* Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the opposition between prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either of which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and sinful through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that prodigality is a sin,

Reply Obj. 1. Some expound this saying of the Apostle as referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual covetousness, which is the concupiscence of the *fomes*,* whence all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of riches, for he had said previously (*verse 9*): *They that will become rich*, etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be *the root of all evils*, not that all evils always arise from covetousness, but because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in order to curry favour with certain persons from whom he may receive riches.

Reply Obj. 2. The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does not do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (*Ethic. iv. 1*), *his giving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought to be. For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor, namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give nothing.*

Reply Obj. 3. The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not in the total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought to be given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those who give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ, and banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are not prodigal but perfectly liberal.

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXI. A. 3, *ad 2.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRODIGALITY IS A MORE GRIEVOUS SIN THAN
COVETOUSNESS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbour by not communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures himself, because the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 1*) that *the corruption of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an undoing of his very being.* Now he that injures himself sins more grievously, according to *Ecclus. xiv. 5, He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good ?* Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.

Obj. 2. Further, A disorder that is accompanied by a laudable circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes (*Ethic. iv. 1*). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.

Obj. 3. Further, Prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated above (Q. LVI., A. 1, *ad 1: I.-II.*, Q. LXI., A. 2, *ad 1*). Now prodigality is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written (*Prov. xxi. 20*): *There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it:* and the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 6*) that *it is the mark of a fool to give too much and receive nothing.* Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. ibid.*) that *the prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man.*

I answer that, Prodigality considered in itself is a less

grievous sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving, wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in *Ethic. iv. (loc. cit.)*. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is opposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want, since much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is not easily cured, for the reason given above (Q. CXVIII., A. 5, *ad 3*).

Reply Obj. 1. The difference between the prodigal and the covetous man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending that which is his, and his means of support, and against others by spending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like manner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency in spending: wherefore it is written (Eccles. vi. 2): *A man to whom God hath given riches . . . yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof*. Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he injures both himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his own goods for his own profit.

Reply Obj. 2. In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend too much for the sake of intemperance

points already to several additional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in *Ethic.* iv. 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others.

Reply Obj. 3. All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.

QUESTION CXX.

OF "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY.

(In Two Articles.)

WE must now consider *epikeia*, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether *epikeia* is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a part of justice?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER "EPIKEIA"* IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that *epikeia* is not a virtue. For no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet *epikeia* does away with another virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore *epikeia* is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De vera Relig.* xxxi.): *With regard to these earthly laws, although men pass judgement on them when they make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge must pronounce judgement not on them but according to them.* But seemingly *epikeia* pronounces judgement on the law, when it deems that the law should not be observed in some particular case. Therefore *epikeia* is a vice rather than a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Apparently it belongs to *epikeia* to consider the intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* v. 10). But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the *Codex of Laws and Constitutions*, under Law i.: *It is fitting and lawful that We alone should interpret*

* ἐπιεικεία.

between equity and law. Therefore the act of *epikeia* is unlawful: and consequently *epikeia* is not a virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* v. 10) states it to be a virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. XCVI., A. 6), when we were treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned, are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to the common good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires deposits to be restored, because in the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes to be injurious—for instance, if a madman were to put his sword in deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to fight against his country. In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good. This is the object of *epikeia* which we call equity. Therefore it is evident that *epikeia* is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. *Epikēia* does not set aside that which is just in itself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it ought to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought not to be followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the *Codex of Laws and Constitutions* under *Law v.*: *Without doubt he transgresses the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of the lawgiver.*

Reply Obj. 2. It would be passing judgement on a law to say that it was not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to be observed in some particular case is passing judgement not on the law, but on some particular contingency.

Reply Obj. 3. Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases where it is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law

without the interpretation of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there is need, not of interpretation, but of execution.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER "EPIKEIA" IS A PART OF JUSTICE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that *epikeia* is not a part of justice. For, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 7), justice is twofold, particular and legal. Now *epikeia* is not a part of particular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that *epikeia* is not a part of justice.

Obj. 2. Further, A more principal virtue is not assigned as the part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now *epikeia* seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as implied by its name: for it is derived from ἐπί, i.e. *above*, and δίκαιον, i.e. *just*. Therefore *epikeia* is not a part of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, It seems that *epikeia* is the same as modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil. iv. 5), *Let your modesty be known to all men* the Greek has ἐπιείκεια.* Now, according to Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore *epikeia* is not a part of justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* v. 10) that *epikeia* is a kind of justice.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XLVIII.), a virtue has three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and posteriority, as *being* of substance and accident.

* τὸ ἐπιείκεις.

Accordingly, *epikeia* is a part of justice taken in a general sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* v. 10). Wherefore it is evident that *epikeia* is a subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of *epikeia*. Hence *epikeia* is by way of being a higher rule of human actions.

Reply Obj. 1. *Epikēia* corresponds properly to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the lawgiver, which is of more account, then *epikeia* is the more important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then *epikeia* is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its general acceptance, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* v. 10), *epikeia* is better than a certain, namely, legal, justice, which observes the letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all justice.

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to *epikeia* to moderate something, namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life—for instance, in his deportment, dress, or the like. Possibly also the term *ἐπιείκεια* is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation.

QUESTION CXXI.

OF PIETY.

(In Two Articles.)

WE must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely, piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost? (2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PIETY IS A GIFT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ from the virtues, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXVIII., A. 1). But piety is a virtue, as stated above (Q. CI., A. 3). Therefore piety is not a gift.

Obj. 2. Further, The gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above all the moral virtues, as stated above (Q. LXVIII., A. 8). Now among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a gift rather than piety.

Obj. 3. Further, The gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXVIII., A. 6). But the act of piety cannot remain in heaven: for Gregory says (*Moral. i.*) that *piety fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy*: and so there will be no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness.* Therefore piety is not a gift.

On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter of Isaias (*verse 2*: Douay,—*godliness*).†

* Cf. Q. XXX. A. 1.

† Cf. Q. LII. A. 4, footnote.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. LXVIII., A. 1: Q. LXIX., AA. 1, 3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial affection towards God, according to Rom. viii. 15, *You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father).* And since it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father, it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1. The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as Father.

Reply Obj. 2. To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the gift of piety is greater than religion.

Reply Obj. 3. As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on account of their being related to his father, so by the gift of piety he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to honour the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one understands them or not, as Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii.). Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness. And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the Day of Judgement, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. v. 5, *Behold how they are numbered among the children of God.* The saints will also mutually honour one another. Now, however, before the Judgement Day, the saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SECOND BEATITUDE, "BLESSED ARE THE MEEK," CORRESPONDS TO THE GIFT OF PIETY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the second beatitude, *Blessed are the meek*, does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude, *Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice*, or the fifth beatitude, *Blessed are the merciful*, since, as stated above (A. 1, *Obj.* 3), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety.

Obj. 2. Further, The gift of piety is directed by the gift of knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts (Isa. xi.). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since, then, the third beatitude, *Blessed are they that mourn*, corresponds to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude corresponds to piety.

Obj. 3. Further, The fruits correspond to the beatitudes and gifts, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXX., A. 2). Now among the fruits, goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not correspond to the gift of piety.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i.*): *Piety agrees with the meek.*

I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore he assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the second beatitude, *Blessed are the meek*, to piety, and so on. Another congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to the gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and fifth beatitudes would correspond to

piety, rather than the second. Yet the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.

This suffices for the *Reply* to the *First Objection*.

Reply Obj. 2. Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to knowledge and piety: but taking them according to their order, different beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity may be observed, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. In the fruits goodness and benignity may be directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.

QUESTION CXXII.

OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE.

(In Six Articles.)

WE must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice? (2) Of the first precept of the decalogue: (3) Of the second: (4) Of the third: (5) Of the fourth: (6) Of the other six.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is to make the citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 1. Wherefore, according to *Ethic.* v. 1, the law prescribes about all acts of all virtues. Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.

Obj. 2. Further, It would seem that to justice belong especially the judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XCIX., A. 4). But the precepts of the decalogue are moral precepts, as stated above (I.-II., Q. C., A. 3). Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, The Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers and the like. But there is no mention of

these in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do not properly belong to justice.

Obj. 4. Further, The precepts of the decalogue are divided into two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our neighbour, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.

On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.

I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at once, as to principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, appears in justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters that refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another that which is his due. Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining are about justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals.

Reply Obj. 1. The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbour, just as the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are contained in the decalogue: and

yet they are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.

Reply Obj. 3. Things that concern the common good must needs be administered in different ways according to the difference of men. Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the decalogue, but among the judicial precepts.

Reply Obj. 4. The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as their end, according to 1 Tim. i. 5, *The end of the commandment is charity*: but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer immediately to acts of justice.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRST PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE IS FITTINGLY EXPRESSED ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his father in the flesh, according to Heb. xii. 9, *How much more shall we* (Vulg.,—*shall we not much more*) *obey the Father of spirits and live?* Now the precept of piety, whereby man honours his father, is expressed affirmatively in these words: *Honour thy father and thy mother.* Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, whereby all honour God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is naturally prior to negation.

Obj. 2. Further, The first precept of the decalogue pertains to religion, as stated above (A. 1). Now religion, since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are forbidden: since we read first: *Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me*; secondly, *Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing*; and thirdly, *Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them.* Therefore the first precept is unfittingly expressed.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De decem chord.* ix.) that *the first precept forbids the sin of superstition.* But there are many wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above

(Q. XCII., A. 2). Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it behoved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the order of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now two things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and in building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes good use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end. Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is the last end of man's will.

The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, according to Jerem. iv. 3, *Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon thorns*. Hence it behoved man, first of all to be instructed in religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, according to Matth. vi. 24, *You cannot serve God and mammon*. Therefore in the first precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded.

Reply Obj. 1. In point of fact there is one affirmative precept about religion, namely: *Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day*. Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of generation negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning

God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (*Div. Nom.* ii.)

Reply Obj. 2. People worshipped strange gods in two ways. For some served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images. Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshipped gods without using images: and this worship is first forbidden by the words, *Thou shalt not have strange gods.* Among others the worship of false gods was observed by using certain images: and so the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, *Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing,* as also the worship of those same images, by the words, *Thou shalt not adore them,* etc.

Reply Obj. 3. All other kinds of superstition proceed from some compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood to be forbidden by the words, *Thou shalt not have strange gods.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SECOND PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE
IS FITTINGLY EXPRESSED ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For this precept, *Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain* is thus explained by a gloss on Exod. xx. 7: *Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature,* so that it forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Deut. v. 11, *Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain,* adds, i.e. *by giving the name of God to wood or stone,* as though they forbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief. Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, whereby superstition is forbidden.

Obj. 2. Further, The name of God is taken for many purposes—for instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col. iii. 17, *All whatsoever you do in word or in*

work . . . do ye in the name of the Lord. Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of God's name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded it.

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Exod. xx. 7 expounds the precept, *Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain*, namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say, swearing without judgement. But false swearing, which is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden them.

Obj. 4. Further, Blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult to God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and other like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.

Obj. 5. Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not have been said indefinitely: *Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain.*

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue it is necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition. Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated above (Q. XCVII., in the preamble, and in the Article that follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing man from acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, according to Isa. xxviii. 20, *The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out*, i.e. either the true God or a false god must fall out from man's heart, *and a short covering cannot cover both.* On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from honouring God after he has acknowledged Him.

Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view to worship, before honouring Him we have acknowledged.

For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.

Reply Obj. 1. These expositions are mystical. The literal explanation is that which is given Deut. v. 11: *Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, namely, by swearing on that which is not.**

Reply Obj. 2. This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of God, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a man's word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name more frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the explanation quoted in the *First Objection*.

Reply Obj. 3. To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called perjury, as stated above (Q. XCVIII., A. 1, ad 3). For when a man swears to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is not supported by the truth. On the other hand, when a man swears without judgement, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the swearer.

Reply Obj. 4. Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law, which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the latter sin.

* Vulg.,—*for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon a vain thing.*

Reply Obj. 5. Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: *Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain*: since it matters not in which of God's names perjury is committed.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE THIRD PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE, CONCERNING THE HALLOWING OF THE SABBATH, IS FITTINGLY EXPRESSED ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed. For this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in commenting on Luke xiii. 14, *The ruler of the synagogue being angry that He had healed on the Sabbath*, says (*Comment. iv.*): The Law forbids, *not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works, i.e. to burden oneself with sin*. Taken literally it is a ceremonial precept, for it is written (Exod. xxxi. 13): *See that you keep My Sabbath: because it is a sign between Me and you in your generations*. Now the precepts of the decalogue are both spiritual and moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.

Obj. 2. Further, The ceremonial precepts of the Law contain *sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances*, as stated above (I.-II., Q. CI., A. 4). Now sacred things comprised not only sacred days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover, there were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention only that of the Sabbath.

Obj. 3. Further, Whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins. But in the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did not sin—for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth day, and the priests

who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also Elias (3 Kings xix.), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of God, Horeb, must have travelled on a Sabbath: the priests also who carried the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Josue vii., must be understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is written (Luke xiii. 15): *Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or his ass . . . and lead them to water?* Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.

Obj. 4. Further, The precepts of the decalogue have to be observed also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord's day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many like things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is unfittingly expressed.

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being removed by the first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above (AA. 2, 3), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby man is established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give worship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach us the interior worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is external worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And since for the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, consisting in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law was necessary respecting the exterior worship that consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the decalogue are, so to speak, first and common principles of the Law, and consequently the third precept of the decalogue prescribes the exterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns all. This universal boon was the work of the Creation of the world, from which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh day: and in sign of this we are commanded to keep holy the seventh day—that is, to set it aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath

the reason for it is given: *For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth . . . and rested on the seventh day.*

Reply Obj. 1. The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, understood literally, is partly moral and partly ceremonial. It is a moral precept in the point of commanding man to set aside a certain time to be given to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as refreshment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the dictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual refreshment, by which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to have a certain time set aside for occupying oneself with Divine things is the matter of a moral precept. But, in so far as this precept specializes the time as a sign representing the Creation of the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its allegorical signification, as representative of Christ's rest in the tomb on the seventh day: as also in its moral signification, as representing cessation from all sinful acts, and the mind's rest in God, in which sense, too, it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its analogical signification, as foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath is placed among the precepts of the decalogue, as a moral, but not as a ceremonial precept.

Reply Obj. 2. The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of certain particular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is representative of a general boon, namely, the production of all creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the general precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial precept of the Law.

Reply Obj. 3. Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of the Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy himself with Divine things, and is signified in the words: *Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day.* For in the Law those things are said to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other thing is cessation from work, and is signified in the words (Exod. xx. 11), *On the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work.* The kind of work

meant appears from Levit. xxiii. 3, *You shall do no servile* work on that day.* Now servile work is so called from servitude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby man is the servant of sin, according to John viii. 34, *Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin,* and in this sense all sinful acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves another. Now one man serves another not with his mind but with his body, as stated above (Q. CIV., AA. 5, 6, *ad 1*). Wherefore in this respect those works are called servile whereby one man serves another. The third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work of worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work. In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath day, because that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath observance: since man abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in order that he may occupy himself with works connected with God's service. For this reason, according to John vii. 23, *a man† receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not be broken:* and for this reason too we read (Matth. xii. 5), that *on the Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath,* i.e. do corporal works on the Sabbath, *and are without blame.* Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner it is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss on Num. xxviii. says that *smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does not cease from his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, and are without blame.*

On the other hand, those works that are called servile in the first or second way are contrary to the observance of the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder man from applying himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered from applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by

* Vulg.,—*You shall do no work on that day.*

† Vulg.,—*If a man, etc.*

lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast day is more against this precept than to do some other but lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says (*De decem chord.* iii.): *It would be better if the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent his time seditiously in the theatre: and their womenfolk would do better to be making linen on the Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the new moon.* It is not, however, against this precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy holiness.

Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of God, are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly to servants; while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they are common to those who serve and those who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries both for himself and for his neighbour, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the well-being of the body, according to Prov. xxiv. 11, *Deliver them that are led to death:* secondarily as regards avoiding damage to one's property, according to Deut. xxii. 1, *Thou shalt not pass by if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother.* Hence a corporal work pertaining to the preservation of one's own bodily well-being does not profane the Sabbath: for it is not against the observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such things as preserve the health of the body. For this reason the Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they fought in self-defence on the Sabbath day (1 Machab. ii.), nor Elias when he fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For this same reason our Lord (Matth. xii. 3) excused His disciples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need which they suffered. In like manner a bodily work that is directed to the bodily well-being of another is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is written (John vii. 23): *Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath day?* And again, a bodily work that is done to avoid an imminent damage to some external thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord

says (Matth. xii. 11): *What man shall there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up?*

Reply Obj. 4. In the New Law the observance of the Lord's day took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the precept but by the institution of the Church and the custom of Christian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the observance of the Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work on the Lord's day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and certain works are permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again, in the New Law dispensation is more easily granted than in the Old, in the matter of certain forbidden works, on account of their necessity, because the figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is unlawful to omit even in small things; while works, considered in themselves, are changeable in point of place and time.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FOURTH PRECEPT, ABOUT HONOURING ONE'S PARENTS, IS FITTINGLY EXPRESSED?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the fourth precept, about honouring one's parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining to piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance, gratitude, and others of which we have spoken (QQ. CI., CII., seq.). Therefore it seems that there should not have been given a special precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.

Obj. 2. Further, Piety pays worship not only to one's parents, but also to one's country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the well-wishers of our country, as stated above (Q. CI., AA. 1, 2). Therefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the honouring of one's father and mother.

Obj. 3. Further, We owe our parents not merely honour

but also support. Therefore the mere honouring of one's parents is unfittingly prescribed.

Obj. 4. Further, Sometimes those who honour their parents die young, and on the contrary those who honour them not live a long time. Therefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the promise, *That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth.*

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbour. Now to our parents, of all our neighbours, we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately after the precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the precept directing us to our parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle: so that this precept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the First Table.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CI., A. 2), piety directs us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common to all. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are general precepts, they ought to contain some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of justice, which regard some special debt.

Reply Obj. 2. The debt to one's parents precedes the debt to one's kindred and country: since it is because we are born of our parents that our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct man to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred. Nevertheless this precept of honouring our parents is understood to command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as secondary matter included in the principal matter.

Reply Obj. 3. Reverential honour is due to one's parents as such, whereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for instance, because they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as stated above (Q. CI., A. 2). And since that which belongs to a thing by nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among the first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of the decalogue, there is a

special precept of honouring our parents: and this honour, as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and whatever else is due to our parents.

Reply Obj. 4. A long life is promised to those who honour their parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present life, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim. iv. 8): *Piety (Douay,—Godliness) is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come.* And with reason. Because the man who is grateful for a favour deserves, with a certain congruity, that the favour should be continued to him, and he who is ungrateful for a favour deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favour of bodily life to our parents after God: wherefore he that honours his parents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful for that favour: while he that honours not his parents deserves to be deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favour. However, present goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above (I.-II., Q. CXIV., A. 12), wherefore sometimes in accordance with the hidden design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the future reward, some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner deprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their parents, live longer.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE OTHER SIX PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE
ARE FITTINGLY EXPRESSED ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation that one refrain from injuring one's neighbour; but it is required that one pay one's debts, according to Rom. xiii. 7, *Render . . . to all men their dues.* Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to injure one's neighbour. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed.

Obj. 2. Further, These precepts forbid murder, adultery,

stealing and bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on one's neighbour, as appears from those which have been specified above (QQ. LXXII., *seq.*). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are unfittingly expressed.

Obj. 3. Further, Concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. vi. 21, *The desire (concupiscentia) of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom*: secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James iv. 1., *From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . . from your concupiscences which war in your members?* Now the concupiscence of the sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise first movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include some that forbid concupiscence.

Obj. 4. Further, Murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder. Therefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the desire of theft and of adultery.

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for some special reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays that which is due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining to religion, whereby man pays what is due to God, and after the fourth precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his parents—which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any special reason—it was necessary in due sequence to give certain precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all indifferently what is due to them.

Reply Obj. 1. Man is bound towards all persons in general to inflict injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the doing of those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbour, had to be given a place, as general

precepts, among the precepts of the decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbour are paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not behove to include affirmative precepts about these duties among the precepts of the decalogue.

Reply Obj. 2. All other injuries that are inflicted on our neighbour are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts, as taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance. For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbour are understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with one's neighbour, especially by way of lust, are understood to be forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as detractions, insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden together with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly opposed to justice.

Reply Obj. 3. The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do not go farther than the bounds of the sensuality. The direct object of their prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or pleasure.

Reply Obj. 4. Murder in itself is an object not of concupiscence but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of good. On the other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e. of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e. of something useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft and adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the concupiscence of murder.

QUESTION CXXIII.

OF FORTITUDE.

(*In Twelve Articles.*)

AFTER considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude. We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts; (3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to it.

Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: (1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; (3) the vices opposed to fortitude.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether fortitude is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring? (4) Whether it is only about fear of death? (5) Whether it is only in warlike matters? (6) Whether endurance is its chief act? (7) Whether its action is directed to its own good? (8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action? (9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences? (10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action? (11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue? (12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER FORTITUDE IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. xii. 9): *Virtue is perfected in*

infirmity. But fortitude is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, If it is a virtue, it is either theological, intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be gathered from what we have said above (I.-II., Q. LVII., A. 2; LXII., A. 3). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues, since according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iii. 7, 8): *Some seem to be brave through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers, both of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue, and some are called brave on account of certain passions;* for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonour, or again on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from passion but from choice, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LV., A. 4). Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it is a *good quality of the mind*, as stated above (*loc. cit.*). But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results from the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine (*De Morib. Eccl.* xv., xxi., xxii.) numbers fortitude among the virtues.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 6) *virtue is that which makes its subject good, and renders its work good*. Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes a man good, and renders his work good. Now man's good is to be in accordance with reason, according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv. 22). Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice; thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs. Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of reason.

First, through being drawn by some object of pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance. Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty, even as a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.

Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as it conforms man to reason.

Reply Obj. 1. The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue of patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity, and this belongs to the perfection that is called humility.

Reply Obj. 2. Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a virtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than virtue. Hence the Philosopher (*Ethic. iii. 8*) mentions five ways in which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through performing acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This may be done in three ways. First, because they tend to that which is difficult as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in three ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not perceiving the greatness of the danger; sometimes it is owing to the fact that one is hopeful of overcoming dangers—when, for instance, one has often experienced escape from danger; and sometimes this is owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who, through skill and practice in the use of arms, think little of the dangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending themselves against them; thus Vegetius says (*De Re Milit. i.*), *No man fears to do what he is confident of having learnt to do well.* Secondly, a man performs an act of fortitude without having the virtue, through the impulse of a passion,

whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Thirdly, through choice, not indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such as honour, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss.

Reply Obj. 3. The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue, as explained in the *Reply* to the *First Objection*, is so called from its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXIII., A. 1).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER FORTITUDE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it is written (Wis. viii. 7): *She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude*, where the text has *virtue* for *fortitude*. Since then the term *virtue* is common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is a general virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says (*De Offic. i*): *Fortitude is not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honour of the virtues and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue*; and he says the same further on in connexion with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special virtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude would seem to derive its name from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in *Ethic. ii*. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral. xxii.*) numbers it among the other virtues.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. LXI., AA. 3, 4), the term *fortitude* can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue. since as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore Tully says (*Rhet.* ii.), that *fortitude is deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils.* In this sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special matter.

Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher (*De Cælo* i. 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action, as stated in *Met.* v. 17. And since this latter meaning is the more common, the term *virtue*, as denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds of assaults.

Reply Obj. 2. Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as denoting firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. Nevertheless even as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those which are less difficult.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection takes fortitude in the first sense.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER FORTITUDE IS ABOUT FEAR AND DARING ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring. For Gregory says (*Moral. vii.*): *The fortitude of the just man is to overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the lusts of the present life.* Therefore fortitude seems to be about pleasures rather than about fear and daring.

Obj. 2. Further, Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet. ii.*), that it belongs to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not about fear and daring.

Obj. 3. Further, Not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XLV., A. 1, *ad 2*) in the treatise on passions. Therefore fortitude should not be about daring any more than about hope.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic. ii. 7; iii. 9*) that fortitude is about fear and daring.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails difficulty, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XLII., AA. 3, 5) in the treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the reason. And it behoves one not only firmly to bear the assault of these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the future, which seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude

of the just man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that which pertains properly to fortitude as a special virtue, by saying: *To love the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal reward.*

Reply Obj. 2. Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the course of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear. Hence fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those passions.

Reply Obj. 3. Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same object, and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XLV., A. 1). And since fortitude properly regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears from Tully's definition quoted in the *Second Objection*, it follows that fortitude properly is about fear and daring and not about hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XLV., A. 2).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER FORTITUDE IS ONLY ABOUT DANGERS OF DEATH ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of death. For Augustine says (*De Morib. Eccl.* xv.) that *fortitude is love bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved*: and (*Music.* vi.) he says that fortitude is *the love which dreads no hardship, not even death*. Therefore fortitude is not only about danger of death, but also about other afflictions.

Obj. 2. Further, All the passions of the soul need to be reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears to a mean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear of death, but also about other fears.

Obj. 3. Further, No virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in *Ethic. iii.* Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of death.

On the contrary, Andronicus says that *fortitude is a virtue of the irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behoves one to hold firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Morib. Eccl. xxii.*) that *the soul is shaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done away and destroyed.* Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of dangers of death.

Reply Obj. 1. Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a restricted sense.

Reply Obj. 2. Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money, as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own life is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue modifying the fear of death.

Reply Obj. 3. In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with reason is not contrary to virtue.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER FORTITUDE IS PROPERLY ABOUT DANGERS OF DEATH IN BATTLE ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their fortitude. But martyrs are not commended in connexion with battle. Therefore fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says (*De Offic. i.*) that *fortitude is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters*: and Tully (*De Offic. i.*), under the heading, 'That it pertains to fortitude to excel in battle rather than in civil life,' says: *Although not a few think that the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of civil life, this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more important and more glorious than those connected with war.* Now greater fortitude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude is not properly concerned with death in battle.

Obj. 3. Further, War is directed to the preservation of a country's temporal peace: for Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei xix.*) that *wars are waged in order to insure peace.* Now it does not seem that one ought to expose oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of one's country, since this same peace is the occasion of much licence in morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude is not about the danger of death in battle.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic. iii.*) that fortitude is chiefly about death in battle.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 4), fortitude strengthens a man's mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now fortitude is a virtue; and it is essential

to virtue ever to tend to good; wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not fly from the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out of sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good. On the other hand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly on account of some good, because, to wit, he is defending the common good by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there is the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle; secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even private individual does not refrain from giving a just judgement through fear of the impending sword, or any other danger though it threaten death. Hence it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the mind against dangers of death, not only such as arise in a general battle, but also such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by the general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted that fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle.

Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other kind of death; especially since man may be in danger of any kind of death on account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck or robbers.

Reply Obj. 1. Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is God; wherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the genus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason they are said to have been *valiant in battle*.*

Reply Obj. 2. Personal and civil business is differentiated from the business of war that regards general wars. However, personal and civil affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain conflicts which are private wars, and

* Office of Martyrs, ex. Heb. xi. 34.

so with regard to these also there may be fortitude properly so called.

Reply Obj. 3. The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it become evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For there are many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented by it, such as murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those which are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the flesh.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ENDURANCE IS THE CHIEF ACT OF FORTITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that endurance is not the chief act of fortitude. For virtue is *about the difficult and the good* (*Ethic. ii. 3*). Now it is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore endurance is not the chief act of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, To be able to act on another seems to argue greater power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to act on another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then fortitude denotes perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to fortitude to attack rather than to endure.

Obj. 3. Further, One contrary is more distant from the other than its mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas to attack denotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies pursuit. Since then fortitude above all withdraws the mind from fear, it seems that it regards attack rather than endurance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic. iii. 9*) that *certain persons are said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), and according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iii. 9*), *fortitude is more concerned to allay fear, than to moderate daring.* For it is more difficult to allay fear than to moderate daring, since the danger

which is the object of daring and fear, tends by its very nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now to attack belongs to fortitude in so far as the latter moderates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of fear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.

Reply Obj. 1. Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for three reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is attacking as though one were the stronger party; and it is more difficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly, because he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; and it is more difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly, because endurance implies length of time, whereas aggression is consistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain unmoved for a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iii. 8.*) that *some hurry to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the behaviour of a brave man.*

Reply Obj. 2. Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the body, but an action of the soul cleaving most resolutely (*fortissime*) to good, the result being that it does not yield to the threatening passion of the body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body.

Reply Obj. 3. He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BRAVE MAN ACTS FOR THE SAKE OF
THE GOOD OF HIS HABIT?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of

action the end, though first in intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fortitude, in the order of execution, follows the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his habit.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii.): *We love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be virtuous, namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own sake, without loving happiness. If they succeed in their endeavour, we shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer love that for the sake of which alone we love virtue.* But fortitude is a virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not to fortitude but to happiness.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Morib. Eccl.* xv.) that *fortitude is love ready to bear all things for God's sake.* Now God is not the habit of fortitude, but something better, since the end must needs be better than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 7) that *to the brave man fortitude itself is a good:* and such is an end.

I answer that, An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that agent's form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is to introduce the likeness of its heat into some passive matter: and the end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of his art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be called the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made external matter is fashioned by art; so in things done, human deeds are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the brave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his habit: but his remote end is happiness or God.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*: for the *First Objection* proceeds as though the very essence of a

habit were its end, instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The other two objections consider the ultimate end.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BRAVE MAN DELIGHTS IN HIS ACT?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For *delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit* (*Ethic.* x. 4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his act.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. v. 22, *But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace*, says that deeds of virtue are called *fruits because they refresh man's mind with a holy and pure delight*. Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in his act.

Obj. 3. Further, The weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently the brave man does all things with pleasure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 9) that *the brave man seems to have no delight in his act*.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. XXXI., AA. 3, 4, 5) where we were treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason. Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul—for instance, the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and things connected with them—but also to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one

side, has something that affords him delight, namely as regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence we read (2 Machab. vi. 30) that Eleazar said: *I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I fear Thee.*

Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God's grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he felt as though he were walking on roses.

Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 3; iii. 9) that *it is not necessary for a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not to be sad.*

Reply Obj. 1. The vehemence of the action or passion of one power hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper operation.

Reply Obj. 2. Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is principally the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 9) that *to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end.*

Reply Obj. 3. In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the presence of great bodily pain.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER FORTITUDE DEALS CHIEFLY WITH SUDDEN OCCURRENCES ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when they are unforeseen. But Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that *fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil.* Therefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says (*De Offic.* i.): *The brave man is not unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say afterwards: This beset me because I did not think it could possibly happen.* But it is not possible to be prepared for the future in the case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 8) that *the brave man is of good hope.* But hope looks forward to the future, which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 8) that *fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death.*

I answer that, Two things must be considered in the operation of fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not about sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to Gregory (*Hom.* xxv. in *Ev.*), *the blow that is foreseen strikes with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge.* The other thing to be considered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of the

virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden occurrences, because according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iii. 8) the habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a habit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a person without forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.

Yet is it possible for a person, even without the habit of fortitude, to prepare his mind against danger by long forethought: in the same way as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for the *Replies to the Objections*.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BRAVE MAN MAKES USE OF ANGER IN HIS ACTION ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher says (*De Memoria* ii.), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not employ anger for his action.

Obj. 2. Further, If a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more imperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (*De Ira* i.): *Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than for reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unsteady, the trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?* Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account

of sorrow or desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 8) that wild beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and adulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now fortitude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore in like manner it should not employ anger.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. *loc. cit.*) that *anger helps the brave.*

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. XXIV., A. 2), concerning anger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded anger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man: whereas the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the soul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed not in reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated above (*loc. cit.*), gave the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport themselves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the command of reason, so that it may co-operate by rendering action more prompt, they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the other passions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite, wherefore they called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them altogether from virtue.

Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but not immoderate anger.

Reply Obj. 1. Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will, which would not be the case were it immoderate.

Reply Obj. 2. Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an instrument, just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it unbecoming for the instrument to be

more imperfect than the principal agent, even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover, Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed by him directly at Aristotle.

Reply Obj. 3. Whereas fortitude, as stated above (A. 6), has two acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the act of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act, but for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the other passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of sorrow, so that it directly co-operates with fortitude in attacking. On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to the thing that hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as being the cause of anger, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XLVII., A. 3), or as making a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to a pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, in so far as one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 5): *Of all the cases in which fortitude arises from a passion, the most natural is when a man is brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose, i.e. for a due end; this is true fortitude.*

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER FORTITUDE IS A CARDINAL VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. For, as stated above (A. 10), anger is closely allied with fortitude. Now anger is not accounted a principal passion; nor is daring which belongs to fortitude. Therefore neither should fortitude be reckoned a cardinal virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, The object of virtue is good. But the direct object of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil and toil, as Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.). Therefore fortitude is not a cardinal virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, The cardinal virtues are about those things upon which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon a hinge (*cardine*). But fortitude is about dangers of death which are of rare occurrence in human life. Therefore fortitude should not be reckoned a cardinal or principal virtue.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* xxii.), Ambrose in his commentary on Luke vi. 20, and Augustine (*De Moribus Eccl.* xv.), number fortitude among the four cardinal or principal virtues.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. LXI., AA. 3, 4), those virtues are said to be cardinal or principal which have a foremost claim to that which belongs to the virtues in common. And among other conditions of virtue in general one is that it is stated to *act steadfastly*, according to *Ethic.* ii. 4. Now fortitude above all lays claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm is so much the more praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall or recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in accordance with reason, both by the pleasing good and the displeasing evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 36): *There is none that does not shun pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the most untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain.* And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are mostly feared which lead to death, and it is against them that the brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Daring and anger do not co-operate with fortitude in its act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended: for it is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal passion, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXV., A. 4).

Reply Obj. 2. Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it behoves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fortitude is directed to evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands, and to the good of reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard.

Reply Obj. 3. Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the occasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account of justice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds, man encounters mortal adversaries.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER FORTITUDE EXCELS AMONG ALL OTHER VIRTUES ?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues. For Ambrose says (*De Offic. i*): *Fortitude is higher, so to speak, than the rest.*

Obj. 2. Further, Virtue is about that which is difficult and good. But fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his possessions. But fortitude is about a man's person, for it is this that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue: whereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other and external things. Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues.

Obj. 4. On the contrary, Tully says (*De Offic. i*): *Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man.*

Obj. 5. Further, the Philosopher says (*Rhet. i. 19*): *Those virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others.* Now liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is a greater virtue.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Trin. vi.*), *In things that are great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good:* wherefore the better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is man's good, according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom. iv.*) Prudence, since it is a perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects this good, since it belongs to justice to establish the order of reason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this good, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they lead man away from

reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude holds the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason: and after fortitude comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing essentially ranks before effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance fourth, and after these the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. Ambrose places fortitude before the other virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he begins by saying (*ibid.*): *Now we come to treat of fortitude, which being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters.*

Reply Obj. 2. Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to its goodness rather than its difficulty.

Reply Obj. 3. A man does not expose his person to dangers of death except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to fortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (*De Offic. i.*) that *fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker.*

The *Fourth* argument is granted.

Reply Obj. 5. Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular favours: whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude, since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the Philosopher says (*Rhet. i. 9*) that *just and brave men are most beloved, because they are most useful in war and peace.*

QUESTION CXXIV.

OF MARTYRDOM.

(In Five Articles).

WE must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue? (2) Of what virtue is it the act? (3) Concerning the perfection of this act: (4) The pain of martyrdom: (5) Its cause.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MARTYRDOM IS AN ACT OF VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not voluntary, as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for Christ's sake, and of whom Hilary says (*Super Matth. i.*) that *they attained the ripe age of eternity through the glory of martyrdom.* Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above (Q. LXIV., A. 5), and yet martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei i.*) that *during persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is honoured in the Catholic Church with most solemn veneration.* Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, It is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court

martyrdom, rather would it seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.

On the contrary, The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (Matth. v. 10): *Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.* Therefore martyrdom is an act of virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIII., AA. 1, 3), it belongs to virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason consists in the truth as its proper object, and in justice as its proper effect, as shown above (Q. CIX., AA. 1, 2; Q. CXXIII., A. 12). And martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident that martyrdom is an act of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Some have said that in the case of the Innocents the use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they suffered martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture contains no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in being slain obtained by God's grace the glory of martyrdom which others acquire by their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for Christ's sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the case of baptized children the merit of Christ is conducive to the acquisition of glory through the baptismal grace, so in those who were slain for Christ's sake the merit of Christ's martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of the martyr's palm. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (*De Diversis* lxvi.), as though he were addressing them: *A man that does not believe that children are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being crowned in suffering for Christ. You were not old enough to believe in Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein you could endure suffering for Christ Who was to suffer.*

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine says (*loc. cit.*) that possibly the Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority thus to honour the memory of those holy women.*

* Cf. Q. LXIV., A. 1, ad 2.

Reply Obj. 3. The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now it has been stated above (Q. CVIII., A. 1, *ad 4*) that some of the precepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the preparation of the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared to do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way certain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the preparation of the mind, so that in such and such a case a man should act according to reason. And this observation would seem very much to the point in the case of martyrdom, which consists in the right endurance of sufferings unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an occasion of acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to endure it in moderation.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER MARTYRDOM IS AN ACT OF FORTITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For the Greek *μάρτυρ* signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the faith of Christ, according to Acts i. 8, *You shall be witnesses unto Me*, etc., and Maximus says in a sermon: *The mother of martyrs is the Catholic faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their blood.* Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, A praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the act avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom: Thus Maximus says in a sermon: *The charity of Christ is victorious in His martyrs.* Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of martyrdom, according to John xv. 13, *Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.* Moreover without charity martyrdom avails nothing, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 3, *If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.* Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity rather than of fortitude.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says in a sermon on S. Cyprian: *It is easy to honour a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great thing to imitate his faith and patience.* Now that which calls chiefly for praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which it is the act. Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude.

On the contrary, Cyprian says (*Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii.*): *Blessed martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors, how shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage?* Now a person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs. Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 1, seq.), it belongs to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against dangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of particular contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a sermon (*loc. cit.*): *The crowd of onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle, and Christ's servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, with souls unmoved, and strength divine.* Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for which reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs: *They became valiant in battle.**

Reply Obj. 1. Two things must be considered in the act of fortitude. One is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and this is the end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby a man does not yield to the contraries that hinder him from achieving that good, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as civic fortitude strengthens a man's mind in human justice, for the safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good

* Heb. xi. 34.

of Divine justice, which *is through faith in Christ Jesus*, according to Rom. iii. 22. Thus martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is strengthened, but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.

Reply Obj. 2. Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as its first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it, whereas fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause, being the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious, like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails not without charity.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 6), the chief act of fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act, which is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves fortitude on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that martyrs are also praised for their patience.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER MARTYRDOM IS AN ACT OF THE GREATEST PERFECTION ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not of precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not necessary for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is necessary for salvation, since the Apostle says (Rom. x. 10), *With the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation*, and it is written (1 John iii. 16), that *we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren*. Therefore martyrdom does not pertain to perfection.

Obj. 2. Further, It seems to point to greater perfection that a man give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give God his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxv.) that *obedience is*

preferable to all sacrifices. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.

Obj. 3. Further, It would seem better to do good to others than to maintain oneself in good, since the *good of the nation is better than the good of the individual*, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. i. 2*). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone, whereas he that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of teaching and guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of martyrdom.

On the contrary, Augustine (*De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi.*) prefers martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore martyrdom seems to belong to perfection in the highest degree.

I answer that, We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First, with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue proximately eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts, because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue being the end is better.

A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in this respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, since, as the Apostle says (*Col. iii. 14*), that *charity . . . is the bond of perfection*. Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of the perfection of charity: since a man's love for a thing is proved to be so much the greater, according as that which he despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all the goods of the present life man loves life itself most, and on the other hand he hates death more than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the pains of bodily torment, *from fear of which even dumb animals refrain from the greatest pleasures*, as Augustine observes (*QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 36*). And from this point of view it is

clear that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the greatest charity, according to John. xv. 13: *Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.*

Reply Obj. 1. There is no act of perfection, which is a matter of counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (*De Adult. Conjug.* xiii.) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency, through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary for salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal for the faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to martyrdom of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be understood as referring to the preparation of the mind.

Reply Obj. 2. Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (Phil. ii. 8) that He became *obedient unto death*. Hence it is evident that martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered absolutely.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers martyrdom according to the proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all other virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than all virtues.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER DEATH IS ESSENTIAL TO MARTYRDOM?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (*Epist. ad Paul. et Eustoch.*): *I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace:* and Gregory says (*Hom. iii. in Ev.*): *Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom, since even*

if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death.

Obj. 2. Further, We read of certain women as commended for despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh: wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the life of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith, as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity of the flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if she were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also Lucy said: *If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity will gain me a twofold crown.*

Obj. 3. Further, Martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs to fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as Augustine declares (*Music. vi.*). Now there are many other hardships besides death, which one may suffer for Christ's faith, namely imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in Heb. x. 34, for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.

Obj. 4. Further, Martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above (A. 2, *ad 1*; A. 3). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death. Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential to martyrdom.

On the contrary, Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that *in dying for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in living without faith.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), a martyr is so called as being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise things visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb. xi. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in order to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the

life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their kindred and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job ii. 4): *Skin for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul* (Douay,—*life*) i.e. for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.

Reply Obj. 1. The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.

Reply Obj. 2. When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it is not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a reward, as Lucy said.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CXXIII., AA. 4, 5), fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these result in death.

Reply Obj. 4. The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however, that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for Christ's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER FAITH ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF
MARTYRDOM ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For it is written (1 Pet. iv. 15, 16): *Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's things. But if as a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this name.* Now a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom to those who suffer.

Obj. 2. Further, A martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is borne to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth, otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.

Obj. 3. Further, Those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most account which are directed to the common good, since *the good of the nation is better than the good of the individual*, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. i. 2*). If, then, some other good were the cause of martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs who die for the defence of their country. Yet this is not consistent with Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of those who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. v. 10): *Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake*, which pertains to martyrdom, according to a gloss, as well as Jerome's commentary on this passage. Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice. Therefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 4), martyrs are so

called as being witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear witness to the truth; not indeed to any truth, but to the truth which is in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ: wherefore Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of faith.

But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also outward profession, which is expressed not only by words, whereby one confesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that he has faith, according to James ii. 18, *I will show thee, by works, my faith.* Hence it is written of certain people (Tit. i. 16): *They profess that they know God but in their works they deny Him.* Thus all virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are professions of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires these works of us, and rewards us for them: and in this way they can be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the martyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny the faith, but for reprovng adultery.

Reply Obj. 1. A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person is said to be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of Christ, according to Rom. viii. 9, *If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His;* and again because in imitation of Christ he is dead to sins, according to Gal. v. 24, *They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences.* Hence to suffer as a Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, which is done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all comes under the head of witnessing to the faith.

Reply Obj. 2. The truth of other sciences has no connexion with the worship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according to godliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to be the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as stated above (Q. CX., AA. 3, 4),

avoidance of a lie, to whatever truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a lie is a sin against the Divine Law.

Reply Obj. 3. The good of one's country is paramount among human goods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of martyrdom, is of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since human good may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God, it follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may be the cause of martyrdom.

QUESTION CXXV.

OF FEAR.*

(In Four Articles).

WE must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2) Fearlessness; (3) Daring.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether fear is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER FEAR IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 4: Q. XLII.) Now we are neither praised nor blamed for passions, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. Since then every sin is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a sin: since the *law of the Lord is unspotted* (Ps. xviii. 8). Yet fear is commanded in God's law, for it is written (Eph. vi. 5): *Servants, be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling.* Therefore fear is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (*De*

* S. Thomas calls this vice indifferently *fear* or *timidity*. The translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account of the connexion with the passion of fear. Otherwise *cowardice* would be a better rendering.

Fide Orthod. iii.). Now fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iii. 7*) that *a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear.* Therefore fear is not a sin. *On the contrary,* Our Lord said (Matth. x. 28): *Fear ye not them that kill the body,* and it is written (Ezech. ii. 6): *Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words.*

I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on account of its being inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, as stated above (Q. CIX., A. 2: Q. CXIV., A. 1). Now this due order requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some sought after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a good is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided. Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other hand, when the appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is neither inordinate nor sinful.

Reply Obj. 1. Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame, because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate manner.

Reply Obj. 2. The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking in the service they owe their masters.

Reply Obj. 3. Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing. Hence there is no sin in fearing them.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SIN OF FEAR IS CONTRARY TO FORTITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated above (Q. CXXIII., AA. 4, 5). But the sin of fear is not always connected with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. cxxvii. 1, *Blessed are all they that fear the Lord*, says that *it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods*. Again a gloss on Matth. xxvii. 44, *He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word*, says that *evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of contempt*. Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, The chief reason why a man is commended for fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or shame. Thus Augustine relates (*De Civ. Dei* i.) that Cato, in order not to be Cæsar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed thereto.

Obj. 3. Further, All despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q. XX., A. 1; I.-II., Q. XL., A. 4). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 7; iii. 7) states that timidity is opposed to fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XIX., A. 3; I.-II., Q. XLIII., A. 1), all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary to something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner

inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for its object, as we find proved in *Ethic.* iii. 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of death. For this reason timidity is said to be antonomastically* opposed to fortitude.

Reply Obj. 1. The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the end, as stated above (I.-II., Q. I., A. 3: Q. XVIII., A. 6): and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a good. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 7), that *to die in order to escape poverty, want, or something disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun hardships is a mark of effeminacy.*

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (I.-II., Q., XLV., A. 2), fear is the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring. Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair results from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove.

* Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of the danger of death.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER FEAR IS A MORTAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 1), fear is in the irascible faculty which is a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the sensuality, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXIV., A. 4). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God. But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges vii. 3, *Whosoever is fearful*, etc., says that *a man is fearful when he trembles at the very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart, but that he can rally and take courage.* Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a precept, but only from perfection; for a gloss on Deut. xx. 9, *What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted?* says: *We learn from this that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches.* Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and yet this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. xxi. 8, *But the fearful and unbelieving and the abominable*, etc., *shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second death.* Therefore fear is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), fear is a sin through being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be shunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of the rational appetite's consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the rational appetite which is called the will, which

deliberately shuns something against the dictate of reason: and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit what is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers fear as confined to the sensuality.

Reply Obj. 2. This gloss also can be understood as referring to the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from accomplishing what he purposed doing.

Reply Obj. 3. This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but for the perfection of a counsel. Suchlike fear is not a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance when one has a reasonable cause for fear.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER FEAR EXCUSES FROM SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is a sin, as stated above (A. 1). But sin does not excuse from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.

Obj. 2. Further, If any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.

Obj. 3. Further, All fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iii. 6*) *one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor anything that is not a result of one's own wickedness.* Therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.

On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I., Q. I., Cap. *Constat.*): *A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by heretics, has an ostensible excuse.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), fear is sinful in so far as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from sin, because suchlike fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body; and evils of the body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet one's sin would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (*Ethic. iii. 1*) says that these things that are done through fear are not

simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.

Reply Obj. 1. Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but in the point of its involuntariness.

Reply Obj. 2. Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of fear.

Reply Obj. 3. According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal goods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that temporal evils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be feared. But according to Augustine (*De Lib. Arb.* ii.) these temporal things are goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that which is good according to virtue.

QUESTION CXXVI.

OF FEARLESSNESS.

(In Two Articles).

WE must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless? (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER FEARLESSNESS IS A SIN ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is written in praise of the just man (Prov. xxviii. 1): *The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread.* Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing is so fearful as death, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iii. 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death, according to Matth. x. 28, *Fear ye not them that kill the body, etc, nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Isa. li. 12, Who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?* Therefore it is not a sin to be fearless.

Obj. 3. Further, Fear is born of love, as stated above (Q. CXXV., A. 2). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.), *the love of God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city.* Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly.

On the contrary, It is said of the unjust judge (Luke xviii. 2) that *he feared not God nor regarded man*.

I answer that, Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear whereby one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of temporal goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure, that is, to love these things not as placing his end therein, but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence it is contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never lapses entirely from this love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says (Eph. v. 29): *No man ever hated his own flesh*. Wherefore even those that slay themselves do so from love of their own flesh, which they desire to free from present stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and other temporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that he loves them* less than he ought. But that he fear none of these things cannot result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride of soul presuming on self and despising others, according to the saying of Job xli. 24, 25: *He (Vulg.,—who) was made to fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing*: and sometimes it happens through a defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 7) that the *Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing*.† It is therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of soul, or dulness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from sin if it be invincible.

* Viz., the contrary goods. One would expect *se* instead of *ea*. We should then read: For the reason that he loves himself less than he ought.

† "*A man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as is said to be the case with the Celts.*"

Reply Obj. 1. The just man is praised for being without fear that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it is written (Ecclus. i. 28): *He that is without fear cannot be justified.*

Reply Obj. 2. Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others. Hence it is written (Prov. xiv. 16): *A wise man feareth and declineth from evil.*

Reply Obj. 3. Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be feared; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. xxxiv. 16): *He that feareth the Lord shall tremble at nothing.* But temporal goods are not to be despised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER FEARLESSNESS IS OPPOSED TO FORTITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude. For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of due love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.

Obj. 3. Further, Vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* iii.) reckons fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 3), fortitude is concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Hence it belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to reason, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when he ought, and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man fears what he ought not, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by deficiency of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to fear.

Reply Obj. 1. The act of fortitude is to endure death without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the fearless man does not do.

Reply Obj. 2. Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But in respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other virtues.

Reply Obj. 3. The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude imposes the mean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its having different extremes in different respects.

QUESTION CXXVII.

OF DARING.*

(*In Two Articles*).

WE must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether daring is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER DARING IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written (Job. xxxix. 21) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi.) the godly preacher is denoted, that *he goeth forth boldly to meet armed men.*† But no vice redounds to a man's praise. Therefore it is not a sin to be daring.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 9), *one should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been counselled.* But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore daring is not sinful but praiseworthy.

Obj. 3. Further, Daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XLV., A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. But hope is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. viii. 18): *Go not on the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils.* Now

* Excessive daring or foolhardiness.

† Vulg.,—*he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men.*

no man's fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring is a sin.

I answer that, Daring, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 1: Q. LV.), is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by deficiency, and on this account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess, thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the same way daring as implying excess is accounted a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude.

Reply Obj. 2. It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 3). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.

Reply Obj. 3. Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks (*Ethic.* ii. 7; iv. 4, 5, 6). Hence the names of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially the names of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good for this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER DARING IS OPPOSED TO FORTITUDE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But presumption pertains to pride which is

opposed to humility. Therefore daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude but to justice.

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 3). Now since timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring. But there is no such vice. Therefore neither should daring be accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude.

On the contrary, The Philosopher in both the *Second* and *Third Books of Ethics* accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXVI., A. 2), it belongs to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of daring. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (Q. CXXII., A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1. Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species. Wherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same virtue as presumption which is its cause.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend on its cause, so neither does it depend on its

effect. Now the harm done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition of daring depend on this.

Reply Obj. 3. The movement of daring consists in a man taking the offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature inclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of timidity, for as the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iii. 7*), *the daring are precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is present, namely through fear.*

QUESTION CXXVIII.

OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE.

WE must now consider the parts of fortitude: first we shall consider what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each part.

ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned. For Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) assigns four parts to fortitude, namely *magnificence, confidence, patience, and perseverance*. Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are concerned about money, and *a magnificent man must needs be liberal*, as the Philosopher observes (*Ethic.* iv. 2). But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (Q. CXVII., A. 5). Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude.

Obj. 4. Further, According to Tully (*loc. cit.*) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof.

Obj. 5. Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is written (Matth. xxiv. 13): *He that shall persevere to the end he shall be saved.* Therefore perseverance should not be accounted a part of fortitude.

Obj. 6. Further, Macrobius (*De Somn. Scip. i.*) reckons seven parts of fortitude, namely *magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability.* Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, *courage, strength of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence.* Therefore it seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete.

Obj. 7. Further, Aristotle (*Ethic. iii.*) reckons five parts of fortitude. The first is *civic* fortitude, which produces brave deeds through fear of dishonour or punishment; the second is *military* fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XLVIII.), a virtue can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter.

However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what fortitude practises in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practise in the matter of certain minor hard-

ships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Q. CXXIII. AA. 3, 6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions *confidence*, of which he says (*loc. cit.*) that *with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great and honourable undertakings*. The second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect Tully mentions *magnificence*, which he describes as being *the discussion and administration, i.e., accomplishment of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind*, so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus *magnificence* is referred by the Philosopher (*Ethic. iv.*) to great expenses, and *magnanimity*, which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honours. Again, two things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this respect he mentions *patience*, which he describes as *the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit*. The other is that by the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, according to Heb. xii. 3., *That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds*. In this respect he mentions *perseverance*, which accordingly he describes as *the fixed and continued persistence in a well considered purpose*. If these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred

to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

Reply Obj. 1. Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.

Reply Obj. 2. Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (Q. XVII., A. 5; I.-II., Q. LXII., A. 3). But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself, yet under God withal.

Reply Obj. 3. To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connexion with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.

Reply Obj. 4. Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part thereof.

Reply Obj. 5. Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the Article.

Reply Obj. 6. Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by Tully, namely *confidence*, *magnificence*, *forbearance*, which he puts in the place of patience, and *firmness*, which he substitutes for perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely *magnanimity* and *security*, are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity.

For it has been stated above (I.-II., Q. XL., A. 2) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for.

A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XL., A. 4, *ad 1*). Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles.

Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions *perseverance* and *magnificence*, and with Macrobius, *magnanimity*. *Strength of will* is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that *strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be endured*—i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as *strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose*. Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says that *manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue*. Besides magnificence he mentions *ἀνδραγαθία*, i.e. manly goodness which we may render *strenuousness*. For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to *ἀνδραγαθία*, strenuousness: wherefore he says that *ἀνδραγαθία* is the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.

Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully.

Reply Obj. 7. The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude, they differ as to motive, as stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 1, *ad 2*); wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.

QUESTION CXXIX.

OF MAGNANIMITY.*

(*In Eight Articles*).

WE must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider (1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether magnanimity is about honours? (2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honours? (3) Whether it is a virtue? (4) Whether it is a special virtue? (5) Whether it is a part of fortitude? (6) Of its relation to confidence: (7) Of its relation to assurance: (8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAGNANIMITY IS ABOUT HONOURS?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not about honours. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since *magnanimity* signifies greatness of mind, and *mind* denotes the irascible part, as appears from *De Anima* iii. 42, where the Philosopher says that *in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind*, i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honour is a concupiscible

* Not in the ordinary restricted sense, but as explained by the author.

good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems that magnanimity is not about honours.

Obj. 2. Further, Since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about passions. But honour is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not about honours.

Obj. 3. Further, The nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honours, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honours.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 3) that *magnanimity is about honour and dishonour.*

I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about which it is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act.

Now an act may be called great in two ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing.

The things which come into man's use are external things, and among these honour is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated above (Q. CIII., AA. 1, 2); and because it is offered to God and to the best; and again because, in order to obtain honour even as to avoid shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely

and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about honours.

Reply Obj. 1. Good and evil absolutely considered regard the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honour, inasmuch, to wit, as honour has the aspect of something great or difficult.

Reply Obj. 2. Although honour is neither a passion nor an operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope, and mediately about honour as the object of hope: even so, we have stated (Q. CXXIII., AA. 4, 5) with regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of fear and daring.

Reply Obj. 3. Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honours so as not to care to do what is worthy of honour, this would be deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honours in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honour, yet not so as to think much of the honour accorded by man.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAGNANIMITY IS ESSENTIALLY ABOUT GREAT HONOURS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honours. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honour, as stated above (A. 1). But great and little are accidental to honour. Therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honours.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as magnanimity is about honour, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either great or little anger. Therefore

neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great honour.

Obj. 3. Further, Small honour is less aloof from great honour than is dishonour. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonour, and consequently in relation to small honours also. Therefore it is not only about great honours.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 7) that magnanimity is about great honours.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*Phys.* vii. 17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in *de Cælo* i. 116. Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 3.

Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* iv. 4).

Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to

reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of money or of honour. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely *magnificence*.

In like manner there are two virtues about honours, one about ordinary honours. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes, which are *φιλοτιμία*, i.e. love of honour, and *ἀφιλοτιμία*, i.e. without love of honour: for sometimes a man is commended for loving honour, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great honours there is *magnanimity*. Wherefore we must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is great honour, and that a magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honour.

Reply Obj. 1. Great and little are accidental to honour considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honour, for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honours.

Reply Obj. 2. In anger and other matters only that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honours which are things existing outside the soul.

Reply Obj. 3. He that makes good use of great things

is much more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks upon great honours as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honours as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot sufficiently honour virtue which deserves to be honoured by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honours, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonour, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAGNANIMITY IS A VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean but the greater extreme: because the *magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the greatest things* (*Ethic. iv. 3*). Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, He that has one virtue has them all, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXV., A. 1). But one may have a virtue without having magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 3*) that *whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous*. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, *Virtue is a good quality of the mind*, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LV., A. 4). But magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 3*) of a *magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance calm*. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, No virtue is opposed to another virtue. But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since *the magnanimous deems himself worthy of great things, and despises others*, according to *Ethic. iv. (loc. cit.)*. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Obj. 5. Further, The properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favours; secondly, he is remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony* towards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he holds to the barren things rather than to those that are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men (2 Machab. xv. 18): *Nicanor hearing of the valour of Judas' companions, and the greatness of courage (animi magnitudinem) with which they fought for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword.* Now, only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.

I answer that, The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good. Now among external human things honours take precedence of all others, as stated above (A. 1: I.-II., Q. 11, A. 2., *Obj. 3*). Therefore magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honours, is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. As the Philosopher again says (*Ethic. iv. 3*), *the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes, in so far as he tends to what is greatest, but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the mean,* because he tends to the greatest things according to reason, for he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth (*ibid.*), since his aims do not surpass his deserts.

Reply Obj. 2. The mutual connexion of the virtues does not apply to their acts, as though every one were competent to practise the acts of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man, but only to great men. On the other hand, as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition

* Cf. Q. CXIII.

thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed to practise that act if it were competent to him according to his state.

Reply Obj. 3. The movements of the body are differentiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement. Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found naturally.

Reply Obj. 4. There is in man something great which he possesses through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from God's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honour others and esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. xiv. 4): *In his sight a vile person is contemned,** which indicates

* Douay. *The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth, etc.*

the contempt of magnanimity, *but he honoureth them that fear the Lord*, which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because they proceed according to different considerations.

Reply Obj. 5. These properties in so far as they belong to a magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has received favours, this points to the fact that he takes no pleasure in accepting favours from others unless he repay them with yet greater favour; this belongs to the perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 3*), *it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle class*. In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with others: this means that he is not at home with others than his friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great and little, according as he ought, as stated above (*ad 1*). It is also said, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAGNANIMITY IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* iv. 3) that *whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous*. Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, The acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man. For it is stated in *Ethic.* iv. (*loc. cit.*) that *it belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof* (which is an act of prudence), *nor to act unjustly* (which is an act of justice), *that he is ready to do favours* (which is an act of charity), *that he gives his services readily* (which is an act of liberality), *that he is truthful* (which is an act of truthfulness), and that *he is not given to complaining* (which is an act of patience). Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Every virtue is a special ornament of the soul, according to the saying of Isaias (lxi. 10), *He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation*, and afterwards he adds, *and as a bride adorned with her jewels*. But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as stated in *Ethic.* iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 7) distinguishes it from the other virtues.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 2), it belongs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honours, as stated above (AA. 1, 2): and honour, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue.

Since, however, honour is the reward of every virtue, as

stated above (Q. CIII., A. 1, *ad* 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it regards all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. Magnanimity is not about any kind of honour, but great honour. Now, as honour is due to virtue, so great honour is due to a great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy of great honours.

Reply Obj. 2. Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence, and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savours of excellence that a man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other virtues. On the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his excellence or greatness.

Reply Obj. 3. Every virtue derives from its species a certain lustre or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in *Ethic.* iv. 3.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAGNANIMITY IS A PART OF FORTITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (*De Quat. Virtut.*): *If magnanimity, which is also called*

fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great assurance: and Tully says (*De Offic.* i.): *If a man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from deception.* Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 3) says that a magnanimous man is not *φιλοκίνδυνος*, that is, a lover of danger. But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof.

Obj. 3. Further, Magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof.

On the contrary, Macrobius (*De Somn. Scip.* i.) and Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. LXI., A. 3), a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because *a firm standing is necessary in every virtue*, according to *Ethic.* ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.

Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

Reply Obj. 1. As the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* v. 1, 3),

to lack evil is looked upon as a good, wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.

Reply Obj. 2. A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks *many* the same as *great*. This is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to danger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (*ibid.*) that the magnanimous man is not *μικροκίνδυνος*, i.e. endangering himself for small things, but *μεγαλοκίνδυνος*, i.e. endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (*De Quot. Virtut.*): *Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life.*

Reply Obj. 3. Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to withstand it is accidental, in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil, evil is of more import in this particular respect.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONFIDENCE BELONGS TO MAGNANIMITY?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in another, according to 2 Cor. iii. 4, 5, *Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.* But this seems inconsistent with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, Confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to Isa. xii. 2, *I will deal confidently and will not fear.* But to be without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, Reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is due to confidence, according to Heb. iii. 6, where it is said that we are the house of Christ, *if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the end.* Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius condivides it with magnanimity (*De Somn. Scip. i.*).

On the contrary, Tully (*De Suv. Rhet. ii.*) seems to substitute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (*ad 6*) and in the prologue to this.

I answer that, Confidence takes its name from *fides* (faith): and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence belongs to hope, according to Job xi. 18, *Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee.* Wherefore confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about something, not only on account of another's statement, but also on account of something we observe in another,

it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through observing something either in oneself—for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long; or in another, for instance, through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help from him.

Now it has been stated above (A. 1, 2 *ad*) that magnanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1. As the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 3), it belongs to the *magnanimous to need nothing*, for need is a mark of the deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds *or scarcely anything*. For it surpasses man to need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (I.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 2: Q. XL., A. 4), when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely good. But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope

causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude.

Reply Obj. 3. Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (*loc. cit.*), but as an integral part, as stated in the preceding Question.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SECURITY BELONGS TO MAGNANIMITY?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For security, as stated above (Q. CXXVIII., *ad 6*), denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, Isidore says (*Etym. x.*) that a man is said to be secure because he is without care. But this seems to be contrary to virtue, which has a care for honourable things, according to 2 Tim. ii. 15, *Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God.* Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all the virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Virtue is not its own reward. But security is accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job xi. 14, 18, *If thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand being buried thou shalt sleep secure.* Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.

On the contrary, Tully says (*De Offic.* i.) under the heading: *Magnanimity consists of two things, that it belongs to magnanimity to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune.* But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to magnanimity.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (*Rhet.* ii. 5), *fear makes a man take counsel*, because, to wit, he takes care to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.

It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of the passion (I.-II., Q. XLV., A. 2). Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair.

Reply Obj. 1. Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.

Reply Obj. 2. Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 3. There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and participation of, future happiness, as stated above (I.-II., Q. V., AA. 3, 7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's reward.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOODS OF FORTUNE CONDUCE TO MAGNANIMITY?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (*De Ira* i.: *De vita beata* xvi.): *virtue suffices for itself*. Now magnanimity makes every virtue great, as stated above (A. 4, *ad* 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, No virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says (*De Offic.* i.) under the heading: *Magnanimity consists of two things, that a great soul is commended for despising external things*. Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.

Obj. 3. Further, Tully adds (*ibid.*) that *it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man*. And Aristotle says (*Ethic.* iv. 3) that *a magnanimous man does not grieve at misfortune*. Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him. Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 3) that *goods of fortune seem to conduce to magnanimity*.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), magnanimity regards two things: honour as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. For since honour is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honour to those who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power and

friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expeditiously.

Reply Obj. 2. The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.

Reply Obj. 3. If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it. Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.

QUESTION CXXX

OF PRESUMPTION.

(In Two Articles.)

WE must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether presumption is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRESUMPTION IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle says: *Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth (Vulg.,—and stretching forth) myself to those that are before.* But it seems to savour of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic. i. 7*) *we should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish those that make us immortal: and (Met. i.) that man should pursue divine things as far as possible.* Now divine and immortal things are seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially

in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (2 Cor. iii. 5): *Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.* If then presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xxxvii. 3): *O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?* and a gloss answers: *From a creature's evil will.* Now all that comes of the root of an evil will is a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin.

I answer that, Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in general throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now it is established throughout all natural things, that every action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is vicious and sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that any one should assume to do what is above his power: and this is what is meant by presumption, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing hinders that which is above the active power of a natural thing, and yet not above the passive power of that same thing: thus the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be so changed as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavour to advance towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually advancing forward.

Reply Obj. 2. Divine and immortal things surpass man

according to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely the intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. In this respect the Philosopher says that *man ought to pursue immortal and divine things*, not that he should do what it becomes God to do, but that he should be united to Him in intellect and will.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iii. 3*), *what we can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense*. Hence since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in God's assistance.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRESUMPTION IS OPPOSED TO MAGNANIMITY
BY EXCESS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. XIV., A. 2: Q. XXI., A. 1). But the sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to magnanimity that one should deem oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, The magnanimous man looks upon external goods as little things. Now according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. iv. 3*), *on account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they deem external goods as something great*. Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by deficiency.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 7; iv. 3) that the *vain man*, i.e. a vapourer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a presumptuous man, is opposed to the *magnanimous man by excess*.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIX., A. 3, *ad.* 1), magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is becoming to us.

Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability, it can be opposed to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 2. Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If, however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary honour, as stated above (Q. CXXIX., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3. No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so far as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may err in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly, as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something that does

not make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 3*), *those who have these things without virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor are rightly called magnanimous.*

Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not simply, but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, despising and wronging others. This savours of an excess of magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca says (*De Quat. Virtut.*) that *when magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty, restless, and bent on excelling in all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of virtue.* Thus it is evident that the presumptuous man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although in appearance he surpasses him.

QUESTION CXXXI.

OF AMBITION.

(In Two Articles.)

WE must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER AMBITION IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition denotes the desire of honour. Now honour is in itself a good thing, and the greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for honour are reprov'd. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired.

Obj. 2. Further, Anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him as a reward. Now honour is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* i. 12; iv. 3; viii. 14). Therefore ambition of honour is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, That which heartens a man to do good and disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honour heartens men to do good and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 8) that *with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonour, and the brave in honour:* and Tully says (*De Tusc. Quæst.* i.) that *honour fosters the arts.* Therefore ambition is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. xiii. 5) that *charity is*

not ambitious, seeketh not her own. Now nothing is contrary to charity, except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CIII., AA. 1, 2), honour denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two things have to be considered with regard to man's honour. The first is that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honour is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point that calls for observation is that the thing in which man excels is given to him by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be pleased that others bear witness to his excellence, as this enables him to profit others.

Now the desire of honour may be inordinate in three ways. First, when a man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is to desire more than his share of honour. Secondly, when a man desires honour for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's appetite rests in honour itself, without referring it to the profit of others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honour, it is evident that it is always a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. The desire for good should be regulated according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it is sinful to desire honour in disaccord with the order of reason. Now those are reprov'd who care not for honour in accordance with reason's dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honour.

Reply Obj. 2. Honour is not the reward of virtue, as regards the virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward: since the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have nothing greater than honour whereby to reward the virtuous; which honour deceives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as stated in *Ethic.* iv. 3.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as some are heartened to do good and

disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honour, if this be desired in due measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man cares not by what means he obtains honour. Wherefore Sallust says (*Catilin.*) that *the good as well as the wicked covet honours for themselves, but the one, i.e. the good, go about it in the right way, whereas the other, i.e. the wicked, through lack of the good acts, make use of deceit and falsehood.* Yet they who, merely for the sake of honour, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iii. 8), where he says that they who do brave things for the sake of honour are not truly brave.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER AMBITION IS OPPOSED TO MAGNANIMITY BY EXCESS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above (Q. CXXX., A. 2). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by excess.

Obj. 2. Further, Magnanimity is about honours; whereas ambition seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Machab. iv. 7) that *Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood.* Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, Ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is written (Acts xxv. 27) that *Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great pomp (ambitione) . . . had entered into the hall of audience,** and (2 Para. xvi. 14) that when Asa died they *burnt spices and . . . ointments over his body with very great pomp (ambitione).* But magnanimity is not about

* *Praetorium.* The Vulgate has *auditorium*, but the meaning is the same.

outward show. Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.

On the contrary, Tully says (*De Offic.* i.) that *the more a man exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate others*. But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of magnanimity.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), ambition signifies inordinate love of honour. Now magnanimity is about honours and makes use of them in a becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered.

Reply Obj. 1. Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its end, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man attempts in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man attempts great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honour, of which it makes right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various respects.

Reply Obj. 2. Honour is due to those who are in a position of dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and accordingly inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition. For if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity, not for the sake of honour, but for the sake of a right use of a dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious but presumptuous.

Reply Obj. 3. The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of honour, wherefore in such cases honour is wont to be shown. This is signified by the words of James (ii. 2, 3): *If there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel, . . . and you . . . shall say to him: Sit thou here well*, etc. Wherefore ambition does not regard outward worship, except in so far as this is a kind of honour.

QUESTION CXXXII.

OF VAINGLORY.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether desire of glory is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is a capital vice? (5) Of its daughters.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DESIRE OF GLORY IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no one sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (Eph. v. i.): *Be ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children.* Now by seeking glory man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it is written (Isa. xliii. 6, 7): *Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth on My name, I have created him for My glory.* Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, That which incites a man to do good is apparently not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully says (*De Tusc. Quæst.* i.) that *glory inflames every man to strive his utmost:* and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works, according to Rom. ii. 7: *To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work . . . glory and honour.** Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.

* Vulg.,—*Who will render to every man according to his works, to them indeed who . . . seek glory and honour and incorruption, eternal life.*

Obj. 3. Further, Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that glory is consistent good report about a person, together with praise: and this comes to the same as what Augustine says (*Contra Maximin.* iii.), viz. that glory is, as it were, clear knowledge with praise. Now it is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to call for praise, according to *Ecclus.* xli. 15, *Take care of a good name*, and *Rom.* xii. 17, *Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of all men.* Therefore the desire of vainglory is not a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v.): *He is better advised who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful.*

I answer that, Glory signifies a certain charity, wherefore Augustine says (*Tract.* lxxxii., c., cxiv. in *Joan.*) that to be glorified is the same as to be clarified. Now clarity and comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word glory properly denotes the display of something as regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those who are far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes that somebody's good is known and approved by many, according to the saying of Sallust (*Catilin.*):* *I must not boast while I am addressing one man.*

But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few, or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good as being worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve one's own good: for it is written (*I Cor.* ii. 12): *Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may know the things that are given us from God.* Likewise it is not a sin to be willing to approve one's own good works: for it is written (*Matth.* v. 16): *Let your light shine before men.* Hence the desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin: but the desire for empty or vain glory denotes a sin: for it

* The quotation is from Livy (*Hist.*, Lib. XXII., C. 39).

is sinful to desire anything vain, according to Ps. iv. 3, *Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?*

Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something frail and perishable: secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: thirdly, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as God's honour, or the spiritual welfare of his neighbour.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says on John xiii. 13, *You call Me Master and Lord; and you say well (Tract. lviii. in Joan.): Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of pride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself, does not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not His: nor does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows.* It is therefore evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but for ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good of others, according to Matth. v. 16, *That they may see your good works, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven.*

Reply Obj. 2. That which we receive from God is not vain but true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works, and of which it is written (2 Cor. x. 17, 18): *He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God commendeth.* It is true that some are heartened to do works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (*De Civ. Dei* v.).

Reply Obj. 3. It is requisite for man's perfection that he should know himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be glorified by men, or that men may

become better by reason of the good they know to be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testimony of others' praise the good which is in him, may himself strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is praiseworthy that a man should *take care of his good name*, and that he should *provide good things in the sight of God and men* : but not that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER VAINGLORY IS OPPOSED TO MAGNANIMITY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. For, as stated above (A1), vainglory consists in glorying in things that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and perishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, Vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Q. CXXX., A. 2: Q. CXXXI., A. 2): and these differ from vainglory. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Philip. ii. 3, *Let nothing be done through contention, neither by vainglory*, says: *Some among them were given to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for the sake of vainglory.* But contention* is not opposed to magnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory.

On the contrary, Tully says (*De Offic.* i.) under the heading, *Magnanimity consists in two things: We should beware of the desire for glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a mag-*

* Cf. Q. XXXVIII.

nanimous man should ever strive to keep untrammelled. Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CIII., A. 1, ad 3), glory is an effect of honour and praise: because from the fact that a man is praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honour, as stated above (Q. CXXIX., AA. 1, 2), it follows that it also is about glory: seeing that as a man uses honour moderately, so too does he use glory in moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1. To think so much of little things as to glory in them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (*Ethic. iv.*) that honour is of little account to him. In like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for honour's sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (*Ethic. iv.*) that he cares more for truth than for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man to glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (*Ethic. iv., loc. cit.*), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding *Reply*. But if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man by way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great in his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CXXVII., A. 2, ad 2), the opposition of vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless contention, if done intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no one contends save for what he

deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 3) that the magnanimous man is not contentious, because nothing is great in his estimation.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER VAINGLORY IS A MORTAL SIN ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory precludes the eternal reward: for it is written (*Matth.* vi. 1): *Take heed, that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise you shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in heaven.* Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man appropriates to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written (*Isa.* xlii. 8): *I will not give My glory to another,* and (*1 Tim.* i. 17): *To . . . the only God be honour and glory.* Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a gloss of Augustine on *1 Thess.* ii. 4, *God, Who proveth our hearts,* says: *Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not perceive its baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to take pleasure in it, when it is given.* Chrysostom also says (*Hom.* xix. in *Matth.*) that *vainglory enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of all our inward possessions.* Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Chrysostom says* that *while other vices find their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory finds a place even in the servants of Christ.* Yet in the latter there is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin.

* *Hom.* xiii. in the *Opus Imperfectum* falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12: Q. CX., A. 4: Q. CXII., A. 2), a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be contrary to charity as regards the love of one's neighbour: yet as regards the love of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by reason of the matter about which one glories: for instance when one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe God, according to Ezech. xxviii. 2, *Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God*, and 1 Cor. iv. 7, *What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?* Or again when a man prefers to God the temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jerem. ix. 23, 24): *Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me.* Or again when a man prefers the testimony of man to God's; thus it is written in reproof of certain people (John xii. 43): *For they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God.*

In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of the one who glories, in that he refers his intention to glory as his last end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to obtain it, forbears not from doing even that which is against God. In this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* v. 14) that *this vice, namely the love of human praise, is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory more than it fears or loves God, that Our Lord said* (John v. 44): *How can you believe, who receive glory one from another, and the glory which is from God alone, you do not seek?*

If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter gloried in, nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal but a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1. No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal

life, if it be done for the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal sin. On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, desires the excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to God alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man.

Reply Obj. 3. Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not only on account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to grave sins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too self-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward goods.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER VAINGLORY IS A CAPITAL VICE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is not a capital sin. For a vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital. But vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.

Obj. 2. Further, Honour would seem to take precedence of glory, for this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honour is not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.

Obj. 3. Further, A capital vice has a certain prominence. But vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good, since human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something outside man himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi.) numbers vainglory among the seven capital vices.

I answer that, The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place vainglory among the capital vices.

Gregory, however (*Moral.* xxxi.), reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and not without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on (Q. CLII., AA. 1, 2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices, and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that are the means whereby man acquires honour, glory seems to be the most conducive to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of a man's goodness: since good is naturally loved and honoured by all. Wherefore, just as by the glory which is in God's sight man acquires honour in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of man he acquires excellence in human things. Hence on account of its close connexion with excellence, which men desire above all, it follows that it is most desirable. And since many vices arise from the inordinate desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and I.-II., Q. LXXXIV., A. 2) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices.

Reply Obj. 2. Praise and honour, as stated above (A. 2), stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory is compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man loves to be honoured and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain renown in the knowledge of others.

Reply Obj. 3. Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin, inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DAUGHTERS OF VAINGLORY ARE SUITABLY RECKONED TO BE DISOBEDIENCE, BOASTFULNESS, HYPOCRISY, CONTENTION, OBSTINACY, DISCORD, AND LOVE OF NOVELTIES ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably reckoned to be *disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity,** For according to Gregory (*Moral.* xxiii.) boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride. Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way about, as Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxi.). Therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory.

Obj. 2. Further, Contention and discord seem to be the outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with vainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of vainglory.

Obj. 3. Further, Chrysostom says (*Hom.* xix. *in Matth.*) that vainglory is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men. Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter of vainglory.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi.), who there assigns the above daughters to vainglory.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XXXIV., A. 5: Q. XXXV., A. 4: I.-II., Q. LXXXIV., AA. 3, 4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own excellence, as stated above (AA. 1, 4): and to this end a man may tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for astonishment, it is love of novelties

* *Præsumptio novitatum*, literally *presumption of novelties*.

which men are wont to wonder at most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a man strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and thus we have *obstinacy*, by which a man is too much attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have *discord*, whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as regards *speech*, and then we have *contention*, whereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly, as regards deeds, and this is *disobedience*, whereby a man refuses to carry out the command of his superiors.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CXII., AA. 1, 2), boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according to *Ethic. iv.*, is directed sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honour, and thus it is the result of vainglory.

Reply Obj. 2. Anger is not the cause of discord and contention, except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a glorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others.

Reply Obj. 3. Vainglory is reprov'd in connexion with almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory to the good of his neighbour, seeing that he does the latter for the sake of the former. But a man is not reprov'd for presuming to give alms as though this were something novel.

QUESTION CXXXIII.

OF PUSILLANIMITY.

(In Two Articles.)

WE must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin? (2) To what virtue is it opposed?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PUSILLANIMITY IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a fainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 3). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (*ibid.*) that *a fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet does not deem himself worthy of them.* Now no one is worthy of great goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says (*ibid.*), *none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honour.* Therefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently pusillanimity is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, *Pride is the beginning of all sin* (Ecclus. x. 15). But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

Obj. 4. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 3) that *he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be faint-*

hearted. Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for instance, Moses and Elias, who were worthy of the office God chose them for, which they both humbly declined (Exod. iii. 11: Jerem. i. 6). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

On the contrary, Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Coloss. iii. 21): *Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged.* Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.

I answer that, Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a natural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto. Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received from his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear, was punished by his master (Matth. xxv.; Luke xix.).

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their neighbour: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil, because he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (*Pastoral. i.*) that if *they who demur to do good to their neighbour in preaching be judged strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they might have done had they been less retiring.*

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing certain great things that are worthy of great honour, and yet through not trying to make

use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially, sometimes mortally.

Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he derives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or from external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity.

Reply Obj. 3. Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion, whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he is competent. Hence it is written (Prov. xxvi. 16): *The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences.* For nothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and having a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says (*Pastor. i.*) of Moses that *perchance he would have been proud, had he undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without misgiving: and again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the command of his Creator.*

Reply Obj. 4. Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which they were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine grace: yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness, demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PUSILLANIMITY IS OPPOSED TO MAGNANIMITY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 3*) that *the fainthearted man knows not himself: for he would desire the good things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself.* Now ignorance of self seems opposed to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence.

Obj. 2. Further, Our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who through pusillanimity refused to make use

of the money. Moreover the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv., *loc. cit.*) that the fainthearted seem to be slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of prudence, as stated above (Q. XLVII., A. 9). Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, Pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear: hence it is written (Isa. xxxv. 4): *Say to the fainthearted: Take courage and fear not.* It also seems to proceed from inordinate anger, according to Coloss. iii. 21, *Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged.* Now inordinate fear is opposed to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 4. Further, The vice that is in opposition to a particular virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the saying of Ecclus. xxxvii. 3, *O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?* Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

On the contrary, Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness and littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and little are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity.

I answer that, Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways. First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it is opposed to magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little differ in connexion with the same subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which on the part of the intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification, and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed one's ability. Thirdly, it may be considered in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from

the great things of which one is worthy. But, as stated above (Q. CXXXII., A. 2, *ad* 3), opposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective species than on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is directly opposed to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but from laziness in considering one's own ability, according to *Ethic.* iv. 3, or in accomplishing what is within one's power.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of view of its effect.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers of death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however, we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to pusillanimity.

Reply Obj. 4. According to its proper species pusillanimity is a graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good things, which is a very great evil according to *Ethic.* iv. Presumption, however, is stated to be *wicked* on account of pride whence it proceeds.

QUESTION CXXXIV.

OF MAGNIFICENCE.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether magnificence is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) What is its matter? (4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAGNIFICENCE IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXV., A. 1). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence: because the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 2) that *not every liberal man is magnificent*. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Moral virtue observes the mean, according to *Ethic.* ii. 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean, for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now *great* and *little* are opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is *equal*, as stated in *Met.* x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, No virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above (Q. CVIII., A. 2: Q. CXVII., A. 1, *Obj. 1*). Now according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 2) the *magnificent man is not*

lavish towards himself: and this is opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, According to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 4) *act is right reason about things to be made.* Now magnificence is about things to be made, as its very name denotes.* Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue.

On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But magnificence (*virtutis*) belongs to Divine power, according to Ps. lxxvii. 35: *His magnificence and His power is in the clouds.* Therefore magnificence is a virtue.

I answer that, According to *De Cælo* i. 16, *we speak of virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power,* not as regards the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence, either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as explained above (Q. CXXIX., A. 3, *ad 2*), as also (I.-II., Q. LXV., A. 1) when we were treating of the connexion of virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity (Q. CXXIX., A. 3, *ad 1*).

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but

* Magnificence = *magna facere*—i.e. to make great things.

because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable dwelling, as stated in *Ethic.* iv.

Reply Obj. 4. As the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vi. 5) *there must needs be a virtue of act*, i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAGNIFICENCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to something great, as stated above (Q. CXXIX., AA. 1, 2). Therefore it belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, Magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is written (Exod. xv. 11): *Magnificent* (Douay,—*Glorious*) *in holiness*, and (Ps. xcv. 6): *Holiness and magnificence* (Douay,—*Majesty*) *in His sanctuary*. Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 8). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others.

On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues (*Ethic.* ii. 7; iv. 2).

I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do (*facere*)

something great, as its name implies. Now *facere* may be taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly *facere* means to work something in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the kind; in a broad sense *facere* is employed to denote any action, whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand or will.

Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something great, the doing (*factio*) being understood in the strict sense, it is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness, namely that the work produced (*factum*) by the act is something great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.

If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something great, the doing (*facere*) being understood in a broad sense, it is not a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1 It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something great in the genus of that virtue, if *doing* (*facere*) be taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper to magnificence.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by making (*faciendo*), or by any kind of action, as stated in *Ethic.* iv. 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something great, direct their principal intention, not to something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue.

On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something great, *doing* (*facere*) being taken in the strict sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that *magnificence is the discussing and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind,*

discussion referring to the inward intention, and *administration* to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in external matter (*factibili*).

Reply Obj. 3. The intention of magnificence is the production of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no end of human works is so great as the honour of God: wherefore magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine honour. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 2*) that *the most commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine sacrifices*: and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect is directed to religion or holiness.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MATTER OF MAGNIFICENCE IS GREAT EXPENDITURE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (Q. CXVII., A. 2). Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.

Obj. 2. Further, *Every magnificent man is liberal* (*Ethic. iv. 2*). But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure. Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts.

Obj. 3. Further, It belongs to magnificence to produce an external work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of magnificence.

Obj. 4. Further, Only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since *the virtues do not necessarily require external fortune*,

but are sufficient for themselves, as Seneca says (*De Ira* i.: *De vita beata* xvi.). Therefore magnificence is not about great expenditure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 2) that *magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale.* Therefore it is only about great expenditure.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), it belongs to magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. *loc. cit.*) that *a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal, i.e. proportionate, expenditure.* Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CXXIX., A. 2), those virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use of money.

Reply Obj. 2. The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due

use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.

Reply Obj. 3. The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as stated in *Ethic.* iv. 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some work, for instance in order to honour someone, or in order to do something which will reflect honour on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.

Reply Obj. 4. The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (*De Prædic. Cap. Ad aliquid*).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAGNIFICENCE IS A PART OF FORTITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above (A. 3). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Fortitude is about fear and darings. But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 2*) that *the magnificent man is like the man of science*. Now science has more in common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

On the contrary, Tully (*De Inv. Rhet. ii.*) and Macrobius (*De Somn. Scip. i.*) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.

I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.

In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above (Q. LXXX.). The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one's property, which is of much less account than danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude.

Reply Obj. 1. Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as

magnanimity does, but in a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.

Reply Obj. 2. Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as to the condition of its matter: since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.

Reply Obj. 3. Magnificence directs the use of art to something great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the risk of a great loss.

QUESTION CXXXV.

OF MEANNESS.*

(In Two Articles).

WE must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether meanness is a vice? (2) Of the vice opposed to it.

FIRST ARTICLE

WHETHER MEANNESS IS A VICE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 2) that *careful reckoning is mean*. But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy, since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* iv. 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 2) that *a mean man is loth to spend money*. But this belongs to covetousness or illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the others.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii.) accounts meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. I., A. 3:

* *Parvificentia*, or doing mean things, just as *magnificentia* is doing great things.

Q. XVIII., A. 6), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean (*parvificus*) because he intends to do something little (*parvum*). Now according to the Philosopher (*Prædic. Cap. Ad aliquid*) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 4*) that *the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more magnificent result*. On the other hand, the mean man intends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 2*) that *he seeks how he may spend least*. As a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher says that *the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good of the magnificent work, for the trifle that he is unwilling to spend*. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a vice.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little things: hence meanness is a vice.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says (*Rhet. ii. 5*), *fear makes us take counsel*: wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this

is not praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure, so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic. iv. 2*) that *although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm one's neighbour, nor are they very disgraceful.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS A VICE OPPOSED TO MEANNESS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.

Obj. 2. Further, Since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated above (A. 1), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much, where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according to *Ethic. iv. 2*, and thus they have something of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.

Obj. 3. Further, Moral acts take their species from their end, as stated above (A. 1). Now those who spend excessively, do so in order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in *Ethic. iv., loc. cit.* But this belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Q. CXXXI., A. 2). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.

On the contrary stands the authority of the Philosopher who (*Ethic.* ii. 8; iv. 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices.

I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are relative terms, as stated above (A. 1). Now just as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion between his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek *βαναυσία*, so called from *βαῦνος*, because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything. It is also called *ἀπυροκαλία*, i.e. lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called *consumptio* (*waste*).

Reply Obj. 1. Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness.

Reply Obj. 2. To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work, by spending much where it behoved to spend little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work, which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far as when it behoves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.

Reply Obj. 3. Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas meanness falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being directed to the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other.

QUESTION CXXXVI.

OF PATIENCE.

(In Five Articles.)

WE must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether patience is a virtue? (2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues? (3) Whether it can be had without grace? (4) Whether it is a part of fortitude? (5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv.). Yet patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according to Isa. xlix. 10 and Apoc. vii. 16, *They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them.* Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, No virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue it is *that makes its subject good.* Yet patience is sometimes found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may amass money, according to Eccles. v. 16, *All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery and in sorrow.* Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, The fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXX., A. 1, *ad* 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. v. 22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i.): The virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us.

*I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 1), the moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. vii. 10, *The sorrow of the world worketh death*, and Ecclus. xxx. 25, *Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it*. Hence the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia ii.): *A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal mind*, i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, *lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things*. It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue.*

Reply Obj. 1. The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven. Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv.) that *patience itself will not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal*.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (De Patientia ii: v.) *properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them*. As for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil, *their patience is neither marvellous nor praiseworthy, for it*

is no patience at all: we may marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them patient.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (I.-II., Q. XI., A. 1), the very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in *Ethic.* i. 8. Now the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue; but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being overcome by sorrow.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PATIENCE IS THE GREATEST OF THE VIRTUES ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now *patience hath a perfect work* (James i. 4). Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, All the virtues are directed to the good of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written (Luke xxi. 19): *In your patience you shall possess your souls.* Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (*Hom. xxxv. in Ev.*) *patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues.* Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory (*Moral. xxii.*) and Augustine (*De Morib. Eccl. xv.*) call principal.

I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For it is virtue that *makes its subject good, and renders the latter's work good* (*Ethic. ii. 6*). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which

are effective of good, incline man more directly to good than those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.

Reply Obj. 1. Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect.

Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, that it is more perfect simply.

Reply Obj. 2. Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul.

Reply Obj. 3. Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but merely because it removes their obstacles.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO HAVE PATIENCE WITHOUT
GRACE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that it is possible to have patience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of grace; for Augustine says (*De Patientia* iii.) that *men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sinfully*. Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be truly patient.

Obj. 2. Further, Some who are not in a state of grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help of grace.

Obj. 3. Further, It is quite evident that some go through much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. lxi. 6): *From Him, i.e. from God, is my patience.*

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Patientia* iv.), *the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which gives pleasure.* The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their

own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 4, *Charity is patient.*

But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through grace, according to Rom. v. 5, *The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us.* Therefore it is clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.

Reply Obj. 1. The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.

Reply Obj. 2. The good of a social virtue* is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without the help of God's grace.† On the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. Even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXI., A. 5.

† Cf. I.-II., Q. CIX., A. 2.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PATIENCE IS A PART OF FORTITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 6), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the *Liber Sententiarum Prosperi** that *patience consists in enduring evils inflicted by others*. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 3), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance.

Obj. 3. Further, The whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.

On the contrary, Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) reckons it a part of fortitude.

I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs to patience *to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by others*, as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv. in *Ev.*). Now of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal

* The quotation is from S. Gregory (*Hom.* xxxv. in *Ev.*).

virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (*Sent.* 811).

Reply Obj. 1. It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death: whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.

Reply Obj. 2. The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering (*patiendo*) things which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible faculty.

Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of suchlike sorrows, however great they be.

Reply Obj. 3. It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts

evils on him; for Chrysostom* says on Matth. iv. 10, *Begone Satan, that it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked*: and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (*Ep. cxxxviii.*) that *the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our enemies*. But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PATIENCE IS THE SAME AS LONGANIMITY?†

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For Augustine says (*De Patientia i.*) that *we speak of patience in God, not as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked, that they may be converted*. Wherefore it is written (*Ecclus. v. 4*): *The Most High is a patient rewarder*. Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, The same thing is not contrary to two things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from patience.

Obj. 4. *On the contrary*, a gloss‡ on Rom. ii. 4, *Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and longsuffering?* says: *It seems that longanimity differs from patience,*

* Homily v. in the *Opus Imperfectum*, falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

† Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with magnanimity.

‡ Origen, *Comment in Ep. ad Rom. ii.*

because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently.

I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with magnanimity than with patience.

Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. xiii. 12, *Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul.* Hence there may be patience in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so far as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous evil.

For this reason Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) in defining patience, says that *patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit.* By saying *arduous* he refers to constancy in good; when he says *difficult* he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and by adding *continued* or *long lasting*, he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in common with patience.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *First* and *Second Objections.*

Reply Obj. 3. That which is a long way off as to place, though distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that which is a long way off in point of time:

hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us.

We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to be borne with patience.

QUESTION CXXXVII.

OF PERSEVERANCE.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether perseverance is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a part of fortitude? (3) Of its relation to constancy: (4) Whether it needs the help of grace?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PERSEVERANCE IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 7), continency is greater than perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in *Ethic.* iv. 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, *By virtue man lives aright*, according to Augustine (*De Lib. Arb.* ii. 19). Now according to the same authority (*De Persever.* i.), *no one can be said to have perseverance while living, unless he persevere until death.* Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, It is requisite of every virtue that one should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that *perseverance is the fixed and continued persistence in a well-considered purpose.* Therefore perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.

On the contrary, Andronicus* says that *perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand, and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are indifferent*. Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*Ethic. ii. 3*), *virtue is about the difficult and the good*; and so where there is a special kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the act's very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special virtue.

Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in connexion with dangers of death (which also is something difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as necessity requires.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessities of life: such are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is

* Chrysippus: in *De Affect.*

strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore suchlike perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty.

Reply Obj. 2. Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name: thus Augustine says (*Tract. in Joan. lxxix.*): *Faith is to believe without seeing.* Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it. Accordingly we must reply that the term *perseverance* is sometimes used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and the magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are, however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance.

Reply Obj. 3. Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end, belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a *quality difficult to change*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PERSEVERANCE IS A PART OF FORTITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic. viii. 7*), *perseverance is about pains of touch*. But these belong to temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Persev. i.*) that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (*De Inv. Rhet. ii.*) reckons perseverance as a part of fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 2: I.-II., Q. LXI., AA. 3, 4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it practises it in connexion with its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment.

In accordance with this it has been stated (Q. CXXIII., A. 2) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends not only on the matter,* but also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising from length of time.

Reply Obj. 2. The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks (*Ethic.* vii. 4, 7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is in the irascible.

Reply Obj. 3. Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end, according to Matth. xxiv. 13, *He that shall persevere to the end, he shall he saved.* Hence it is incompatible with suchlike perseverance for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.

* Cf. Q. CXXXVI., A. 4 *ad 2.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONSTANCY PERTAINS TO PERSEVERANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q. CXXXVII., A. 5): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.

Obj. 2. Further, *Virtue is about the difficult and the good.* Now it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.

Obj. 3. Further, If constancy pertained to perseverance, it would seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (*De Somn. Scip.* i.) condivide constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance, as stated above (Q. CXXVIII., A. 6). Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.

On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to perseverance.

I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good, against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude, because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external obstacles.

Reply Obj. 1. External obstacles to persistence in good are especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as stated above (Q. CXXXVI., A. 1). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.

Reply Obj. 2. It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.

Reply Obj. 3. Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the point of their difference, as stated in the Article.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PERSEVERANCE NEEDS THE HELP OF GRACE?*

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that perseverance does not need the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Now according to Tully (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.

Obj. 2. Further, The gift of Christ's grace is greater than the harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. v. 15 *seq.* Now *before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had received*, as Augustine says (*De Correp. et Grat.* xi.). Much more therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, persevere without the help of a further grace.

Obj. 3. Further, Sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis. v. 7): *We . . . have walked through hard ways.*

* Cf. I.-II., Q. CIX., A. 10.

Now some persevere in sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Persev. i.*): *We hold that perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in Christ.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 2: A. 2, ad 3), perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated above (I.-II., Q. CIX., A. 10), when we were treating of grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to accomplish.

Reply Obj. 1. The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*De Correp. et Grat. xi.*), *it was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their constancy, have persevered in faith.*

Reply Obj. 3. Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs the help of grace for that end

QUESTION CXXXVIII.

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE.

(In Two Articles.)

WE must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Of effeminacy; (2) Of pertinacity.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER EFFEMINACY* IS OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance. For a gloss on 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10, *Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liars with mankind*, expounds the text thus: *Effeminate—i.e. erotic, subject to womanish complaints.* But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (*Ethic. vii. 7*) that *delicacy is a kind of effeminacy.* But to be delicate seems akin to intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but to temperance.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (*ibid.*) that *the man who is fond of amusement is effeminate.* Now immoderate fondness of amusement is opposed to *εὐτραπεία*, which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as stated in *Ethic. iv. 8.* Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic. vii. 7*) that *the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate.*

* *Mollities*, literally *softness*.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXXVII., AA. 1, 2), perseverance is deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is directly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be *soft* if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic. vii. 7*) that *it is no wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them.* Now it is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (*De Offic. i.*) under the heading *True magnanimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure.* Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (*loc. cit.*), properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.

Reply Obj. 1. This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared to men, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic. vii., loc. cit.*): wherefore those who are subject to womanish complaints are said to be effeminate, being womanish themselves, as it were.

Reply Obj. 2. Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures.

Now the delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Deut. xxviii. 56): *The tender and delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her foot for . . . softness* (Douay,—*niceness*). Thus delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for instance toil or the like.

Reply Obj. 3. In play two things may be considered. In the first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play is opposed to εὐτραπελία. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PERTINACITY IS OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance. For Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxi.) that pertinacity arises from vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above (Q. CXXXII., A. 2). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance.

Obj. 2. Further, If it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess: because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 9) *they rejoice when they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected.* And if it be opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as the persevering man persists in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures, the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity is over-persistence

in something. Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.

On the contrary, Tully says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that pertinacity is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is opposed to religion, as stated above (Q. XCII., A. 1). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.

I answer that, As Isidore says (*Etym.* x.) a person is said to be *pertinacious* who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious. *Pervicacious* has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients called 'vicia' what we call victory. These the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 9) calls *ισιχρογνώμονες*, that is *head-strong*, or *ιδιογνώμονες*, that is *self-opinionated*, because they abide by their opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while pertinacity is reprov'd for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for falling short of it.

Reply Obj. 1. The reason why a man is too persistent in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now it has been stated above (Q. CXXVII., A. 2, *ad* 1: Q. CXXXIII., A. 2), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on their species.

Reply Obj. 2. The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man. Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the other virtues persist against the onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is directly opposed to perseverance.

QUESTION CXXXIX.

OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE.

(In Two Articles.)

WE must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether fortitude is a gift? (2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER FORTITUDE IS A GIFT?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should not be reckoned a gift.

Obj. 2. Further, The acts of the gifts remain in heaven, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXVIII., A. 6). But the act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says (*Moral. i.*) that *fortitude encourages the fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven.* Therefore fortitude is not a gift.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ. ii.*) that *it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures of the passing show.* Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.

On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the Holy Ghost (Isa. xi. 2).

I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of

mind, as stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 2: I.-II., Q. LXI., A. 3): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 2).

Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above (I.-II., Q. LXVIII., AA. 1, 2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1. Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 2. The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way: for there they exercise acts in connexion with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil.

Reply Obj. 3. The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FOURTH BEATITUDE: 'BLESSED ARE THEY THAT HUNGER AND THIRST AFTER JUSTICE,' CORRESPONDS TO THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the fourth beatitude, *Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice*, does not correspond to the gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above (Q. XLV.). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.

Obj. 3. Further, The fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according to *Ethic. i. 8*. Now the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i.*): *Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXI., A. 2), Augustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude.

Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A. 1), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which

receive the common designation of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.

Reply Obj. 1. As Chrysostom says (*Hom. xv. in Matth.*), we may understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which is related to all virtuous deeds according to *Ethic. v. 1.* wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a gift.

Reply Obj. 2. Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as stated above (Q. XXIII., A. 8, *ad 3*: I.-II., Q. LXVIII., A. 4, *ad 3*). Hence whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.

Reply Obj. 3. There are two of the fruits which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards the enduring of evils; and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods.

QUESTION CXL.
OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE.
(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must next consider the precepts of fortitude: (1) The precepts of fortitude itself; (2) The precepts of its parts.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE ARE SUITABLY
GIVEN IN THE DIVINE LAW ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Deut. xx.). Therefore precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law also.

Obj. 2. Further, Affirmative precepts are of greater import than negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 2: I.-II., Q. LXI., A. 2). Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should have been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief precepts of the Law.

On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.

I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a view to directing the mind to God. For this reason it is written (Deut. xx. 3, 4): *Fear ye them not : because the Lord your God is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies.*

As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among them we find precepts of fortitude according to the requirements of those goods.

Reply Obj. 1. The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal, according to Augustine (*Contra Faust.* iv.). Hence in the Old Law there was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Matth. xi. 12, *The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away.* Hence Peter commands (1 Pet. v. 8, 9): *Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye, strong in faith,* as also James (iv. 7): *Resist the devil, and he will fly from you.* Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely endure temporal evils, according to Matth. x. 28, *Fear ye not them that kill the body.*

Reply Obj. 2. The law gives general directions in its precepts. But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the things to be avoided, reducible to some common good. Hence the precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CXXII., A. 1), the precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear dangers of death.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE
ARE SUITABLY GIVEN IN THE DIVINE LAW?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of the parts of fortitude are unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence, magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above (Q. CXXVIII.). Now we find precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and magnanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, Patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (*Hom. in Ev.* xxxv.). Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* i.), *as to the preparedness of the mind.*

Obj. 3. Further, Patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, as stated above (Q. CXXVIII: Q. CXXXVI., A. 4: Q. CXXXVII., A. 2). Now the precepts of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance should have been negative and not affirmative.

The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by Holy Writ.

I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man needs not only the principal

virtues, but also the secondary and annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the secondary and annexed virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness which they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity. On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them, but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of precepts of patience and perseverance.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. III., A. 2), although affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but according to place and time. Wherefore just as the affirmative precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be understood in the same way.

Reply Obj. 3. Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution; nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On the other hand, patience and perseverance are about minor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially in general, what is to be done in such cases.

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